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Abstract 
 
The handbook is aimed at providing Nordic decision-makers and their expert 
advisors with required background material for the development of an optimised, 
operational preparedness for situations where airborne radioactive matter has 
contaminated a Nordic inhabited area. The focus is on the mitigation of long-term 
problems. It should be stressed that the information given in the handbook is 
comprehensive, and many details require careful consideration well in time 
before implementation of countermeasures in a specific area. Training sessions 
are therefore recommended. The handbook describes the current relevant Nordic 
preparedness (dissemination routes) in detail, and suggests methods for 
measurement of contamination and prognoses of resultant doses, and data for 
evaluation of countermeasures and associated waste management options. A 
number of non-technical aspects of contamination in inhabited areas, and of 
countermeasures for its mitigation, are discussed, and a series of 
recommendations on the application of all the handbook data in a holistic 
countermeasure strategy are given. A part of the handbook development has 
been a dialogue with end-user representatives in each of the Nordic countries, to 
focus the work of the specific needs of the users. 
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Abstract:  
 
The handbook is aimed at providing Nordic decision-makers and their expert advisors with required 
background material for the development of an optimised, operational preparedness for situations 
where airborne radioactive matter has contaminated a Nordic inhabited area.  The focus is on the 
mitigation of long-term problems.  It should be stressed that the information given in the handbook 
is comprehensive, and many details require careful consideration well in time before 
implementation of countermeasures in a specific area.   Training sessions are therefore 
recommended.  The handbook describes the current relevant Nordic preparedness (dissemination 
routes) in detail, and suggests methods for measurement of contamination and prognoses of 
resultant doses, and data for evaluation of countermeasures and associated waste management 
options.  A number of non-technical aspects of contamination in inhabited areas, and of 
countermeasures for its mitigation, are discussed, and a series of recommendations on the 
application of all the handbook data in a holistic countermeasure strategy are given.  A part of the 
handbook development has been a dialogue with end-user representatives in each of the Nordic 
countries, to focus the work of the specific needs of the users.  
 
 
Keywords: Radiation dose, radiocaesium, urban, inhabited areas, preparedness, decontamination, 
countermeasures, nuclear emergency, cost-benefit analysis, nuclear power plant, accident, dirty 
bomb, decision-making, waste management, kitchen garden.  
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Short summary: 
 
In the event of a serious nuclear emergency affecting inhabited areas, it is essential to have state-of-
the-art information on how to deal with the contamination situation available as early as possible, so 
that countermeasures can be initiated as early as possible.  Equally importantly, such information 
would contribute to make it possible to avoid wrong decisions, which could have irreversible 
unnecessary adverse effects.  The scope of the present handbook is to support responsible decision-
makers and their expert advisors in making the right decisions to mitigate the long-term problems 
associated with an airborne contamination of inhabited areas.   
 
The handbook starts with an introduction explaining the general scope and structure of the 
handbook.  The second chapter gives suggestions regarding the establishment of a strategy for 
measurements and mapping.  It suggests methods for prioritisation in situations where timing and 
resources can place constraints on the scale of countermeasure implementation.  It also describes a 
general methodology to obtain the data that are necessary to evaluate the situation and introduce the 
right countermeasures.  Out of a large number of previously suggested countermeasures, a total of 
17 methods have been selected for reduction of long-term external doses (Chapter 3).  These cover 
the 6 different important types of surfaces in an inhabited environment: open (grassed) soil areas, 
paved areas (streets), house walls, house roofs, vegetation (trees, shrubs, bushes), and indoor 
surfaces.  Each countermeasure has been described in a standardised format facilitating 
intercomparison of method features (Appendix A).  Apart from a short general explanation of the 
method, the primary method data reported in the standard templates relate to requirements, 
effectiveness, waste and constraints.  Non-technical factors (e.g., legal, social, information-related) 
to be considered and management schemes for wastes produced by countermeasures are often of a 
general nature and not suitable for discussion in a stringent datasheet format.  These have therefore 
been addressed separately in Chapters 6 and 7.  It is important that any waste problems are 
considered in connection with the choice of countermeasure strategy, as the waste production is a 
direct implication of the countermeasure selection.  Although the primary focus is on emergencies 
involving major nuclear power plant accidents, also the implications of some ‘plausible’ types of 
malicious radioactivity dispersion devices are discussed.  The fourth chapter demonstrates a simple 
methodology for calculation of the various dose contributions that would be received by inhabitants 
of an area contaminated by radionuclides from a nuclear power plant accident or a so-called ‘dirty 
bomb’ dispersion device.  This type of data is an essential requirement in the decision-making 
process.  This dose assessment chapter specifically excludes consumption doses, as food products 
are mostly produced outside the inhabited areas.  However, it is recognised that some food products 
may be produced in inhabited areas, in small kitchen garden lots.  The doses that these products 
could result in, as well as countermeasures for their reduction, are discussed separately in Chapter 5, 
with specific kitchen garden countermeasure descriptions in Appendix B.  In Chapter 8, the 
application of the content of the handbook is discussed in relation to the process of countermeasure 
strategy formation.  For reference, Appendix C presents the current organisation of the relevant 
emergency management in the Nordic countries.  This is of value, for instance in ensuring correct 
dissemination of knowledge at different information levels and to foster mutual understanding 
within Nordic countries.   
 
 4 
Preface: 
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In 2006-2007, a prototype version of the handbook was presented to end-user fora in each of the 
Nordic countries, and its contents were discussed in a step towards better addressing the specific 
requirements of end-users.  This process comprised an exercise aimed at securing that the 
applicability of the various parts of the handbook was considered by the Nordic end-user 
representatives.  The present version of the handbook is the result of a revision process in the light 
of the end-user viewpoints.  The end-user participants in the interaction process are listed in the text 
below: 
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End-user participants in the URBHAND interaction process: 
 
Sweden: 
1. Statens strålskyddsinstitut 
Swedish Radiation Protection Authority 
SE-171 16 Stockholm. 
2. Statens Räddningsverk 
Avdelningen för stöd till räddningsinsatser  
Enheten för beredskap mot farliga ämnen  
SE-651 80 Karlstad . 
3. Statens Jordbruksverk 
Marknads avd. Beredskapsenheten 
SE-551 82 Jönköping. 
4. Statens Livsmedelsverket,   
Box 622,  
SE-751 26 Uppsala.  
5. Krisberedskapsmyndigheten 
Swedish Emergency Management Agency 
Box 599 
SE-101 31, Stockholm. 
 
 
 
Denmark: 
 
1. National Institute of Radiation Hygiene (SIS)  
Knapholm 7 
DK-2730 Herlev 
2. Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) 
Nuclear Preparedness 
Datavej 16 
DK-3460 Birkerød 
3. Danish Veterinary and Food Administration 
Division for Chemical Food Safety and Veterinary 
Medical Products 
Mørkhøj Bygade 19 
DK-2860 Søborg 
4. The Danish Fire Brigades (facilitated through DEMA) 
DK-1553 Copenhagen-V 
 
Finland: 
 
The Finnish end-user representatives were all from 
STUK, as this is in all aspects the central authority that 
would be the key end-user. 
 
The experts involved in the end-user group are: 
Hannele Aaltonen 
Riita Hänninen 
Kyllikki Aakko 
Tarja Ikäheimonen 
Kari Sinkko 
Juhani Lahtinen 
Eila Kostiainen 
Norway: 
 
In Norway, the leading organisation responsible for the 
nuclear and radiological preparedness is NRPA.  They are 
thus the key end-user in Norway, and will decide on 
distribution of information to other actors of relevance to 
contaminating incidents.  Therefore, the Norwegian end-
user representatives were the personnel within NRPA, 
who are in charge of such matters. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
This introductory section is aimed at providing a general overview of the handbook, its scope, 
features and structure.  It also gives generic recommendations on how the handbook should be 
used, and how this handbook and the European EURANOS handbook, which was created in 
parallel, are complementary to each other and can be used together by the Nordic end-users.  
 
 
1.1  Scope, context and audience 
 
The Chernobyl accident tragically revealed that large accidents at nuclear power plants may lead to 
significant contamination of vast land territories, including urban areas.  As efforts to identify 
suitable countermeasures for such accidents had in the past focused on agricultural production, it 
became apparent that there was a need for new work to test and analyse countermeasures that would 
be applicable to reduce doses to inhabitants of urban areas.  A series of experimental programmes 
were conducted to address this need (Roed et al., 1996; Andersson & Roed, 2006).  At the same 
time efforts were made to improve the understanding of urban radioecology in general, and 
processes governing the doses that would be received in inhabited areas of different characteristics 
(e.g., population densities) were scrutinised (Andersson et al., 2002).  The Chernobyl accident 
further provided a unique opportunity to examine the various responses of affected persons and 
impacts on society of a major emergency situation (Howard et al., 2005).   Knowledge of this type 
is essential in emergency decision-making, to address requirements for information and dialogue 
and evaluate the situation in a holistic perspective.   
 
This handbook aims to utilise state-of-the-art knowledge to provide a platform for decision-makers 
and their advisors (particularly radiation specialists), which can facilitate the process of selecting 
the right countermeasures to improve the situation in an inhabited area that has been contaminated 
by an airborne release of radionuclides.  The handbook deals with decision support for the 
‘recovery’ time phase when the contamination has occurred, air contaminant levels have gone down 
considerably, and the task is to improve the long-term conditions for people staying in the affected 
area.  It specifically addresses the various aspects of emergency management in relation to Nordic 
conditions (e.g., with respect to selection of potentially suitable countermeasure types, evaluation of 
risk perception and other non-technical aspects).  Whereas previously published compilations of 
countermeasures (e.g., Andersson et al., 2003, Andersson, 1996; Roed et al., 1995) have solely dealt 
with the consequences of airborne releases from nuclear power plants, this handbook goes a step 
further, in enabling the consequences of some ‘likely’ types of malicious radionuclide dispersion 
devices (‘dirty bombs’) to be assessed.   
 
The URBHAND handbook was developed in parallel with the generic European EURANOS 
handbook for inhabited areas (Brown et al., 2007).  The EURANOS handbook is in a sense 
comparatively much more comprehensive, as it is aimed at providing decision support in relation to 
all time-phases of contaminating incidents that might occur in all regions of Europe, where for 
instance traditional practice differs considerably, and environmental conditions can put different 
constraints on countermeasure application.  Acknowledging that considerable location-specific 
parameterisation and contextualisation is required to integrate the EURANOS handbook in any 
operational national emergency management system, the authors of the EURANOS handbook 
strongly recommend that its contents be ‘customised’ and as such only form the background 
material for more focused handbooks for use in specific countries or regions.   
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The URBHAND handbook is aimed at presenting information that is directly applicable in the event 
of an accident contaminating a Nordic inhabited area.  It is targeted on the specific Nordic 
conditions, which is for instance reflected in the focused selection of countermeasures and a section 
describing the structure of the emergency management organisation in the Nordic community.  This 
focusing and limitation makes the URBHAND handbook much easier to overview and handle in 
relation to a crisis situation.   Moreover, it is important to be aware that in spite of its highly generic 
approach, the EURANOS handbook has some inherent shortcomings and restrictions.  One of these 
is that due to the initial definitions of the EURANOS project, none of the dose calculations are 
suited for handling smaller scale contamination events like ‘dirty bombs’, although it is clear from 
calculations made elsewhere that consequences of ‘dirty bombs’ can be very severe and extend out 
over large inhabited areas (Andersson, 2005a).  It is clear that models that can predict the 
radiological consequences outside the immediate vicinity of the blast are crucial, both to ensure that 
the preparedness systems are adequate to handle this type of situations (training and development) 
and to enable optimised countermeasure implementation (Astrup et al., 2005; Andersson et al., 
2007).  Measurements of any kind are slow to perform in an inhabited area, where many complex 
surfaces are present, and dose rate measurements do not alone yield applicable information on 
which surfaces should be treated.  For non-gamma emitters (e.g., 90Sr) this need is even more 
pronounced, as ‘screening’ measurements could take very long time. 
 
Compared with the EURANOS handbook, the URBHAND handbook provides more refined dose 
calculations for different inhabited environments, enabling direct evaluation of averted doses by 
introducing a countermeasure on a given environmental surface.  As agricultural products would 
primarily be produced outside the inhabited areas, the primary focus is thus on the long term 
external doses.  However, it is recognised that some food products may be produced in residential 
areas, e.g., in kitchen gardens, and the inclusion of the impact of a contaminating incident on 
kitchen garden products in decision-support handbook material is a completely new implement.   
 
To maximise the applicability of the handbook for the end-user community, a ‘prototype’ version of 
the handbook was presented to a wide range of Nordic end-user representatives (see participant 
organisation list in the Preface section of this report).  These commented on the handbook in free 
format, as well as in relation to an exercise that was conducted in 2006-7 to ensure that the use of as 
many corners as possible of the handbook would be carefully considered by the end-user 
community in relation to different types of hypothetical contaminating situations.  The end-users 
welcomed the handbook and found it useful.  They also did a thorough reviewing job, giving many 
useful comments and recommendations for changes, and it is on this background that amendments 
were made, so that the present version more closely reflects the specific wishes and requests of the 
Nordic end-users.  In some cases requests made by different end-users conflicted, though rarely on 
important issues.  The amendments that were made are those that the work group found it 
reasonable to make, to deliver a product which is deemed to be as coherent, comprehensive and 
targeted as possible, considering the budget frames.  The changes made in the light of the feedback 
from the URBHAND end-user exercise comprise clearer description of scope and audience, 
improved discussion of countermeasure justification and optimisation, clearer table headings, 
guidance on how to apply standard dose calculation factors for situations involving ‘untypical’ 
dwellings, more focus on the characteristics of ‘dirty bomb’ incidents, a new section on calculation 
of doses from resuspended radionuclides, discussion of time aspects of waste handling, substantial 
revision and movement to appendices of both information on Nordic emergency management 
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structures and countermeasure datasheets, as well as an additional worked example of use of the 
handbook material..  
 
 
1.2  The handbook structure 
 
An important step in any emergency management strategy is to assess the nature and extent of the 
contamination problem, as far as possible through measurements.  The second chapter gives an 
introduction to methodologies and systems for measurement and mapping.  It outlines the many 
different roles of monitoring in connection with an emergency affecting inhabited areas, including 
those measurements that would need to be carried out to optimise decision-making and practical 
implementation of countermeasures, which is the primary objective of this handbook.  Suggestions 
are made regarding prioritisation of measurements, as time and resources may be restricted in an 
emergency situation.  The described measurement procedures outline the need for equipment to be 
used in the vital processes of securing optimal remediation. 
 
The third chapter gives detailed descriptions of countermeasures to reduce long-term external dose, 
in a standardised format which facilitates comparison of method features.  Descriptions are given of 
17 selected countermeasures that are deemed to be most suitable in general for the Nordic countries 
(the schematic descriptions are placed in Appendix A).  Compared with the EC-STRATEGY 
database (Andersson et al., 2003), the countermeasure template format has been simplified, so that 
non-technical factors to be considered (also in connection with formation of whole dose reduction 
strategies), which are often of a general nature and not suitable for discussion in a stringent 
datasheet format, have been addressed separately in Chapter 7.  This is believed to make the 
presentation easier to overview.  The database is also very simplified compared with that given in 
the EURANOS handbook (Brown et al., 2007), which contains further information on, e.g., worker 
doses, environmental impact as well as a series of tabulated data excerpts and examples, which can 
be used to facilitate comparison of method features.  The EURANOS handbook also contains a lot 
of material in the form of diagrammes and figures aimed at guiding the user through some 
important aspects of the countermeasure selection for a given scenario.  However, since the 
URBHAND selection of countermeasures deemed to be particularly useful for Nordic conditions is 
very much smaller than the suite of countermeasure descriptions in the generic European 
EURANOS handbook, such information is of much less interest in the present context.  
 
One of the essential requirements in developing an optimised countermeasure strategy is the 
evaluation of doses that can be averted.  For this purpose, it is necessary to estimate the various 
contributions to dose that would be likely to be received in inhabited environments of different 
characteristics.  A simple method facilitating these dose calculations is described in Chapter 4, with 
data tables that can be applied in uncomplicated calculations.  Although the focus is, as mentioned 
above, on the long-term external dose contributions, also other dose contributions to inhabitants of 
contaminated areas (excluding contributions from agricultural products, which would have been 
produced elsewhere) have been estimated, so that the total residual dose following the 
implementation of countermeasures can be estimated.   
 
As mentioned above, also doses from those food products that are produced inside inhabited areas 
in kitchen gardens are considered in the handbook.  Chapter 5 gives an introduction to the problem, 
and some calculations that can be used to assess the extent of its local importance.  Also some 
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additional countermeasures specifically targeted at reducing doses received from consumption of 
contaminated kitchen garden products are described here. 
 
A number of the countermeasures suggested in Chapter 3 (Appendices A and B) will generate 
waste, which must be managed in a safe way.  The handling of waste must be considered as an 
inherent part of the countermeasure optimisation process, so that costs and other problems in 
connection with the waste are not overlooked.  A series of relatively simple, but generally sufficient 
waste management strategies are described in Chapter 6, outlining important aspects to be 
considered in connection with the strategy formation. 
 
Countermeasure strategy perspectives of legal, ethical and communication-related nature are 
discussed in Chapter 7, with a view towards practical implementation issues.  The needs for 
communication and avoidance of violation of public rights are some of the key aspects.  These 
perspectives could be of great importance in securing the continued maintenance of societal 
functions.  
 
As mentioned above, the formulation of an optimised countermeasure strategy is indeed complex.  
In Chapter 8, two examples are given, pinpointing the use of the data from the handbook and the 
requirements from other, case-specific evaluations, in the identification of elements of a total cost-
benefit analysis for countermeasure optimisation.  
 
For reference, Appendix C of the handbook gives an overview of the structure of the organisation of 
the relevant emergency preparedness in the different Nordic countries for dealing with the 
consequences of radioactive contamination in inhabited areas.  It provides important information on 
the key players and their various responsibilities in the preparedness process and pinpoints 
similarities and differences between the Nordic countries.  The information given can be used to 
assess possibilities for collaboration across borders and thereby homogenise decision-making in the 
Nordic area as a whole, thus reducing the risk of making ‘contrasting’ decisions that could be 
perceived as illogical and possibly lead to disruption in society.   
 
 
1.3  Recommendations for preparation before use of the handbook 
 
It should be stressed that it is not the aim of this handbook to suggest a rigid framework for 
decision-making.  As outlined by the ICRP (1999) in their latest recommendations, the process of 
selecting the optimal protection options is by no means unambiguously determined by factors that 
can be quantified on a generic scale.  It is therefore the aim of the handbook to clarify which factors 
need to be taken into account in the decision matrix, and as far as possible provide the required data.  
However, this leaves a series of open questions, e.g., on the value that a saved unit of dose should 
be assigned, and the (positive or negative) impacts that a countermeasure might have on property 
value, productivity or the psychological well-being of a specific population affected by the 
contamination. Obviously the relative importance of such quantities would depend on the exact 
situation, and a monetary assignment of their value would reflect a political choice.  Incorporation 
of such aspects in an operational preparedness should therefore benefit from dialogue with the 
potentially affected population groups, to assess local prioritisation.  This dialogue should be 
initiated well in advance of a contaminating incident.  A countermeasure is justified only if the total 
benefits outweigh the total costs.   
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It is important that responsible planners go through the comprehensive countermeasure descriptions 
and make sure that all knowledge concerning requirements of the selected countermeasures is 
disseminated out to those organisations that would participate in the countermeasure 
implementation, to ensure that everything is in place if an emergency occurs.  The handbook also 
provides some basis material for consideration in connection with an information dissemination 
process to the public and other affected groups, which also needs consideration in the local context 
in advance of an emergency.  Further information for this purpose can be found in the generic 
European EURANOS handbook (Brown et al., 2007).  Moreover, e.g., requirements for the 
measurement strategies and waste management strategies scheduled in this handbook need 
consideration.  The handbook is thus not something that can be picked up for the first time, on the 
day that an emergency occurs.  It should be seen as a first step in a process towards the 
establishment of an optimised, operational preparedness.  The handbook aims to give 
comprehensive information, to keep the user, as far as possible, from the numerous potential pitfalls 
in emergency management for inhabited areas.  Training sessions using the handbook would be 
recommended to identify the local ‘politically’ driven decision matrix that is needed to enable 
implementation of the handbook data in an operational preparedness system.    
 
It can not be stressed strongly enough that the information given in this handbook should be made 
familiar to the Nordic end-user community (responsible preparedness organisations and advisors) 
well in advance of any emergency situation, for which it is to be used.  For instance, the 
descriptions given in Appendix C of the current organisation of emergency management in each of 
the Nordic countries could serve to pinpoint illogical differences, which may be perceived as 
conflicting, and thus, depending on the nature of an emergency, could cause severe communication 
problems / social disruption.  That appendix also outlines the key actors on various levels of the 
emergency management process and could be helpful in providing an overview of responsibilities 
for different sub-tasks specifically in relation to remediation of contaminated inhabited areas, while 
also visualising any needs for extension of the current system of inter-organisational interaction 
pathways.   
 
The second chapter of the handbook gives a generic recommendation on strategies for monitoring.  
This is also important to carefully address well in advance of an emergency, so as to apply 
resources optimally for equipment and training that will be particularly useful in an emergency 
situation, and to incorporate monitoring prioritisation aspects into an operational strategy.   This 
also highlights the role that the handbook information could have as background material in 
preparedness exercises.  By the time where countermeasures for reduction of long-term external 
doses would typically be implemented, the measurement procedures mentioned in section 3.6 would 
have been carried out, and contamination levels on the various surfaces in contaminated locations 
would have been estimated.   
 
As mentioned in section 1.1, the URBHAND handbook has been developed in parallel with the 
European EURANOS handbook (Brown et al., 2007).  As stressed in that section, the URBHAND 
handbook is in a number of ways complementary to the EURANOS handbook, and addresses some 
of the recommendations made in the EURANOS handbook in relation to customisation to match the 
specific requirements of a country or region.  Moreover, it is important to stress that potential 
Nordic users of the URBHAND handbook can benefit from the EURANOS handbook material in a 
number of ways.  For instance, the scope of the EURANOS handbook is broader, with respect to 
emergency time phases, and it contains further useful advice for generic contextualisation of data.  
The EURANOS handbook also contains a series of sections with generic background information 
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on, e.g., radiological protection principles, radionuclides and radiation hazards, which can be useful 
in building up competence for all persons participating in the decision making and related 
processes.  The radiation ‘primer’ or ‘crash course’ sections in the EURANOS handbook would be 
particularly useful to potential users of the URBHAND handbook who might have little specific 
knowledge in the field of environmental radiation and its implications.    
 
Assuming that appropriate measures have been taken to establish an operational preparedness on 
the basis of the handbook material, a first logical step of application of the handbook in an 
emergency situation is the assessment of the contamination problem (general levels), identification 
of priority areas, and assessment of the distribution of the deposited contaminants in the area 
(Chapter 2).  On the basis of these measurements, the doses that the affected population would be 
subjected to over time can be identified from the information in Chapters 4 and 5.  This latter step, 
in turn, is a requirement to identify an optimised countermeasure strategy (see Chapter 3).  Other 
requirements in this context are an identification of possible legal, social, ethical and 
communication perspectives (Chapter 7), identification of suitable countermeasure options (Chapter 
3 and Section 5.4), and identification of applicable routes of waste management (Chapter 6).  The 
implementation of the countermeasures should be carried out in accordance with the results of the 
optimisation process, and in dialogue with affected population groups.  Measurements need to 
support the practical implementation work, to ensure that it is carried out with the desired effect 
(Section 2.6).          
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2. Methodologies, systems and equipment for contamination 
measurements and mapping 
 
This chapter contains a description of methodologies, systems and equipment for contamination 
measurements and mapping after fallout of radioactivity in urban/inhabited areas. Some end-users 
with experience and knowledge in this field will find this description unnecessarily specific and 
detailed. The authors of this handbook have chosen to retain the level of details in order to comply 
with the needs of end-users without detailed knowledge of environmental monitoring and 
measurements.  The users are assumed to have some basic knowledge of detector types and their 
application (a good account of these is given by Knoll, 2002).  One of the objectives of this 
handbook is to describe methodologies for harmonized management in the Nordic countries of 
fallout situations in urban areas. In this way it will be easier for one country having a 
contamination problem to seek assistance and help from other countries.  It should also be 
mentioned that there may be some legal restrictions or requirements for measurements of certain 
areas or objects. Such legal aspects should be clarified before measurements are performed. 
 
 
2.1 Important dose pathways 
 
The main purpose of mapping and measurements of contamination and dose rates is to provide data 
to decide if countermeasures to avert doses should be carried out and the type and the priority of 
such countermeasures. Both in planning of emergency preparedness and in choosing the 
measurement strategy in a fallout situation it is important to keep in mind the main dose pathways 
that are: 
 
• External radiation from fallout: 
o Doses from outdoor activities 
o Doses indoors from fallout on roofs, walls, contamination around houses and from 
contaminated dust indoors.  
• Doses from consumption of contaminated fresh water sources. 
• Doses from consumption of locally produced food on contaminated land areas, i.e. kitchen 
garden products. 
• Doses from inhalation of airborne contaminated dust: 
o Outdoor from traffic and wind. 
o From contaminated dust indoors. 
• Doses from contamination of humans 
• Doses from handling of contaminated tools and equipment. 
 
Some of these pathways are more important than others. The strategy and priority of measurements 
and mapping should reflect this.  
  
 
 
2.2 Objectives of measurements 
 
As soon as possible after the acute phase of a fallout period after a nuclear accident or other serious 
situations causing radioactive contamination in an urban area a plan for mapping the dose rate 
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levels and contamination levels should be made and carried out. The main objectives of this work 
are: 
 
• Define areas where relocation of people is necessary. 
• Define areas where temporary evacuation of people is necessary. 
• Define areas where other countermeasures are justified. 
• Define areas where the accumulated doses, dose rates or radioactivity concentrations are 
below levels recommended for countermeasures. 
 
Further objectives of measurements and mapping are: 
 
• Make data available for calculation of doses and further decisions on interventions. 
• Provide data for planning and optimisation of countermeasures. 
• Provide data for calculation of the effects of countermeasures. 
• Personal monitoring of directly exposed persons. 
• Long time following up of doses to the population. 
 
 
2.3 Important factors in planning of measurements 
 
In planning and prioritising mapping and measurements a lot of factors must be taken into 
consideration, some are: 
 
• Localisation of the source of the contaminating accident. 
• The source term, i.e. nuclides and activity levels released in the contaminating accident. 
• Atmospheric conditions and dispersion. 
• Weather condition in the urban area, i.e. wet deposition and/or dry deposition. 
• Time of the year. 
• Information of the urban area: 
o Population and age distribution. 
o Type of settlements and buildings. 
o Location of kindergartens, schools, playgrounds, parks and recreation areas. 
o Location and types of fresh water sources. 
o Psychological factors. 
 
Some of this information may not be immediately available after the acute phase of an accident but 
all available information should be used in planning and prioritising measurements. Of special 
importance in planning and prioritising is of course: 
 
• Available instruments, numbers and types. 
• Personnel resources. 
 
It is important as far as possible to use simple methods and readily available instruments to avoid 
delays of mapping and other measurements requiring early implementation. 
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2.4 Strategy and priority of measurements 
 
 Since the main purpose of countermeasures is to avoid or reduce doses to the population the 
strategy and priority of measurements must be to localize areas where dose pathways and radiation 
concentrations make countermeasures necessary according to prevailing recommendations. The 
priority should therefore be: 
 
1. Mapping to define areas where: 
o Relocation is necessary 
o Temporary evacuation is necessary 
 
2. Measurements in areas where people still live and some kind of countermeasures and 
interventions must be decided to avert doses to the population and to minimize other 
harmful consequences of the accident to people and society. A suggested priority is given in 
Section 2.7 below.  
 
Doses to emergency response personnel should be measured by personal dosimetry. Doses to 
relocated and evacuated people should be measured if possible and calculated to evaluate the need 
for medical treatment.   
 
If the fallout requires relocation and evacuation of some areas the first priority must be to locate 
these areas and carry out these countermeasures as soon as possible.  When this has been done it is 
no immediate need to do further measurements in these areas until later but before people are 
allowed to move back. 
  
The priority should then shift to areas where people still live and introduction of countermeasures 
will reduce doses to the population. To be able to make optimal use of instrumentation and 
personnel it is important that measurements make it possible to distinguish these areas from areas 
where no immediate action is necessary.  
 
 
2.5 Methods and equipment for measurements 
 
There are several methods for rough determination of the fallout pattern and contamination levels. 
Choice of method depends on available detector systems and instrumentation and size and location 
of the contaminated area. The methods described here are: 
 
• Measurements by use of instruments mounted in aeroplanes of helicopters. 
• Measurements by use of instruments mounted in cars. 
• Reference points measurements. 
• Measurements by use of hand held instruments. 
 
In many cases fallout from nuclear accidents will contain a variety of γ-emitting nuclides. In such 
situations NaI-detector systems often do not have the necessary energy resolution to provide 
necessary spectroscopic information of the fallout. In these cases mobile germanium-detector 
instruments should be used.  
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Most radiological laboratories in the Nordic countries are equipped with stationary Ge-detector 
systems that can be used to measure the content of γ-emitting nuclides in samples taken from 
contaminated areas.  
 
Measurements to get a complete picture of the contamination levels and dose rates in urban areas 
can be very time consuming and there can also be limitations on what can be measured. In many 
situations a combination of measurements and model calculations based on some photon transport 
code will be less time consuming and give sufficient information of the situation in complex urban 
areas to decide upon necessary countermeasures.  
 
 
2.5.1 Measurements by use of instruments mounted in aeroplanes of helicopters 
 
Mapping of large areas is most effectively done by detector systems mounted in aeroplanes or 
helicopters. This type of measurements is most effective for large towns and densely populated 
areas of large sizes.  Instruments normally used are NaI-detector systems or Ge-detector systems. 
Data must be stored digitally together with data of positions for later analysis.  
 
The systems should be calibrated to provide figures for the contamination levels on the ground 
surface. From this information it will be possible to provide rough calculations of the dose rates at 
ground level. Some uncertainty in the measurements must be accepted from variation of the ground 
level compared to the flight path and shielding structures on the ground. Houses in towns and 
settlements will also introduce some uncertainty in the measurements. 
 
Guidelines and information of measurements by airborne instruments are described in ICRU (1994) 
and IAEA (1999). 
 
 
2.5.2 Measurements by use of instruments mounted in cars 
 
For towns and settlements including suburbs car mounted instrument systems will provide more 
reliable data of relevance for decision-making than aeroplane or helicopter mounted instruments. 
Measurements are then made at the ground level along roads where people live. It is then possible 
to select areas of priority for further measurements from this mapping. 
 
Car-mounted instruments can be NaI-detector systems, Ge-detector systems, ionisation-chamber 
instruments, GM-tube instruments or some combinations of these. By adjusting the car velocity and 
the data sampling time for the detector systems mean values, dose rates and spectroscopic 
information over selected distances can be obtained. Data from the instruments must be stored 
digitally together with GPS information for later analysis and use.  
 
 
 
 
2.5.3 Reference point measurements 
 
Reference point measurements refer to the method of measurements in predefined locations. The 
selection of locations should be made as a part of the emergency preparedness work. The locations 
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should be selected in such a way that they form a sufficient network of points for mapping in case 
of a fallout situation. Representative dose rate measurements require some open spaces at the 
selected locations. In this way the detector will “see” a representative radiation field in the location.  
By doing measurements in pre selected locations as a part of the emergency preparation work 
reference values in the points can be recorded. In a fallout situation repeated measurements in the 
same locations will give information of the temporal development of dose rates and contamination 
levels in the proximity. This information can be used to introduce and select proper 
countermeasures and to withdraw countermeasures.  
 
In addition to dose rate measurements all other types of measurements should also be made in 
reference points. Measurements at reference points can be: 
 
• Dose rate measurements: For mapping and evaluation of countermeasures. 
 
• Spectroscopic measurements: By portable Ge-detector systems or NaI-detector systems to 
obtain information of the radionuclides in the fallout. 
  
• Sampling of grass, soil and vegetation in the location: Laboratory analysis of these samples 
by γ-spectroscopy will provide information of the activity levels of radionuclides in the 
environment. Radiochemical analyses of samples will also provide information of activity 
levels of α- and β- emitting nuclides not accessible by γ-spectroscopy. 
 
 
2.5.4 Measurements by hand held instruments 
 
For small areas up to 1 km x 1 km mapping by hand held portable instruments can be performed. 
Instruments used for this can be dose rate meters, portable NaI-detector systems or portable Ge-
detector systems. There should be some way of storing the data together with information of the 
location of measurements. This measuring method can be used after applying airborne screening or 
car-mounted systems to obtain more detailed information of contamination levels and dose rate 
levels within specified areas.  
 
Measurements can be made in different ways to obtain necessary information of the situation: 
 
• Pre selection of locations within a specified area where measurements are to be made. For 
mapping purposes the selection of points should be of relevance for assessment of doses to 
the population in the area and for evaluation of countermeasures. Measurements can be 
made as described in Section 2.6.3 above but without available reference information.  
 
• Divide the area into tracks.  By accumulating data from measurements at selected distances 
along the tracks average values of dose rates or spectroscopic information can be obtained. 
As pointed out above the tracks should be chosen in such a way that this information could 
be used to assess doses to the population in the area and for evaluation of countermeasures. 
This method can also be used to locate radioactive sources or fragments if necessary. 
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2.6 Priority of measurements in inhabited areas, exposure pathways 
 
When further priority of measurements is evaluated dose pathways must be considered: 
1. Fresh water sources 
2. Where people live and work 
3. Foodstuffs from local gardens  
4. Tools and equipment: Equipment and remedies used in everyday life. 
 
The suggestion for priority of measurements is therefore:  
 
1. Measurements of fresh water sources. 
2. Measurements in kindergartens indoor and outdoor. 
3. Measurements in schools indoor and outdoor. 
4. Measurements inside and outside dwellings in residential areas 
5. Measurements in parks, playgrounds and recreation areas. 
6. Measurements of kitchen garden products. 
7. Measurements inside office buildings. 
8. Measurements in streets and pavements. 
9. Measurements of tools, equipment used in everyday life 
 
The arguments for this suggested priority list are given below.  
 
 
2.6.1 Fresh water sources 
 
Surface water sources used by communities are especially exposed to fallout and later runoff from 
surrounding areas. This also includes private wells. Such fresh water used for drinking or in food 
preparation is an important part of the diet. Measurements of fresh water sources for towns and 
communities and also private wells should be repeated regularly to detect contamination by runoff 
from the surrounding environment. Ground water sources are to a less extent vulnerable but should 
also be checked.  
 
The fresh water source for some cabins is runoff from the roof and surfaces collected in tanks. 
Experience from the Chernobyl accident shows that this water can be highly contaminated. Stores 
of water collected from roofs and surfaces should be emptied and washed.  
 
Exposure pathway: Intake of contaminated water. 
 
 
2.6.2 Kindergartens, schools and playgrounds 
 
The doses received by children from contamination on surfaces are generally higher than for adults 
and the health risk per unit dose is also higher. The reason for this is that organs in children are 
closer to the ground than for adults and they have a higher rate of cell division because of the 
growth process. Small children in kindergartens are especially exposed since they are often in close 
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contact with the ground. In general children and adolescents also have a long life ahead of them to 
accumulate doses and therefore have a higher probability for development of cancer diseases 
compared to elderly people. Doses accumulated during childhood and in the fertile period of life 
can also cause hereditary effects in progeny. Altogether measurements to evaluate and introduce 
countermeasures to reduce doses to children and adolescents must have a high priority. 
Many children spend many hours a day in kindergartens. Measurements should therefore be 
performed both indoor and outdoor to evaluate necessary countermeasures to reduce doses. All 
children and young people spend many hours at school and also outdoor in playgrounds. 
Measurements in these places should also be performed for protection of young people.  
 
Exposure pathways by indoor residence:  
• Gamma radiation from fallout on the ground/snow cover around the houses, dry and/or wet 
deposition. 
• Gamma radiation from fallout on the roofs from dry and/or wet deposition and on the 
ground from runoff from the roofs by precipitation.  
• Gamma radiation from contamination on the walls. 
• Inhalation of radioactive dust inside houses. 
• In some cases (dry deposition) contamination on indoor surfaces. 
 
Exposure pathways by outdoor residence: 
• Gamma radiation from fallout on the ground/snow covers, from lawns, playgrounds, sand 
boxes, schoolyards etc. 
• Gamma radiation from trees (spring, summer and autumn).  
• Inhalation of airborne radioactive dust. 
• Contaminated toys outdoor. 
• Contamination of skin and cloths from playing.  
 
 
2.6.3 Inside and outside dwellings and in recreation areas 
 
People normally spend most of their time at home after work in the afternoons and during the 
nights. Single-family houses usually have garden areas where they spend some of their time for 
recreation or tending their kitchen garden. Small children often play outdoors in this area. Semi-
detached houses, terrace-houses and also apartment buildings often have lawns surrounding the 
houses and nearby recreation areas.  
 
Doses received by children and adults in the afternoons and nights from outdoor and indoor 
activities during their spare time give a major contribution to the overall doses from fallout and 
contamination. We therefore suggest that priority should be given to measurements indoor in 
dwellings and outdoor in gardens and nearby recreation areas.  However, as explained in section 3.8 
of this chapter, also other measurements will be valuable in evaluating the consequences of the 
contamination and in optimising implementation of countermeasures. 
 
Exposure pathways: See Section 2.6.2 above 
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2.6.4 Kitchen garden products 
 
The problem of contaminated food depends on the season. Fallout in the autumn after the harvest 
period, in the winter and in the early spring will contaminate the soil. Contamination of the 
vegetables grown in this soil occurs by uptake through the roots. If the fallout occurs during the 
growth period in the late spring, in the summer or in the autumn before the harvest the products are 
usually contaminated directly from the fallout by contamination on the leaves of the plants. The 
contamination levels will then be higher then by uptake though the roots alone. 
 
Following a major nuclear power plant accident, the most important radionuclides in food products 
are likely to be 137Cs and 131I on leafy vegetables during some weeks after the fallout. It is 
recommended to avoid eating products from kitchen gardens in a fallout area before sufficient 
information of radioactivity in the garden products is known. Measurements of radioactivity in the 
products must be made in order to recommend adequate countermeasures according to prevailing 
intervention levels. It is normally not necessary to measure products from all kitchen gardens in an 
area. Based on the results of a mapping of the fallout level in an area a sufficient plan for random 
sampling and measurements of kitchen garden products can be worked out. The various local areas 
should be selected and defined with due regard to the similarities between dwellings and properties 
in the area.  
 
Exposure pathway: Intake of contaminated food.  
 
 
2.6.5 Office buildings 
 
Most people spend many hours each day at work. Doses received during working hours can 
therefore be a significant fraction of the total dose received per day from fallout.  Some 
measurements inside and outside office building should therefore be performed with priority on one 
and two story buildings. 
 
Exposure pathway: As for indoor residence given in Section 2.6.2. 
 
 
2.6.6 Streets and pavements 
 
Fallout on streets and pavements represents radiation sources for traffic and transportation activity. 
Drivers of transportation vehicles are the most exposed persons by these radiation sources. By 
precipitation a fraction of the radioactivity will be drained away into ditches or down the drainage 
system. In the winter clearing of snow from streets and pavements will concentrate the radioactivity 
along the side of the streets. Snowfall at the top of the fallout will to some extent reduce the 
radiation level because of the shielding effect of the snow.  
 
Exposure pathway:  
• Gamma radiation from fallout on the streets and pavements. 
• Inhalation of airborne dust by traffic.  
 
The most efficient way to map the radiation levels and contamination along streets and pavements 
is to use car-mounted instruments described in Section 2.6.2 above. Taking air samples by filtration 
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provide information of the content of radioactive dust in the air. Note that contamination levels on 
streets are expected to decline greatly over a period of some months, due to 'natural' processes 
(weathering, traffic). 
 
 
2.6.7 Tools and equipment used in everyday life 
 
After a fallout situation many tools and remedies used in everyday life will be contaminated. This 
will include all equipment located outside during this period and will also include all types of 
transportation vehicles parked outside. All this equipment and remedies should be cleaned before 
use. Removal of contamination from smooth surfaces by washing is quite efficient. Contamination 
measurements of tools and equipment should be given low priority and only performed if use is 
likely to give a significant dose contribution to individuals.  Special attention should be given to 
outdoor toys in playgrounds and mentioned in Section 2.7.2 above. 
 
 
2.7 Procedures for measurements 
 
The main objective, i.e. protection of the population and decision of countermeasures, should 
always be kept in mind when methods for measurements are selected. The simplest and fastest 
methods to assess the doses to the population should be used. Complicated and time-consuming 
methods should be postponed or used only if necessary to provide important information for 
decision-making. Simple methods for measurements are: 
 
• Dose rate measurements by use of dose rate instruments. 
• Contamination measurements by use of contamination monitors. 
 
If information of radioactive nuclides is necessary to assess the situation, spectroscopic 
measurements need to be performed.  This will be the case if there are several different 
radionuclides involved (e.g., after a major nuclear power plant accident).    
 
Dose rate measurements can give information of the radiation hazard at the time of the 
measurement to a person located in the exact position where the measurement is made.  They can 
thus give an indication of the local extent of an emergency, but yield no information that can be 
used to estimate doses over longer time periods, nor of which surfaces in the urban complex that 
contribute most to the dose rate and therefore should have priority in a decontamination strategy.   
 
It is in this context useful to determine the level of contamination on a reference surface in the area 
(an area with short grass is generally the most suitable reference).  Grass samples should be cut as 
closely to the ground as possible from a representative area (e.g., 1 m2), and at least 5 soil samples 
of, e.g., 50-100 cm2 should be taken in different representative locations in the same area.  These 
samples should be analysed in a gamma spectrometer.  If the grass sample contains less 
contamination per unit sampled area than does the soil sample, the contamination is likely to have 
taken place in precipitation – otherwise the area can be assumed to have been dry-contaminated.  
On this basis, an estimate of the contamination levels on other surfaces in the area can be made 
according to Table 4.5 in Chapter 4.  It should however be noted that the figures in that table are 
specific to the ca. 1 µm aerosol released from the Chernobyl accident.   
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During winter time with snow covering of the ground the contamination level can be determined by 
snow sampling and measurements by the same method as described above.  
 
Dose estimates and prognoses made with decision support tools can in general very significantly be 
improved by incorporation of measured contamination levels on the different types of surface in the 
environment.  This will often require the use of collimated germanium detectors.  Collimated 
shields, usually made of lead, can be designed for all spatial orientations (ICRU, 1994).  It is 
important that the responsible decision-makers consider potential monitoring requirements well in 
advance of a contaminating incident, so that equipment and trained operators are in place as early as 
possible. 
 
In most cases in the inhabited environment, decontamination procedures do not require very rapid 
implementation to be effective.  It is here important to consider that many potentially very useful 
countermeasures could have only very little positive, or even negative, net effect if applied wrongly.  
For instance, removal of a thin topsoil layer containing practically all the deposited contamination 
can be a very useful dose-reducing countermeasure.  However, soil contamination levels after wet 
deposition would in some cases peak a few centimetres down in the soil.   This means that the 
removal of a thin topsoil layer could imply the removal of shielding rather than contamination, and 
the countermeasure could thus result in an increase in dose rate, if the thickness of the removed 
layer is not optimised according to measurements of the contamination profile in the soil.  This 
problem was demonstrated by the very poor outcome of the effort of the Russian army in 1989 to 
decontaminate 93 settlements in the Bryansk region, which had been contaminated by the 
Chernobyl accident.   This example highlights the importance of measuring the location and level of 
the contamination prior to implementation of countermeasures. 
 
Measurements of dose rate or contamination level after countermeasure implementation would also 
be desirable to demonstrate that the desired effect has actually been obtained.       
 
Analysis of samples in a laboratory is normally a time consuming process and is often not suitable 
for fast decision-making, but may be useful for some of the decision processes that do not require 
immediate action. In some cases as for monitoring of fresh water sources and measurements of 
kitchen garden products, this is the only reliable method to assess the content of radionuclides and 
must therefore be used. Sampling of soil, grass and vegetation and analysis in laboratories can be 
used to supplement other measurements.   
 
Procedures for continuous survey of exposure of people in inhabited areas can be distinguished 
between: 
 
• Indoor measurements. 
• Outdoor measurements. 
• Personal monitoring 
• Sampling and analysis of samples 
 
 
2.7.1 Indoor measurements 
 
In general the radiation fields inside houses are caused by fallout in the environment around the 
houses and on the roofs, and in some situations inside the houses. Indoor measurements should 
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therefore be supplemented by outdoor measurements and measurements of the contamination levels 
on the roofs to assess the sources of the situation indoor.   
 
• Dose rate measurements in rooms ordinarily occupied by people during days and nights. 
Measurements in the centre of the room and in the corners for calculation of the average 
dose rate level.  
 
• Contamination measurements by smear tests of surfaces (floors and benches) to provide 
information of the concentration of radioactive dust indoor.  
 
If information of the γ-energies in the radiation field is needed, a spectroscopic measurement in the 
centre of a room in the same position as the dose rate measurement should be performed.  
 
 
2.7.2 Outdoor measurements 
 
Dose rate measurements:  
 
• Along house walls at the centre and at the corners for small houses, several measurements 
along long walls. Note that washout from the roof can give high contamination in the 
ground along the walls and at the outlet of the gutters. 
 
• In the centre and at the corners of the lawns and yards. 
 
• In kindergartens, schoolyards and playgrounds at 5 – 10 meter intervals to obtain sufficient 
information of the radiation levels. 
 
• In parks and recreation areas at 50 – 100 meter at intervals to obtain sufficient information 
of the radiation levels. 
 
Contamination measurements: 
 
• Direct measurements of surfaces in kindergartens, schoolyards and  playgrounds.  
 
• Direct measurements on the roof tiles. 
 
 
2.7.3 Personal monitoring 
 
In the early phase after a contamination has occurred, persons in strongly contaminated areas may 
have been contaminated on the body or through inhalation.  These may include emergency response 
workers, who should be equipped with personal dosimeters.  Contamination on the human body can 
in some cases give rise to significant beta and gamma doses, which will be received over a period of 
few days, unless active decontamination (e.g., thorough washing and scrubbing) is carried out early. 
Persons suspected to have received high doses should be sent to medical examination.  
 
 
 26
2.7.4 Sampling and analysis of sample 
 
In the following situations it is necessary to take samples for analysis in a laboratory: 
 
• Fresh water samples for monitoring of radionuclides in drinking water. Samples should be 
taken from fresh water sources for towns and communities and also from local wells. 
 
• Analysis of 137Cs and 131I concentrations in kitchen garden products and food products 
produced locally in urban areas. Samples should be taken for every type of products. The 
necessary number of samples of products within a specified area depends on information of 
the fallout level in that area. It is normally not necessary to measure products from every 
kitchen garden in an area.  Density of sampling points within an area should be selected to 
provide statistically significant results and a firm basis for comparison with recommended 
intervention levels.  
 
 
2.8 Training and exercises 
 
Measurements and mapping of the contamination levels and dose rate levels in an urban area often 
require a wide group of workers not necessary familiar with the use of radiation protection 
instruments and detector systems. Measurements by complicated instruments such as NaI-detector - 
and Ge-detector systems require knowledge and skill for correct use. Training sessions and 
exercises in measurements and identification of radioactive sources should therefore be organized 
regularly to establish and maintain the know-how and skill among the work force.  
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3.   Countermeasures and strategies for implementation 
 
This chapter is aimed at introducing a number of countermeasures, which are believed to be 
particularly useful for reduction of the long-term (recovery phase) radiological consequences of a 
contaminating incident.  The first section also addresses the potential benefits of introducing 
countermeasures on a ‘self-help’ basis.  The second section of the chapter gives advice on the 
application of groups of countermeasures in a remediation strategy for a given area.  Optimisation 
and justification of intervention is discussed, stressing the importance of balancing a host of more 
or less easily quantifiable factors in the optimisation process, and pinpointing practical concerns 
that may determine the timing or sequence of countermeasure introduction.  
  
 
3.1. Descriptions of individual countermeasures 
 
Countermeasure descriptions in standard formats facilitating intercomparison of methodological 
features can significantly speed up the decision making process and at the same time ensure that 
issues that could be important to consider are not overlooked in the process of optimisation.  Such 
descriptions also allow planners to assess in time whether some countermeasures would in a local 
area be more suitable or acceptable than others.  Further, the descriptions show local planners which 
equipment, consumables, skilled personnel, etc. must be available to carry out the countermeasures, 
and the local availability of these resources can thus be secured prior to an emergency.   
 
In Appendix A, descriptions are given for a total of 17 countermeasures, which are believed to be 
the most suitable options for reduction of long-term external doses in Nordic contaminated 
inhabited areas.  The selected countermeasures cover the 6 different important types of surfaces in 
an inhabited environment: open (grassed) soil areas, paved areas (streets), house walls, house roofs, 
vegetation (trees, shrubs, bushes), and indoor surfaces.  The generic URBHAND countermeasure 
template format that has been applied is a further development of that used in the EC-STRATEGY 
project (Andersson et al., 2003; Howard et al., 2005).  The descriptions are based on state-of-the-art 
knowledge from experimental work carried out to test the individual methods on various scales and 
under different conditions.  Each datasheet includes a number of references to the most important 
background information.  It should be stressed that a more comprehensive description of for 
instance additional doses received by workers and environmental impact can be found in the 
parallel EURANOS handbook (Brown et al., 2007).  It also needs to be noted that decontamination 
efficiencies stated in these datasheets (and in all other methodological descriptions published to 
date) are to a great extent based on practical experience obtained from experimental work with 
radiocaesium from the Chernobyl accident.  It is likely that for instance larger insoluble 
contaminating particles that might be produced by some types other types of incidents, particularly 
where physical fractionation rather than evaporation/condensation is the dominant aerosolisation 
process, would be easier to remove from impermeable surfaces in the environment.   
 
Some of these countermeasures (specifically denoted in ‘operator skills’ section in the individual 
datasheets) have potential to be implemented by the affected local population themselves, as a ‘self-
help’ measure.  Generally, such measures should be based on generally available and simple 
equipment and resources.  They should not require specific skills, nor expose members of the public 
to significant additional risk (e.g., from falling from heights or use of potentially dangerous 
equipment).  It is important that it is ensured that also these workers are adequately protected (as 
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outlined in the individual countermeasure datasheets) and carefully instructed/supervised, so as to 
ensure the success of the operation.  Although some simple countermeasures can be implemented 
by unskilled workers, they may have an inherent risk of irreversible failure, if not implemented 
correctly.  For instance, a method like triple digging requires much hard labour, and the extra labour 
resource is thus very useful (the extra labour resource would also be useful for measures like grass 
cutting, which must be carried out in large scale over limited time to be effective).  However, if the 
digging layer thicknesses are not optimised according to assessments (made by skilled workers) of 
the vertical contamination distribution, and care is not taken to avoid layer mixing, the result of the 
implementation could have far from optimal effect, and whatever the effect might be, it would be 
permanent, unless a very thick layer (40-50 cm deep) of topsoil is subsequently removed.  It should 
also be noted that not all persons are sufficiently physically fit to participate in the implementation 
of a method like triple digging.  In general, ‘self-help’ countermeasures can only be carried out on a 
voluntary basis.  Important points making ‘self-help’ methods attractive are that they involve the 
affected persons more directly in the effort to improve their own situation.  This gives insight on 
how exposures can in general be avoided, and provides a better feeling of control.  The knowledge 
obtained can function to avoid undue anxiety, and as the population know exactly what has been 
done in the area, the arising of myths is effectively prevented.  The response from affected 
population that have participated in ‘self-help’ countermeasures in areas of the former Soviet Union 
that were contaminated by the Chernobyl accident has generally been positive (Beresford et al., 
2001).     
 
3.2. Formation of countermeasure strategies 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, dose contributions in an inhabited area may come from numerous 
pathways.  A countermeasure strategy for a given area will thus often be constituted by several 
countermeasures targeted at reducing different dose contributions.  The basic principle that should 
always be fulfilled with respect to justification of any countermeasure strategy is that the 
advantages of intervening offset the disadvantages.  Among the justified options, the optimum 
protection option is the action which results in the maximum net-benefit.  Consequently, the 
optimum protection option is not necessarily the option that results in the lowest residual individual 
or collective dose (ICRP, 1999).  It is thus not possible to give generic recommendations for 
contamination or dose threshold levels above which countermeasures should be implemented, or 
below which countermeasures should not be recommended.  In agreement with the ICRP system of 
protection, it can be beneficial to reduce even a low dose if the associated total costs are outweighed 
by the total benefits of the action.  However, vague indications of a classification system based on 
dose limits have been suggested (IAEA, 1997).  Any rigid threshold values for intervention are 
politically determined and not the result of an optimisation process.  On the use of such values, the 
view of the ICRP (1999) is: ‘The use of predetermined specific reference levels can facilitate timely 
decisions on interventions and the effective deployment of resources; however, an improper use 
may lead to inconsistencies with the principles of justification and optimisation’.  It is thus clear 
that their consideration requires great caution. 
  
As indicated in the above paragraphs as well as in the countermeasure description datasheets, 
selecting the optimal countermeasure for a specific emergency situation is by no means an easy 
task, as countermeasure implementation can impact on society in a wide range of more or less 
foreseeable ways.  Some aspects can relatively unproblematically be quantified in for instance 
monetary terms, thereby facilitating intercomparison.  Such aspects include the use of machinery, 
consumables, transport, and worker wages, although due attention must be paid to local and 
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temporal variation.  However, as stated by the ICRP in their latest recommendations (ICRP, 1999), 
also problems like social disruption, loss of property value and loss of income due to the 
contamination situation as well as due to countermeasure implementation should be taken into 
account (see Chapter 7).  Depending on the specific scenario, there may be a wealth of such 
'indirect' factors, the importance of which is very difficult to describe.  When evaluating the 
possible implications of a countermeasure strategy, it is important always to measure these against 
the implications of doing nothing.  If nothing is done to reduce the contamination problems there 
will be an equally long (quite possibly longer) list of different types of adverse effects on society, 
both radiological and non-radiological.   
 
In the European project STRATEGY (Howard et al., 2005), a series of choice experiments were 
conducted to assess how groups of affected populations would rank various adverse effects of a 
countermeasure implementation.  Such effects could include disruption, heritage and the aesthetic 
value of a landscape.  The experiments were based on the persons' willingness to allocate money 
from a limited budget in a way they felt would maximise utility.  Although in these experiments, 
which took place in Spain and the UK, for instance the preservation of a landscape was generally 
found to rank somewhat higher than disruption, it was not possible to draw any firm conclusions 
that would be considered valid in a generic sense.  A problem with questionnaires made in ‘peace 
times’ is in general that it is difficult to imagine how far people would in reality go to eliminate a 
given threat that may possibly have the undivided attention of the media.  
 
Various approaches have been suggested to equate averted doses with a monetary value (e.g., 
Guenther & Thein, 1997; Eged et al., 2001; Hedemann Jensen & Yatsalo, 1998).  Also such values 
may vary considerably between Nordic countries and with time.  Such a value may be based on 
economical analyses, for instance relating to what is paid in other contexts to save a human life, and 
is essentially politically determined.  According to the ICRP (1990), an effective dose of 1 Sv is 
estimated to result in a probability of 5 % for the exposed person to develop fatal radiation-induced 
cancer. 
 
In addition to securing that any strategy for remediation is justified and optimised in relation to a 
wide range of aspects, it is of course essential to secure that the strategy achieves the ultimate goal 
of implementation: that the adverse health consequences of the contamination are reduced 
sufficiently to allow the affected population and society as a whole to resume their lives and 
functions in the area.  In extreme cases, contamination levels might be so high that even the most 
effective existing countermeasures would be insufficient in reducing exposure to an acceptable level 
that would permit a population to remain and function in the area, and any clean-up effort would 
thus then be in vain.  Although clean-up may, as discussed above, be justified at much lower 
exposure levels, the most important goal of intervention remains to secure that evacuation and 
removal of (parts of) a population for shorter or longer time periods can be avoided, as this can have 
immense societal repercussions, which would generally justify the use of any remedial means for 
mitigation.         
 
It must be stressed that the sequence of implementation of the different countermeasures in a 
strategy is important.  As explained in the datasheets, some countermeasures should be carried out 
before others.  For instance, a method for cleaning of walls may wash contamination down into the 
ground next to the building.  Here it may come closer to the humans living in the area than it was 
when it was still on the wall.  It is therefore important that the contaminated soil surrounding the 
building is removed afterwards, so that this extra soil contamination is also removed.   
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Finally, it should be noted that some countermeasures, such as snow removal and lawn mowing, 
need to be carried out over a short time period after the contamination, to be effective.  However, 
due consideration needs to be made of the higher doses that might be received by clean-up workers 
in an early phase, due to the possible occurrence (depending on the contaminating event) of short-
lived radionuclides.  Also, it should be stressed that some of the more complex countermeasures 
that impinge on long-term doses should not be implemented before adequate assessments (see 
Chapter 2) have secured that there will be a positive net benefit of the intervention - particularly as 
some countermeasures will have irreversible effect.  A number of countermeasures may if required 
be postponed for years and still save much dose (see the individual countermeasure descriptions for 
details). 
 
Concerning worker protection, not only extra doses that they may receive needs to be considered 
(described in section 4.6).  Also other types of risks that workers may be exposed to must be taken 
into account in the justification and optimisation of a countermeasure strategy.  Specific implements 
that may be required to protect workers include: 
 
• Shielding against highly concentrated waste (e.g., from grass cutting or road sweeping). 
• Ventilation (if indoor contaminant concentrations exceed those outdoors). 
• Limitation of worker time in particularly exposing locations. 
• Respiratory protection, protective clothing, glasses, helmets, lifelines and scaffolds where 
necessary (see countermeasure descriptions in Appendices A and B).  
• Fixation of radioactive contaminants to avoid resuspension in air and extra inhalation 
hazard. 
• Delaying of countermeasure implementation to reduce worker doses from shortlived 
radionuclides (note: some countermeasures must be implemented early to be effective). 
 
Legislative aspects of worker protection are treated in section 7.1. 
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4. Estimation of doses received in a contaminated inhabited 
area 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to present simple methodologies that can be used by decision-makers and 
their expert advisors to gain an overview of the radiological consequences of contamination in a 
residential area.  The focus is also here on the time phases, where the contamination has occurred, 
and the contaminating plume has passed.  It should be stressed that detailed models for calculation 
of many of these dose contributions are under development and will be integrated in European 
decision-support systems (ARGOS and RODOS).  These models will give the user more flexibility in 
describing the scenario in detail than can be provided in this section.  However, simple 
methodologies have the strength that they may be easier and less time-consuming to use. 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
As shown in Fig. 4.1, doses to humans in inhabited areas exposed to airborne contaminant releases 
can come from a variety of different pathways.  Contamination on outdoor and indoor surfaces will 
contribute to external dose.  An other contribution to external dose is received from contaminants 
deposited on humans (skin, clothing, hair).  Inhalation of contaminated air and consumption of food 
produced locally in contaminated inhabited areas (e.g., in kitchen gardens of living areas – see 
separate description in Chapter 5) can give important contributions to internal dose.  Food products 
imported into the inhabited area (e.g., from agricultural / industrial areas) are not considered here, 
as their level of contamination depends on the distribution of contamination in a different area.   
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1.  Some potentially significant pathways of radionuclides in a residential area. 
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In the event of a contaminating incident it is important to be able to rapidly estimate the magnitude 
of the doses people may receive.  This is valuable in judging the severity of the situation and its 
future implications.   Detailed estimates of dose contributions can form a platform for decision 
making, ensuring the identification of optimal countermeasure strategies.   
 
 
4.2. External doses from contamination on outdoor surfaces  
 
External doses from outdoor contamination will be important to consider in all contaminating 
scenarios, unless the contaminants only emit alpha radiation.  The focus is here on long-term doses, 
as these will determine the needs for remediation of outdoor surfaces.  Radiocaesium (137Cs and 
134Cs) has importance, as it is likely to govern long-term external doses after a large accident at a 
nuclear power plant.  This was illustrated by the Chernobyl accident.  Moreover, radiocaesium is 
among the key contaminants of concern in relation to malicious airborne dispersion of 
radionuclides, e.g., through the use of so-called 'dirty bombs'.  Also particularly three other 
radionuclides are considered in this context since they have had widespread use, e.g., for powering 
thermoelectric generators, have comparatively high radiotoxicity, and comparatively long half-lives 
(Sohier & Hardeman, 2005; Ferguson et al., 2003).  These are: 60Co, 192Ir, and 90Sr.  Both 137Cs, 
134Cs, 60Co and 192Ir emit beta as well as gamma radiation, but it is the gamma radiation that will 
generally dominate external doses.  90Sr differs from the other of these radionuclides in that it only 
emits beta radiation. 
 
Tables 4.1-4.4 show estimates, based on detailed calculations made with Monte Carlo models 
(Briesmeister, 1993), of integrated external gamma dose contributions (per unit contamination on 
each surface) from respectively 192Ir,  60Co, 137Cs and 134Cs on different types of surface in inhabited 
environments (Andersson, 2005).  Based on a number of independent surveys in Western Europe 
and in California (Jenkins et al., 1992; Andersson, 1996; Long et al., 2001; Kousa et al., 2002), it 
seems that the assumption that people on average spend some 15 % of their time outdoors is 
generally reasonable.  The remaining 85 % of the time would be likely to be spent practically 
evenly between the various residential floors of the building, and this was assumed in the 
calculations.  It was assumed that the contamination occurred in the form of small particles in the 
ca. 0.5-5 µm range, as was for instance observed over large areas of Europe after the Chernobyl 
accident.  If the deposited particles were larger and insoluble, the contaminant weathering processes 
on the surfaces might well be faster, and the given dose estimates would thus then be conservative.  
Note that the trees are assumed to be coniferous, shedding needles over a period of four years.  If 
the trees were deciduous, the resultant dose contributions would be limited to the first year.  The 
data in the tables can be used to obtain information on the doses that would be received over various 
time spans from a given level of contamination on a surface, if nothing is actively done to reduce 
doses.  The data thus gives a dynamic overview of the importance of cleaning a particular type of 
surface in the environment.  Four different types of housing environment are represented, to reflect 
different conditions (e.g., different sizes of open areas, heights of buildings, construction materials), 
which will affect the doses received from contaminants in the area.   It is believed that these types 
of environment together reflect a large part of the building tradition in the Nordic countries. 
 
The four environments are: 
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Area with single storey detached houses 
These single-family houses are constructed of light materials (wood, glass wool and gypsum).  The 
floor area is about 11 m by 11 m. The distance from the ground to the roof apex is 6.5 m.  The area 
of each lot is about 1000 m2.  Streets are not modelled here, as they are assumed to be far from the 
building. 
 
Area with two storey semi-detached houses (double house) 
These houses have thicker walls constructed of brick and breeze block, but also a slightly higher 
window fraction.  The land area covered by a pair of semi-detached houses is about 14 m by 16 m.  
The distance from the ground to the roof apex is 9 m.   The area of each lot is about 800 m2.  Streets 
are not modelled here, as they are assumed to be far from the building. 
 
Area with rows of two storey terrace houses 
Each house accommodates four families.  The terrace houses are in many ways similar to the semi-
detached house area, but longer.  The house-walls and window fractions are practically identical.  
The differences between the two environments in terms of dose mainly illustrate that people living 
in the middle of the long terrace house are better shielded through internal walls.  Further, the 
influence of road contamination was assumed to be negligible in the semi-detached housing 
environment, but becomes important in the terrace house environment, where relatively wide roads 
have been modelled close to the buildings.   
 
Area with multistorey blocks of flats (5 stories) 
The 5-storey urban centre block of flats has very thick outer walls (30 cm brick).  Further, the 
grassed areas are here smaller, the street areas are increasingly important, and some of the 
inhabitants are living high above the ground and most of the time get a comparatively small dose 
rate contribution from the many contaminated ground level surfaces.   
 
 
These four different environments should not only be regarded as four distinct options.  
Interpolations between the data for two or more of these environments could be made to for 
instance evaluate the situation in areas with buildings resembling one of the standard house types, 
but perhaps with slightly larger gardens, as modelled in an other of the 4 standard environments.  
For instance, the semi-detached house area is clearly much less trafficked than is the terrace house 
(row house) area.   If, however, guidelines were requested for an area of houses resembling the 
semi-detached standard house, but in a more urban type of environment with roads near the 
buildings, the impact of the roads could be evaluated from the data sheets for treatment of roads in 
the standard environment of row houses, which has many similarities.  As the garden areas would 
then become smaller, it would be necessary to diminish the dose contribution from these slightly.  
Some guidance as to the influence on dose rates of the size of open areas can be deduced from 
calculations made with the MCNP Monte Carlo photon transport code, which have shown that with 
a normal initial distribution of a 137Cs contamination, about 13 % of the dose rate in an infinitely 
large field can be ascribed to the contamination within a circular area of the soil with a radius of 
1m.  It was found that 34 % of the dose rate is due to the part of the contamination that is more than 
16m away, and 13 % comes from contaminated areas more than 64m away.   Likewise, it is 
possible to generate alternative row-house-like environments from the same two standard 
environments.   
 
In some Nordic urban areas, there are row houses in similar surroundings to those assumed in the 
terrace house standard environment, but with two or three more storeys.  Since some of the 
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inhabitants would then get to live higher above the ground, modifications would need to be made to 
the figures for the standard terrace house area to reflect an averaging over all storeys.  One obvious 
effect of putting a few more storeys on the terrace house would be that it is still practically only the 
people staying on the top floor who get a significant dose rate contribution from the contamination 
on the roof.  This means that the average (over all floors) person in the building gets a much smaller 
dose rate contribution from the roof.  The magnitude of this contribution can be assumed to be 
about the same as that for people living in the 5-storey block standard environment.  Note that as 
the calculated doses are averaged over the local population in the particular type of environment, 
some dose rate contributions to individuals in the environment may be significantly higher or lower.   
 
A more detailed description of the four environments (exact dimensions and material compositions) 
is given by Meckbach et al. (1988).  By looking at the raw data for the dose response (from 
Meckbach et al.'s presentation of the standard environments), it can be deduced that by adding a 
couple of storeys the dose rate contributions from the grassed areas, vegetation and roads to an 
average person in a terrace house environment would decrease to some three-fourths to four-fifths 
of those from the standard terrace house environment.  The dose rate contributions from walls 
would practically be unaffected.   
 
In any case, the objective of dose modelling in strategy formation is merely to obtain a sufficiently 
detailed image of the local dose rates and doses to enable a prioritising of countermeasures to be 
effected together with a rough overview of the potential health-effects of the situation in question.  
Significant local features should be identified, but it would be impracticable to consider in great 
detail the specific dose burden for the inhabitants of each single house.  
 
Table 4.1.  Integrated external gamma dose contributions from 192Ir contamination on different surfaces in the 
environment.  Integration periods range from 10 days to 70 years.  15 % of the time is assumed to be spent outdoors. 
Doses are given in Sv per 1 Bq m-2 deposited on each surface type, thus permitting scaling according to the actual level 
of contamination.  Results are shown for four different area types, with different types of buildings, ranging from single 
storey detached houses with rather thin construction to multistorey houses with thick walls. 
Area type   Surface 10  days 30 days 90 days 1 year 2 years 10 years 30 years 70 years 
Walls 6.8E-11 1.9E-10 4.3E-10 7.2E-10 7.4E-10 7.5E-10 7.5E-10 7.5E-10 
Roof 4.6E-11 1.3E-10 2.9E-10 4.8E-10 4.9E-10 4.9E-10 4.9E-10 4.9E-10 
Grass/soil 1.7E-10 4.7E-10 1.1E-09 1.8E-09 1.9E-09 1.9E-09 1.9E-09 1.9E-09 
Single 
storey 
detached 
 Trees 3.8E-11 1.0E-10 2.3E-10 3.8E-10 3.9E-10 3.9E-10 3.9E-10 3.9E-10 
Walls 1.7E-11 4.6E-11 1.1E-10 1.8E-10 1.8E-10 1.8E-10 1.8E-10 1.8E-10 
Roof 3.0E-11 8.2E-11 1.9E-10 3.1E-10 3.2E-10 3.2E-10 3.2E-10 3.2E-10 
Grass/soil 6.3E-11 1.7E-10 4.0E-10 6.7E-10 6.9E-10 6.9E-10 6.9E-10 6.9E-10 
Two storey 
semi-
detached 
 Trees 9.6E-12 2.6E-11 6.0E-11 9.6E-11 9.8E-11 9.8E-11 9.8E-11 9.8E-11 
Walls 1.3E-11 3.4E-11 7.9E-11 1.3E-10 1.4E-10 1.4E-10 1.4E-10 1.4E-10 
Roof 1.8E-11 4.8E-11 1.1E-10 1.8E-10 1.8E-10 1.8E-10 1.8E-10 1.8E-10 
Grass/soil 3.9E-11 1.1E-10 2.5E-10 4.1E-10 4.3E-10 4.3E-10 4.3E-10 4.3E-10 
Trees 8.5E-12 2.3E-11 5.3E-11 8.5E-11 8.7E-11 8.7E-11 8.7E-11 8.7E-11 
Rows of 
two storey 
terrace 
houses 
 Street 2.0E-11 5.2E-11 1.1E-10 1.5E-10 1.5E-10 1.5E-10 1.5E-10 1.5E-10 
Walls 1.0E-11 2.8E-11 6.4E-11 1.1E-10 1.1E-10 1.1E-10 1.1E-10 1.1E-10 
Roof 2.3E-13 6.3E-13 1.4E-12 2.4E-12 2.4E-12 2.4E-12 2.4E-12 2.4E-12 
Grass/soil 1.3E-11 3.7E-11 8.5E-11 1.4E-10 1.5E-10 1.5E-10 1.5E-10 1.5E-10 
Trees 3.1E-12 8.3E-12 1.9E-11 3.1E-11 3.1E-11 3.1E-11 3.1E-11 3.1E-11 
Multistorey 
blocks of 
flats  
(5 stories) 
 Street 3.7E-11 9.7E-11 2.0E-10 2.8E-10 2.8E-10 2.8E-10 2.8E-10 2.8E-10 
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Table 4.2.  Integrated external gamma dose contributions from 60Co contamination on different surfaces in the 
environment.  Integration periods range from 10 days to 70 years.  15 % of the time is assumed to be spent outdoors. 
Doses are given in Sv per 1 Bq m-2 deposited on each surface type, thus permitting scaling according to the actual level 
of contamination.  Results are shown for four different area types, with different types of buildings, ranging from single 
storey detached houses with rather thin construction to multistorey houses with thick walls. 
Area type   Surface 10  days 30 days 90 days 1 year 2 years 10 years 30 years 70 years 
Walls 2.3E-10 6.9E-10 2.0E-09 7.5E-09 1.4E-08 3.3E-08 3.6E-08 3.6E-08 
Roof 1.7E-10 4.9E-10 1.4E-09 5.1E-09 8.7E-09 1.6E-08 1.7E-08 1.7E-08 
Grass/soil 6.2E-10 1.8E-09 5.4E-09 2.0E-08 3.6E-08 8.7E-08 9.7E-08 9.7E-08 
Single 
storey 
detached 
 Trees 1.3E-10 3.9E-10 1.1E-09 3.8E-09 6.2E-09 1.0E-08 1.0E-08 1.0E-08 
Walls 8.5E-11 2.5E-10 7.5E-10 2.8E-09 5.0E-09 1.2E-08 1.3E-08 1.3E-08 
Roof 9.6E-11 2.9E-10 8.3E-10 3.0E-09 5.0E-09 9.4E-09 9.7E-09 9.7E-09 
Grass/soil 2.5E-10 7.4E-10 2.2E-09 8.1E-09 1.5E-08 3.5E-08 3.9E-08 3.9E-08 
Two storey 
semi-
detached 
 Trees 4.0E-11 1.2E-10 3.4E-10 1.2E-09 1.9E-09 3.1E-09 3.1E-09 3.1E-09 
Walls 6.0E-11 1.8E-10 5.3E-10 2.0E-09 3.5E-09 8.5E-09 9.5E-09 9.5E-09 
Roof 7.7E-11 2.3E-10 6.6E-10 2.4E-09 4.0E-09 7.5E-09 7.7E-09 7.7E-09 
Grass/soil 1.3E-10 3.9E-10 1.2E-09 4.3E-09 7.7E-09 1.9E-08 2.1E-08 2.1E-08 
Trees 3.3E-11 9.8E-11 2.8E-10 9.7E-10 1.6E-09 2.5E-09 2.5E-09 2.5E-09 
Rows of 
two storey 
terrace 
houses 
 Street 5.5E-11 1.6E-10 4.1E-10 9.3E-10 1.1E-09 1.1E-09 1.1E-09 1.1E-09 
Walls 3.4E-11 1.0E-10 3.0E-10 1.1E-09 2.0E-09 4.9E-09 5.4E-09 5.4E-09 
Roof 6.6E-12 2.0E-11 5.7E-11 2.0E-10 3.4E-10 6.4E-10 6.6E-10 6.6E-10 
Grass/soil 3.7E-11 1.1E-10 3.2E-10 1.2E-09 2.2E-09 5.2E-09 5.8E-09 5.8E-09 
Trees 9.8E-12 2.9E-11 8.4E-11 2.9E-10 4.6E-10 7.5E-10 7.5E-10 7.5E-10 
Multistorey 
blocks of 
flats  
(5 stories) 
 Street 6.9E-11 2.0E-10 5.1E-10 1.2E-09 1.4E-09 1.4E-09 1.4E-09 1.4E-09 
 
 
Table 4.3.  Integrated external gamma dose contributions from 137Cs contamination on different surfaces in the 
environment.  Integration periods range from 10 days to 70 years.  15 % of the time is assumed to be spent outdoors. 
Doses are given in Sv per 1 Bq m-2 deposited on each surface type, thus permitting scaling according to the actual level 
of contamination.  Results are shown for four different area types, with different types of buildings, ranging from single 
storey detached houses with rather thin construction to multistorey houses with thick walls.  
Area type   Surface 10  days 30 days 90 days 1 year 2 years 10 years 30 years 70 years 
Walls 9.1E-11 2.7E-10 8.1E-10 3.1E-09 5.9E-09 1.9E-08 2.6E-08 2.7E-08 
Roof 6.3E-11 1.9E-10 5.5E-10 2.0E-09 3.6E-09 8.4E-09 9.1E-09 9.1E-09 
Grass/soil 2.3E-10 6.8E-10 2.0E-09 8.0E-09 1.6E-08 6.0E-08 1.1E-07 1.2E-07 
Single 
storey 
detached 
 Trees 5.0E-11 1.5E-10 4.3E-10 1.5E-09 2.6E-09 4.8E-09 5.0E-09 5.0E-09 
Walls 2.3E-11 6.9E-11 2.0E-10 7.9E-10 1.5E-09 4.8E-09 6.7E-09 6.9E-09 
Roof 4.3E-11 1.3E-10 3.7E-10 1.4E-09 2.4E-09 5.7E-09 6.1E-09 6.1E-09 
Grass/soil 8.4E-11 2.5E-10 7.5E-10 3.0E-09 5.8E-09 2.2E-08 3.9E-08 4.4E-08 
Two storey 
semi-
detached 
 Trees 1.3E-11 4.0E-11 1.2E-10 4.1E-10 7.0E-10 1.3E-09 1.3E-09 1.3E-09 
Walls 1.8E-11 5.5E-11 1.6E-10 6.3E-10 1.2E-09 3.9E-09 5.3E-09 5.5E-09 
Roof 2.5E-11 7.6E-11 2.2E-10 8.2E-10 1.5E-09 3.4E-09 3.7E-09 3.7E-09 
Grass/soil 5.1E-11 1.5E-10 4.5E-10 1.8E-09 3.5E-09 1.3E-08 2.3E-08 2.7E-08 
Trees 1.2E-11 3.4E-11 1.0E-10 3.5E-10 6.0E-10 1.1E-09 1.1E-09 1.1E-09 
Rows of 
two storey 
terrace 
houses 
 Street 2.1E-11 6.0E-11 1.6E-10 3.7E-10 4.3E-10 4.5E-10 4.5E-10 4.5E-10 
Walls 1.2E-11 3.7E-11 1.1E-10 4.2E-10 7.9E-10 2.6E-09 3.6E-09 3.7E-09 
Roof 7.4E-13 2.2E-12 6.5E-12 2.4E-11 4.3E-11 9.8E-11 1.1E-10 1.1E-10 
Grass/soil 1.0E-11 3.0E-11 8.9E-11 3.5E-10 6.8E-10 2.6E-09 4.6E-09 5.2E-09 
Trees 3.3E-12 9.9E-12 2.9E-11 1.0E-10 1.7E-10 3.2E-10 3.3E-10 3.3E-10 
Multistorey 
blocks of 
flats  
(5 stories) 
 Street 2.8E-11 7.9E-11 2.1E-10 4.9E-10 5.7E-10 5.9E-10 5.9E-10 5.9E-10 
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Table 4.4.  Integrated external gamma dose contributions from 134Cs contamination on different surfaces in the 
environment.  Integration periods range from 10 days to 70 years.  15 % of the time is assumed to be spent outdoors. 
Doses are given in Sv per 1 Bq m-2 deposited on each surface type, thus permitting scaling according to the actual level 
of contamination.  Results are shown for four different area types, with different types of buildings, ranging from single 
storey detached houses with rather thin construction to multistorey houses with thick walls. 
Area type   Surface 10  days 30 days 90 days 1 year 2 years 10 years 30 years 70 years 
Walls 2.3E-10 6.9E-10 2.0E-09 6.9E-09 1.1E-08 1.9E-08 1.9E-08 1.9E-08 
Roof 1.6E-10 4.8E-10 1.4E-09 4.5E-09 7.1E-09 1.0E-08 1.0E-08 1.0E-08 
Grass/soil 5.9E-10 1.7E-09 5.0E-09 1.7E-08 2.9E-08 4.8E-08 4.8E-08 4.8E-08 
Single 
storey 
detached 
 Trees 1.3E-10 3.8E-10 1.1E-09 3.4E-09 5.2E-09 6.9E-09 6.9E-09 6.9E-09 
Walls 5.9E-11 1.8E-10 5.1E-10 1.8E-09 2.9E-09 4.8E-09 4.9E-09 4.9E-09 
Roof 1.1E-10 3.2E-10 9.3E-10 3.1E-09 4.8E-09 7.0E-09 7.0E-09 7.0E-09 
Grass/soil 2.2E-10 6.4E-10 1.9E-09 6.4E-09 1.1E-08 1.8E-08 1.8E-08 1.8E-08 
Two storey 
semi-
detached 
 Trees 3.5E-11 1.0E-10 2.9E-10 9.2E-10 1.4E-09 1.8E-09 1.8E-09 1.8E-09 
Walls 4.7E-11 1.4E-10 4.0E-10 1.4E-09 2.3E-09 3.8E-09 3.9E-09 3.9E-09 
Roof 6.6E-11 1.9E-10 5.5E-10 1.8E-09 2.9E-09 4.2E-09 4.2E-09 4.2E-09 
Grass/soil 1.3E-10 3.9E-10 1.1E-09 3.9E-09 6.4E-09 1.1E-08 1.1E-08 1.1E-08 
Trees 3.0E-11 8.7E-11 2.5E-10 7.9E-10 1.2E-09 1.6E-09 1.6E-09 1.6E-09 
Rows of 
two storey 
terrace 
houses 
 Street 5.4E-11 1.5E-10 3.9E-10 8.5E-10 9.6E-10 9.7E-10 9.7E-10 9.7E-10 
Walls 1.2E-11 3.6E-11 1.0E-10 3.6E-10 5.8E-10 9.8E-10 9.9E-10 9.9E-10 
Roof 1.9E-12 5.6E-12 1.6E-11 5.3E-11 8.3E-11 1.2E-10 1.2E-10 1.2E-10 
Grass/soil 2.6E-11 7.6E-11 2.2E-10 7.6E-10 1.3E-09 2.1E-09 2.1E-09 2.1E-09 
Trees 8.6E-12 2.5E-11 7.1E-11 2.3E-10 3.4E-10 4.6E-10 4.6E-10 4.6E-10 
Multistorey 
blocks of 
flats  
(5 stories) 
 Street 7.1E-11 2.0E-10 5.2E-10 1.1E-09 1.3E-09 1.3E-09 1.3E-09 1.3E-09 
 
As local initial contamination levels would often be measured on a grassed reference surface, it may 
be convenient to express initial contamination levels on other surfaces as fractions of that on the 
reference surface.  Table 4.5 shows the contamination levels of radiocaesium that were typically 
recorded on different types of outdoor surface immediately after the Chernobyl accident, relative to 
the levels deposited by respectively dry and wet deposition on short grass/soil.  Values for trees are 
given per unit of garden area covered by the trees.  Note that the dry deposition values should not be 
compared with the wet deposition values.  Precipitation is generally very efficient in washing 
contaminants out of a plume, whereby wet deposition levels generally become much higher than 
dry deposition levels, assuming the same plume and locality.  It should however be stressed that the 
factors given in Table 4.5 constitute a crude background material for evaluation of contamination 
levels on different outdoors surfaces, as various forms and intensities of precipitation would lead to 
differences in deposition, and also dry deposition to, e.g., snow covered pavings would be 
influenced by other mechanisms.  Indoor deposition is treated separately (in Section 5.3), as it can 
not be directly linked to outdoor deposition, due to the strong dependence on dwelling parameters. 
 
Table 4.5.  Relative source strengths on different types of outdoor urban surface immediately after a deposition of 137Cs 
with or without precipitation (Bq m-2 on surface per Bq m-2on grassed reference surface).  Averages over observations 
in different European countries after the Chernobyl accident.  Note that levels for trees are given per unit projected 
garden area covered by the tree. 
Surface type Rel. dry deposition Rel. wet deposition 
Short grass and soil 1.0 1.0 
Walls 0.1 0.01 
Roof 1.0 0.4 
Trees 3.0 0.1 
Street 0.4 0.5 
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Other airborne particulate contaminants of about same aerosol size would be expected to distribute 
similarly.  It is difficult to say anything in general about the aerosol sizes that would result from a 
malicious dispersion incident, as this could occur in many ways (e.g., explosion, nebulisation). 
 
The values in Table 4.5 for instance show that if a dry deposition of 1 MBq per m2 of 137Cs has been 
measured on a shortcut lawn, the 137Cs contamination level on a wall in the same area would be 
expected to be about 0.1 MBq per m2, whereas the contamination level on a tree would be 3 MBq 
per m2 soil area covered by the tree.  Table 4.6 shows estimates of the doses that would be received 
in the four environments, over different periods, from a contamination that resulted in an initial 
contamination level of 1 Bq m-2 on the (grassed) reference ground surface and relative 
contamination levels on other surfaces as given by the figures in Table 4.5.       
 
Table 4.6.  Integrated external gamma dose contributions from respectively 192Ir, 60Co, 137Cs and 134Cs contamination 
on different surfaces in the environment.  Integration periods range from 10 days to 70 years.  Doses are given in Sv 
per 1 Bq m-2 deposited on the reference surface (a cut lawn).  Results are shown for four different area types, with 
different types of buildings, ranging from single storey detached houses with rather thin construction to multistorey 
houses with thick walls. 15 % of the time is assumed to be spent outdoors. 
Nuclide Area Mode 10  days 30 days 90 days 1 year 2 years 10 years 30 years 70 years 
WET 2.0E-10 5.3E-10 1.2E-09 2.1E-09 2.1E-09 2.1E-09 2.1E-09 2.1E-09 Single 
storey DRY 3.4E-10 9.2E-10 2.1E-09 3.5E-09 3.6E-09 3.6E-09 3.6E-09 3.6E-09 
WET 7.6E-11 2.1E-10 4.8E-10 8.0E-10 8.3E-10 8.3E-10 8.3E-10 8.3E-10 Semi-
detached DRY 1.2E-10 3.4E-10 7.8E-10 1.3E-09 1.3E-09 1.3E-09 1.3E-09 1.3E-09 
WET 5.7E-11 1.6E-10 3.5E-10 5.7E-10 5.8E-10 5.9E-10 5.9E-10 5.9E-10 Terrace 
houses DRY 9.1E-11 2.5E-10 5.7E-10 9.2E-10 9.4E-10 9.4E-10 9.4E-10 9.4E-10 
WET 3.2E-11 8.6E-11 1.9E-10 2.9E-10 2.9E-10 2.9E-10 2.9E-10 2.9E-10 
192Ir 
 
 
 
 
Blocks of 
flats DRY 3.9E-11 1.0E-10 2.3E-10 3.6E-10 3.7E-10 3.7E-10 3.7E-10 3.7E-10 
WET 7.0E-10 2.1E-09 6.1E-09 2.3E-08 4.0E-08 9.5E-08 1.1E-07 1.1E-07 Single 
storey DRY 1.2E-09 3.6E-09 1.0E-08 3.7E-08 6.5E-08 1.4E-07 1.5E-07 1.5E-07 
WET 2.9E-10 8.7E-10 2.6E-09 9.5E-09 1.7E-08 4.0E-08 4.4E-08 4.4E-08 Semi-
detached DRY 4.7E-10 1.4E-09 4.1E-09 1.5E-08 2.6E-08 5.5E-08 5.9E-08 5.9E-08 
WET 1.9E-10 5.7E-10 1.7E-09 5.8E-09 1.0E-08 2.3E-08 2.5E-08 2.5E-08 Terrace 
houses DRY 3.4E-10 9.9E-10 2.9E-09 1.0E-08 1.7E-08 3.5E-08 3.8E-08 3.8E-08 
WET 7.5E-11 2.2E-10 6.1E-10 1.9E-09 3.0E-09 6.3E-09 6.9E-09 6.9E-09 
60Co 
 
 
 
 
Blocks of 
flats DRY 1.0E-10 3.1E-10 8.7E-10 2.8E-09 4.6E-09 9.2E-09 9.8E-09 9.8E-09 
WET 2.6E-10 7.7E-10 2.3E-09 9.0E-09 1.7E-08 6.4E-08 1.1E-07 1.2E-07 Single 
storey DRY 4.5E-10 1.3E-09 4.0E-09 1.5E-08 2.8E-08 8.5E-08 1.3E-07 1.5E-07 
WET 1.0E-10 3.1E-10 9.2E-10 3.6E-09 6.8E-09 2.5E-08 4.2E-08 4.7E-08 Semi-
detached DRY 1.7E-10 5.1E-10 1.5E-09 5.7E-09 1.0E-08 3.2E-08 5.0E-08 5.5E-08 
WET 7.3E-11 2.2E-10 6.3E-10 2.3E-09 4.3E-09 1.5E-08 2.5E-08 2.8E-08 Terrace 
houses DRY 1.2E-10 3.6E-10 1.1E-09 3.9E-09 7.0E-09 2.1E-08 3.1E-08 3.4E-08 
WET 2.5E-11 7.2E-11 2.0E-10 6.2E-10 1.0E-09 3.0E-09 5.0E-09 5.6E-09 
137Cs 
 
 
 
 
Blocks of 
flats DRY 3.3E-11 9.7E-11 2.8E-10 9.2E-10 1.5E-09 4.2E-09 6.3E-09 6.9E-09 
 WET 6.7E-10 2.0E-09 5.7E-09 2.0E-08 3.2E-08 5.3E-08 5.3E-08 5.3E-08 
 
Single 
storey DRY 1.2E-09 3.4E-09 9.8E-09 3.3E-08 5.2E-08 8.1E-08 8.1E-08 8.1E-08 
 WET 2.7E-10 7.9E-10 2.3E-09 7.8E-09 1.3E-08 2.1E-08 2.1E-08 2.1E-08 
134Cs 
Semi-
detached DRY 4.4E-10 1.3E-09 3.7E-09 1.2E-08 2.0E-08 3.1E-08 3.1E-08 3.1E-08 
 WET 1.9E-10 5.5E-10 1.6E-09 5.1E-09 8.1E-09 1.3E-08 1.3E-08 1.3E-08 
 
Terrace 
houses DRY 3.1E-10 9.2E-10 2.6E-09 8.6E-09 1.3E-08 2.0E-08 2.0E-08 2.0E-08 
 WET 6.3E-11 1.8E-10 4.9E-10 1.4E-09 2.0E-09 2.8E-09 2.9E-09 2.9E-09 
 
Blocks of 
flats DRY 8.3E-11 2.4E-10 6.7E-10 2.0E-09 2.9E-09 4.2E-09 4.2E-09 4.2E-09 
 38
The figures in Table 4.6 can be used to directly estimate the dose implications of an airborne 
contamination resulting in a certain level of contamination on a grassed surface.  For instance, if a 
wet contamination of  2 MBq m-2 of 192Ir occurs to the grassed ‘reference’ surface in a single storey 
housing environment, the values in Table 4.6 suggest that the integrated dose received over the first 
year from this contamination would be of the order of 2 MBq m-2 * 2.1 10-9 Sv per Bq m-2 = 4.2 
mSv.  Due to the physical half-life of 192Ir of only 74 days, doses received over longer periods will 
be negligible in comparison.  Note that although the values given in the table for dry deposition are 
generally higher than those given for wet deposition, dry deposition will in a given area generally 
lead to much lower doses than will wet deposition, because the initial contamination levels from 
wet deposition will be much higher than those resulting from dry deposition.   
 
Finally, it should be noted that over the first few months after a large nuclear power plant accident, 
important external gamma doses could be received from other, short-lived radionuclides – 
particularly 131I and 103Ru (Kelly, 1987).  Table 4.7 shows a rough estimate of dose rates that would 
be received outdoors from contamination with these radionuclides on a large ground area.  This data 
may be of importance in optimising restrictions of access to the area and protection of clean-up 
workers, who would spend much time outdoors. 
 
Table 4.7.  Estimates of outdoor dose rates [Sv h-1] above a large ground area contaminated with 1 Bq m-2 of 
respectively 131I and 103Ru.   
Radionuclide 10 days 30 days 90 days 1 year 
131I 3.0E-13 5.8E-14 2.1E-15 1.1E-22 
103Ru 8.7E-13 6.2E-13 2.2E-13 2.1E-15 
 
 
The external beta dose contributions from strontium deposited on outdoor surfaces would in 
connection with a nuclear power plant accident be insignificant in comparison with the above 
external gamma doses.  However, as strontium might well be a candidate for malicious dispersion, 
and resulting contamination levels could locally be very high, also this dose contribution needs 
consideration.  Beta particles have short range in practically any material, so beta radiation from 
contaminated surfaces in the environment could only possibly have significance if the distance 
between the exposed person and the source is short (max. a few metres).  Also, the energy of the 
emitted beta particles must be high, and there must be virtually no shielding material other than air 
between the person and the contaminated object.  Even thin cotton clothing protects well against 
most types of beta radiation (ICRU, 1997).  A highly conservative estimate of the dose rate to the 
skin from the high energy beta particles emitted from a uniform 90Sr contamination on a ground 
surface would be of the order of 4 10-11 Sv h-1 per Bq m-2 (Eckerman and Ryman, 1993).  Doses to 
inner organs would be expected to be some 3 orders of magnitude lower, and thus most likely of 
very little significance (Eckerman and Ryman, 1993).  A requirement to reach as high dose rates as 
this would be that the contamination lies on the very surface of the ground.  If it is 1 cm down in 
soil, as would be expected shortly after an airborne contamination – particularly if it occurred in 
rain - the shielding effect is so great that the dose rate to the skin would be about 3 orders of 
magnitude lower.  Contamination on impermeable surfaces may however give contributions to dose 
over longer periods of time.  An example could be asphalted playgrounds for children.  Although 
the natural decline in contamination on such surfaces is slower than that on trafficked roads, most of 
the contamination on these asphalt surfaces will however typically have been weathered away 
through natural processes within one year (Andersson, 2005a). 
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4.3. External doses from contamination on indoor surfaces 
 
Only in locations with dry deposition of contaminants, the indoor contamination will contribute 
significantly to the dose because in locations with wet deposition, the dose contribution from the 
comparatively much higher levels of outdoor deposition will dominate.   
 
Based on experimental work (Andersson et al., 2004), it is assumed that the natural removal process 
of contamination on interior walls as well as on the ceiling has a half-life in the region of 10 years 
for 1 µm particles and 3 years for 5 µm particles.  Also on the basis of this work, the half-life of 
natural removal from the floor is assumed to be of the order of 0.5 years.  Much shorter half-lives 
have been reported for Chernobyl contamination on a floor (Allott et al., 1994).  However, it should 
be noted that the indoor contamination was here almost exclusively associated with large soil 
particles that had inadvertently been brought in from the garden.  This latter contamination problem 
could in practice be eliminated by taking off shoes at entry. 
 
Table 4.8 shows the results of calculations of the gamma doses that would be received from 
contamination on indoor surfaces over a lifetime by a person staying all the time in a contaminated 
4m by 4m room with a ceiling height of 2.5 m (Andersson et al., 2004).  Data are given per unit 
contamination on the outdoor grassed reference surface, for a number of potentially important 
radionuclides.  In reality, a person would, as mentioned above, probably be indoors some 90 % of 
the time.  As doses from indoor contamination to people staying outdoors would be of 
comparatively little importance, the doses in the table should thus be multiplied by a factor of about 
0.9 to obtain an estimate for a person living in the contaminated area.    
 
 
Table 4.8.  Gamma dose conversion factors (total time-integrated dose) for the various contaminants and surfaces 
considered.  Doses are given per unit of surface contamination on the outdoor grassed reference surface, as both 
indoor contamination levels are proportional to those outdoors, and measurements are most likely to have been made 
on the outdoor grassed reference surface.  Dose conversion factors are given separately for walls, floor and ceiling, as 
the specific technologies that would be applied for forced decontamination of these would often differ (see Appendix A), 
and be carried out at different times and frequencies. 
 
Radionuclide Dose conversion factor (walls) 
[Sv per Bq m-2] 
Dose conversion 
factor (floor) 
[Sv per Bq m-2] 
Dose conversion 
factor (ceiling) 
[Sv per Bq m-2] 
Sr-90 0 0 0 
Zr-95 1.2 E-08 2.8 E-08 3.2 E-09 
Mo-99 3.0 E-12 1.6 E-11 4.7 E-13 
Ru-103 1.7 E-10 6.4 E-10 2.3 E-11 
Ru-106 5.6 E-10 9.4 E-10 7.5 E-11 
I-131* 5.1 E-10 3.6 E-10 2.8 E-10 
Te-132 6.0 E-12 2.8 E-11 8.4 E-13 
Cs-134 7.2 E-09 7.8 E-09 9.7 E-10 
Cs-137 1.4 E-08 4.2 E-09 1.9 E-09 
Ba-140 4.9 E-10 1.3 E-09 1.3 E-10 
Ce-141 6.7 E-10 1.6 E-09 1.7 E-10 
Ce-144 1.6 E-09 2.2 E-09 4.1 E-10 
* Elemental iodine 
 
For instance, if a person is staying permanently in an area with a 2 MBq m-2 contamination level of 
137Cs on grassed reference surfaces, that person will be likely to receive a time-integrated dose 
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contribution from contamination on the floors in buildings of 0.9 * 4.2 10-9 Sv per Bq m-2 * 2 MBq 
m-2 = 7.6 mSv.   
 
It has been measured that the total deposition in a furnished room may be higher than that to the 
same room without furniture, by a factor of about 1.3-2 (Lange, 1995).  However, the furniture will 
also constitute elements that will shield against contamination on other surfaces in the indoor 
environment.  It has been demonstrated (Andersson et al., 2004) that even the most vigorous 
physical impact can only be expected to lead to resuspension in the air of a very limited fraction of 
the contamination initially deposited indoors.  The resulting redistribution of contaminants on the 
various indoor surfaces will thus have little significance for the external dose contributions from 
these surfaces. 
 
Beta doses from indoor surfaces might have significance in connection with, e.g., a 90Sr 
contamination.   Crucial factors in this context would be the shielding and distance between the 
source and exposed person.  Over a given period of time, migration of contaminants into indoor 
surfaces (e.g., furniture) could well result in less shielding than would for instance migration into 
soil.  The closest contact between sources and exposed persons would be in situations where 
persons are sitting or lying on contaminated surfaces.  In such cases, the beta doses can be 
compared with the corresponding contributions from the same source density deposited directly on 
human skin/clothing (see section 4.3).  The natural removal half-life of contamination on skin is 
generally much shorter than that on most building interior surfaces.  On the other hand, initial 
contamination levels on for instance indoor walls would be much lower than those to human skin 
(Andersson et al., 2004).  As even thin fabric offers some protection against beta radiation, the most 
critical situations would be those where unshielded skin comes into direct or close contact with a 
contaminated surface.  This is for instance the case at night, when part of the body is in direct 
contact with a possibly contaminated bed surface for hours.  However, ordinary machine washing is 
efficient in removing contaminants from clothing (Andersson et al., 2002), so if bed sheets are 
washed regularly, these doses would be limited to a short period after the contamination took place.  
On the background of current state-of-the-art knowledge, it can not be ruled out that frequent use of 
chairs or sofas, if contaminated, may give a beta dose that is significant.  It is recommended that 
this be investigated further.  
 
 
 
4.4. Doses from contamination on humans 
 
Contaminated aerosols will also dry deposit directly on humans in the affected areas.  If the 
contaminants are of outdoor origin, indoor air concentrations of contaminants will often be lower 
than outdoor air concentrations, particularly if air ducts in the dwelling are closed off when outdoor 
air concentrations are high.   
 
Gamma radiation emitted by radionuclides deposited on the human body will contribute to the 
effective dose to the exposed persons.  Beta particles have short range in human tissue, and even 
high energy beta radiation will generally lead to negligible doses at a depth of one centimetre (Cross 
et al., 1992).  However, most beta particles can penetrate into the basal layer of the epidermis, 
where proliferating cells in the skin are mostly located.  As the energy of the beta particles is 
transferred to a thin layer of tissue, local doses can be very high.  The result is an increased risk of 
skin cancer.  The risk of skin cancer mortality is according to ICRP (1991) estimated to be 2 10-4 
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Sv-1, whereas the skin morbidity risk is 9.8 10-2 Sv-1.  Deterministic health effects on the skin will 
only occur at beta doses exceeding ca. 15 Sv.  The depth at which the proliferating cells are located 
can vary somewhat, for instance according to body sites.  In an investigation it has been found to be 
50 ± 22 µm on the face, but 85 ± 26 µm on the back of hands (ICRP, 1992).  Recognising that 
adverse effects may arise in deeper layers, the ICRU recommends that doses to skin be determined 
at a depth of 70 µm (ICRU, 1997).  The calculations of Rohloff and Heinzelmann (1996) clearly 
show that the dose rate contributions to the basal layer of the skin epidermis from gamma radiation 
are generally not significant compared with the contributions from associated beta radiation.  Alpha 
particles emitted from contaminants deposited on skin have too short range in human tissue to 
penetrate the stratum corneum layer of dead cells. 
 
Clearance by natural removal processes of particulate skin contamination is strongly dependent on 
the size of the contaminating particles.  Particles greater than ca. 10 µm would largely be removed 
from the skin surface over a period of only few hours.  However, small particles in the 1 µm range 
would lodge in skin cavities (e.g., hair follicles), and can be difficult to get rid of without very 
thorough washing/scrubbing.  The size of the contaminant particle thus has an important bearing on 
dose.   
 
Contaminants of different physical and chemical characteristics would result from different types of 
contaminating incidents.  Table 4.9 shows estimates of skin beta doses that would be received over 
various periods per unit of contamination of some radionuclides that would be likely to contribute 
particularly much to dose after a major nuclear reactor accident.  Based on observations made after 
the Chernobyl accident, it was assumed that all the selected radionuclides were associated with 
small particles in the 1 µm range.  Also elemental iodine gas has been included in this table, since it 
deposits very strongly on surfaces.  As can be seen, even a thin layer of clothing protects the skin 
well.  It was assumed in these calculations that the small contaminants to some extent remain on the 
skin until the surface layer of dead skin cells has shed over a period of ca. 2 weeks (Hession et al., 
2006).  Contaminated clothes are assumed to be washed at intervals of 2 days (Andersson et al, 
2002).   
 
For instance, if a person receives a contamination on skin of 100 Bq cm-2 137Cs, that person will 
over the first two days receive a beta dose to the freely exposed skin of 7.5 10-5 Sv per Bq cm-2 *  
100 Bq cm-2 = 7.5 mSv.  
 
Table 4.10 shows the corresponding skin beta doses from deposition of 5µm particles carrying a 
number of contaminants that may be of importance in connection with various other types of 
incidents.  Particles of this size would for instance be likely to play a key role in connection with a 
conventional bomb explosion dispersing radioactive matter (Stradling et al., 1998; Eriksson, 2002).  
Larger particles would also be released from this type of incident, but would for instance to a much 
lesser extent be able to penetrate into buildings (Andersson, 2005a).  Also, the natural clearance 
half-life of particles in the size range of tens of µm would be likely to be exceedingly short.  A 
survey has been conducted of published values of AMAD's of radioactive aerosols measured in 
working environments (Dorrian & Bailey, 1995).  The results covered 52 publications and included 
a wide variety of industries and other work places.  The results were found to be well fitted by a 
log-normal distribution with a median value of 4.4 µm, supporting the choice of the ICRP Task 
Group on Human Respiratory Tract Models of a 5 µm default AMAD for occupational exposure.     
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Tables 4.11 and 4.12 show the corresponding effective doses from gamma radiation from the same 
contaminants. 
 
Based on available data, amounts of contaminants that could be transported through the skin and 
into the body would in general be considered to be very low, although some studies have reported 
penetration of trace amounts (Andersson et al., 2004).   
 
In connection with a contaminating incident, radionuclides could also be lodged on the skin as a 
result of the skin touching a contaminated surface (contact transfer).  It has been demonstrated that 
if the contamination was airborne, doses from contact transfer from environmental surfaces would 
generally be small compared to doses from direct skin contamination during the passage of the 
contaminated plume (Andersson et al., 2004).  However, skin contamination may be highly 
important in other scenarios, such as handling/spilling of open sources or decommissioning.  It 
could also be worth considering in connection with work at repositories for highly concentrated 
waste from countermeasure implementation. 
 
It should also be noted that beta radiation from contaminants deposited on the human eye can lead 
to opacity of the lens or capsule of the eye, causing impairment of vision or blindness. 
Representative conversion factors from eye contamination level to doses to the lens of the eye range 
from about 2 10-2 nGy per beta particle emitted per cm2 for 0.1 MeV beta particles to some 4 10-1 
nGy per beta particle emitted per cm2 for 2 MeV beta particles (ICRP, 1996).  Linear interpolation 
is allowable between these values.  The dose to the eye lens from beta particles emitted with a 
specific energy from a specific radionuclide can be calculated from the equation: D [nGy] = C [nGy 
per beta particle cm-2] * f * d [Bq cm-2] * t [s], where C is the conversion factor, f is the number of 
beta particles emitted by the radionuclide per disintegration, d is the contaminant concentration on 
the eye, and t is the amount of time that the contaminants are on average present on the eye (taking 
into account also reduction in concentration through radioactive decay).  The concentration of 
particle contaminants on the eye can be calculated from knowledge of the time-integrated air 
concentration (Ct) over the period of exposure: d [Bq cm-2] = Ct [Bq s cm-3] * Vd [cm s-1].  A 
probably conservative estimate of Vd is ca. 3 10-2 cm s-1 for 1 µm particles and 2 10-1 cm s-1 for 20 
µm particles (Gudmundsson et al., 1997).  
 
It should be mentioned that the dose limit for the public for exposure of the eye is 15 mSv annually, 
whereas it is for skin 50 mSv, signalling a difference in the sensitivity of these organs to radiation. 
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Table 4.9. Estimates of skin beta dose [Sv] from 1 Bq cm-2 deposited on human skin and clothing of various selected radionuclides originating from a large reactor 
accident.  Doses received over respectively 2 days and 2 weeks following contamination of skin / clothing. 
 
Radionuclide Skin dose (2 weeks) freely 
exposed skin 
Skin dose (2 days) freely 
exposed skin 
Skin dose (2 weeks) covered 
skin1) 
Skin dose (2 days) covered 
skin1) 
Ru-103 1.6E-04 2.8E-05 3.2E-05 1.1E-06 
Ru-106/Rh-106 5.2E-04 8.6E-05 1.5E-04 5.0E-05 
I-131 elem. 2.4E-04 5.9E-05 1.4E-05 1.4E-05 
I-131 aerosol 2.4E-04 5.9E-05 2.7E-05 1.1E-05 
Te-132 8.8E-05 3.5E-05 4.0E-07 2.2E-07 
Cs-134 3.1E-04 5.1E-05 3.2E-05 1.1E-05 
Cs-137/Ba-137m 4.6E-04 7.5E-05 4.8E-05 1.6E-05 
 
1) The skin is here assumed to be covered by a thin layer of cotton, corresponding to a T-shirt.  If a part of the body is covered by thick clothes, the dose to the skin from contamination 
on that part of the body can be considered to be negligible compared with the above.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.10. Estimates of skin beta dose [Sv] from 1 Bq cm-2 deposited on skin or clothing of various radionuclides originating from a contamination event involving 
radioactive 5 µm aerosol.  Doses received over respectively 2 days and 2 weeks following contamination of skin / clothing. 
 
Radionuclide Skin dose (2 weeks) freely 
exposed skin 
Skin dose (2 days) freely 
exposed skin 
Skin dose (2 weeks) covered 
skin1) 
Skin dose (2 days) covered 
skin1) 
P-32 9.4E-06 9.4E-06 1.0E-05 1.0E-05 
Co-60 5.8E-06 5.8E-06 2.7E-06 2.7E-06 
Sr-90 8.2E-06 8.2E-06 3.5E-06 3.4E-06 
I-131  7.4E-06 7.4E-06 3.0E-06 3.0E-06 
Cs-137/Ba-137m 8.9E-06 8.9E-06 4.0E-06 4.0E-06 
Ir-192 8.2E-06 8.2E-06 3.2E-06 3.1E-06 
Ra-226 No beta dose No beta dose No beta dose No beta dose 
Am-241 No beta dose No beta dose No beta dose No beta dose 
 
1) The skin is here assumed to be covered by a thin layer of cotton, corresponding to a T-shirt.  If a part of the body is covered by thick clothes, the dose to the skin from contamination 
on that part of the body can be considered to be negligible compared with the above.  
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Table 4.11. Estimates of contributions to effective dose [Sv] from 1 Bq cm-2 deposited on human skin and from 1 Bq cm-2 on clothing of various selected radionuclides 
originating from a reactor accident.  Doses received over respectively 2 days and 2 weeks following contamination of skin / clothing. 
 
Radionuclide Effective dose (2 weeks) from 
skin contam.2) 
Effective dose (2 days) from 
skin contam.2) 
Effective dose (2weeks) from 
clothing contam.2) 
Effective dose (2 days) from 
clothing contam.2) 
Ru-103 3.8E-07 6.9E-08 9.7E-07 3.4E-07 
Ru-106/Rh-106 1.6E-07 2.6E-08 3.8E-07 1.3E-07 
I-131 elem. 2.0E-07 5.0E-08 2.9E-07 2.9E-07 
I-131 aerosol 2.0E-07 5.0E-08 5.8E-07 2.5E-07 
Te-132 5.9E-08 2.3E-08 2.1E-07 1.1E-07 
Cs-134 1.1E-06 1.8E-07 2.7E-06 8.9E-07 
Cs-137/Ba-137m 5.0E-07 8.2E-08 1.2E-06 4.0E-07 
 
2) A total of 15 % of the skin was assumed to be freely exposed to contamination, whereas the rest was assumed to be covered by clothing.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.12. Estimates of contributions to effective dose [Sv] from 1 Bq cm-2 deposited on skin and from 1 Bq cm-2 on clothing of various radionuclides originating from 
a contamination event involving radioactive 5 µm aerosol.  Doses received over respectively 2 days and 2 weeks following contamination of skin / clothing. 
 
Radionuclide Effective dose (2 weeks) from 
skin contam.2) 
Effective dose (2 days) from 
skin contam.2) 
Effective dose (2weeks) from 
clothing contam.2) 
Effective dose (2 days) from 
clothing contam.2) 
P-32 No gamma dose No gamma dose No gamma dose No gamma dose 
Co-60 4.3E-08 4.3E-08 4.5E-07 4.5E-07 
Sr-90 No gamma dose No gamma dose No gamma dose No gamma dose 
I-131  6.3E-09 6.3E-09 6.6E-08 6.6E-08 
Cs-137/Ba-137m 9.7E-09 9.7E-09 1.0E-07 1.0E-07 
Ir-192 1.1E-08 1.1E-08 1.2E-07 1.2E-07 
Ra-226 1.3E-10 1.3E-10 1.4E-09 1.4E-09 
Am-241 3.4E-10 3.4E-10 3.6E-09 3.6E-09 
 
2) A total of 15 % of the skin was assumed to be freely exposed to contamination, whereas the rest was assumed to be covered by clothing.  
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4.5. Doses from inhalation of resuspended contaminants 
 
Inhalation doses may also be received after the passage of the contaminate plume, due to inhalation 
of contaminant particles resuspended in the air.  Doses from inhalation of resuspended contaminants 
would greatly depend on the processes leading to the resuspension.  Also, for instance dust 
concentrations on surfaces, dust particle sizes, mechanical disturbances (e.g., by heavy traffic) and 
weather conditions will influence how large a fraction of the deposited contamination will be 
resuspended.  Resuspension factors (ratio of aerosol concentration in air at a relevant reference 
height above a surface to the aerosol particle loading per unit area of the surface) have been 
reported to vary by many orders of magnitude for particles deposited in inhabited areas (Sehmel, 
1980).  After the Chernobyl accident, the resuspension factor due to wind and weather on open soil 
areas was generally found to decrease by about a factor of 2 over the first 2 days, and something of 
the order of a factor of 10 over the first 10 days following the deposition.  Since variation is thus 
obviously considerable from case to case, and depending on time, these dose contributions should 
be evaluated by experts taking into account the relevant factors for the given case.  Generic dose 
conversion factors for resuspension in inhabited areas (e.g., as reported by Walsh, 2002 - see Table 
5.13) should be used with great caution.  Indicative, rough (probably highly conservative) dose 
estimates can be made for a number of radionuclides using Table 4.13 and the formula: 
 
D [Sv] = Committed integrated effective dose from inhalation [Sv per Bq m-2 on the ground] * 
Ground contamination level [Bq m-2]. 
 
It should be noted that particles greater than about 10 µm are rapidly cleared from the human 
respiratory tract through a natural process and will thus not lead to significant inhalation doses 
(ICRP, 1995).  Also, most dwellings would provide a significant protective effect against 
contaminant particles of outdoor origin (e.g., through filtration), again depending on particle sizes. 
All this would make the values in Table 4.13 even more conservative, particularly if the incident 
involves a ‘dirty bomb’, which could lead to dispersion of large particles, depending on the exact 
construction. Resuspension from indoor contaminated surfaces is generally negligible, compared 
with resuspension from outdoor contaminated surfaces. 
  
Table 4.13.  Assumed integrated committed effective doses from inhalation [Sv per Bq m-2 on the ground]assuming lung 
type S (according to ICRP, 1995) and an inhalation rate of 2.3 10-4 m3 s-1(for adults) and 1.8 10-4 m3 s-1 (for children) . 
Adults 239Pu 241Am 137Cs 106Ru 103Ru 244Cm 
1 day 3,8E-10 3,8E-10 9,3E-13 1,6E-12 7,2E-14 3,1E-10 
10 days 1,3E-09 1,3E-09 3,1E-12 5,2E-12 2,3E-13 1,0E-09 
30 days 1,7E-09 1,7E-09 4,1E-12 6,9E-12 2,8E-13 1,4E-09 
90 days 2,1E-09 2,1E-09 5,1E-12 8,4E-12 3,1E-13 1,7E-09 
1 year 2,6E-09 2,6E-09 6,4E-12 9,9E-12 3,2E-13 2,1E-09 
2 years 2,9E-09 2,9E-09 7,0E-12 1,0E-11 3,2E-13 2,3E-09 
10 years 3,5E-09 3,5E-09 8,4E-12 1,1E-11 3,2E-13 2,7E-09 
Children 239Pu 241Am 137Cs 106Ru 103Ru 244Cm 
1 day 3,6E-10 3,6E-10 9,0E-13 1,7E-12 7,8E-14 3,2E-10 
10 days 1,2E-09 1,2E-09 3,0E-12 5,6E-12 2,5E-13 1,0E-09 
30 days 1,6E-09 1,6E-09 4,0E-12 7,4E-12 3,1E-13 1,4E-09 
90 days 2,0E-09 2,0E-09 4,9E-12 9,1E-12 3,4E-13 1,7E-09 
1 year 2,5E-09 2,5E-09 6,2E-12 1,1E-11 3,5E-13 2,2E-09 
2 years 2,7E-09 2,7E-09 6,8E-12 1,1E-11 3,5E-13 2,4E-09 
10 years 3,3E-09 3,3E-09 8,1E-12 1,1E-11 3,5E-13 2,8E-09 
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4.6. Additional doses to clean-up workers 
 
If the dose rate is in the early phase of a contaminating incident dominated by short-lived 
radionuclides, workers implementing countermeasures in the short term (some countermeasures 
greatly influencing long-term doses need to be implemented within short time to be effective; see 
Appendix A) may receive comparatively high doses.  These doses should be taken into account in 
the decision of the optimal countermeasure strategy.  However, if the initial contamination level is 
such that cleaning could permit humans to subsequently stay permanently in the area, the doses 
received by workers over the comparatively short cleaning period would in general be low 
compared to doses received over longer times by inhabitants of the cleaned area.  In general, 
workers in a contaminated area will be subjected to the same dose pathways as will the inhabitants 
in that area.  However, as much of the countermeasure work would be conducted outdoors, the 
clean-up workers are likely to be less protected by the shielding effect of dwellings than is the 
average inhabitant of the area.  Simply because of the extra time spent outdoors, it would typically 
be expected that the external dose rate to workers would in the cleaning period exceed that to 
inhabitants by about a factor of 2-3 (Andersson et al., 2003), and due to the limited duration of the 
cleaning period be of little significance.     
 
It should be noted that some countermeasures, such as vacuum sweeping of streets and mowing of 
lawns, generate waste with high specific activity.  This means that for instance operators of lawn 
mowers and vacuum sweepers equipped with waste collection vessels can receive rather relatively 
doses over short periods of time.  These problems can be reduced, e.g., by reducing the individual 
operator time or inserting a metal shielding between the operator and the waste vessel.  For 
instance, an operator of a vacuum sweeper, a seated lawn-mower or a waste transport truck would 
over one hour receive a dose of some 50 µSv, if the waste in the vessel of the vehicle is collected 
from an area with a 137Cs contamination level of 1 MBq m-2.  This is about the same external dose 
as an average inhabitant in the area would receive over 4 days (Andersson, 1996).  This type of 
problems would be likely also to arise in connection with waste management at repositories, where 
it may well be more difficult to achieve a shielding effect to protect workers. 
 
By the time where the countermeasures suggested in this handbook could be considered for 
implementation, worker doses from resuspension of contaminants would be unlikely to constitute a 
significant problem.  It has been found after the Chernobyl accident that contaminant resuspension 
is reduced proportionally with t-1, where t is time in days after the initial deposition.  Naturally, 
methods like ploughing could generate much dust, but the resuspended soil dust particles, to which 
contaminants would be attached, would be so large that they would be rapidly cleared from the 
respiratory tract by ciliary action (ICRP, 1993).   
 
Contamination on the human body can result in beta doses to the skin and gamma doses to the body 
(see section 4.4).  Workers in areas with elevated airborne contaminant concentrations should be 
instructed to wear protective clothing, change/wash the clothes regularly and wash any freely 
exposed skin thoroughly and regularly. 
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5.  Doses and countermeasures for kitchen gardens 
 
Countermeasures in kitchen garden can be more important in some situations than in other- if there 
is not sufficient food available in the market. Another situation is when people do not trust the 
authority and the market to have safe food with low concentration of radionuclides (Bq). In this 
situation the production in kitchen garden will probable increase. People will also in this situation 
have possibility to measure crops from the gardens in their neighbourhood in the municipality. 
 
5.1. Kitchen gardening in Sweden 
 
Gardening is one of the most common leisure activities in the country. There are ca 2.5 million 
gardens in Sweden distributed between houses, summer houses and allotments. The total 
cultivatable area is estimated to ca 266 000 hectares, Table 5.1. 
 
In Sweden ca 44% of adults say that they are very interested in gardening. There is a clear 
connection between an interest in gardening and the type of housing: the more people who live in 
detached houses, both large and small, the greater the interest in gardening. Men and women 
usually garden to the same extent. But women are more likely to look after growing plants. 
Approximately 70% of children under 16 have access to a garden where they live. Whereas 
gardening has increased in recent decades, interest from society as a whole has decreased because 
gardening contributes less to the economy and food supply than it used to. Nevertheless, kitchen 
gardening provides a reserve capacity for food supply in times of emergency. 
 
Table 5.1. Types of cultivation and area of the most important cultivation units  
for kitchen gardening in 2000. 
Type of 
cultivation 
Houses/allotments 
in 2000 
Total garden area, 
ha, 
estimated/potential
Cultivated area 
per house, m2 
estimated 
Detached house 1 280 000 165 000 800 
Terraced house 255 000 5 100 150 
Summer house 683 000 95 400 200 
Allotment 42 000 1 125 250 
Farm cottage 245 000 49 500 1 000 
Total for the 
country 
2 505 000 316 125 - 
Source: Björkman (2001) 
 
 
The total area suitable for kitchen gardening in Sweden is estimated to 316,125 hectares.  
Approximately 200,000 hectares of this is in the countryside and the remainder (ca 100,000 
hectares) in urban areas. 
 
 
5.1.1. What is grown in Sweden? 
 
In most gardens there is a small kitchen garden, as well as fruit trees and berry bushes. Common 
products are apples, potatoes, carrots, onions, lettuce and dill.  Table 5.2 shows that each household 
consumes 57 kg home-grown vegetables. In terms of value, total home production makes up 
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approximately 11% of households’ consumption of these products. This corresponded to about 2.73 
million SEK in 1996. 
 
Potatoes are the main product with 25 kg produced per household per year.  For the whole country 
this corresponds to 93 million kg (Mkg) potatoes. Vegetable production is calculated to 30 million 
kg and fruit and berry production to 80 million kg for the whole country. There is also a great 
interest in cultivating flowers and decorative plants and establishing lawns in our gardens. 
 
 
Table 5.2. Households’ consumption of home-grown products in 1996. (Home-grown products are 
potatoes, white cabbage, lettuce, cucumber, tomatoes, onions, leeks, carrots, apples, pears, 
strawberries, raspberries, currants, plums, fruit syrups and sauces.  The number of households in 
Sweden in 1986 were ca 3 686 000). 
Crop/product Kg/household 
1996 
Total Mkg 
1996 
Potatoes 25.0 92.4 
Carrots and onions 4.6 16.8 
Apples 6.8 25.2 
Berries 5.1 18.9 
Fruit syrups and 
sauces 
10.3 37.8 
Other products 5.1 18.9 
Total 57 209.5 
M = million.  Source: Statistics Sweden expenditure barometer (utgiftsbarometern) 
 1996 
 
 
5.1.2. Can a kitchen garden produce all the food you need? 
 
Research has been done at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences in Uppsala (Ekhaga 
experimental farm, Ullmark, 1999) into how large an area is needed to produce enough vegetables 
to feed one person for an entire year. An area the size of a normal garden is sufficient to supply a 
year’s requirement of food for one person. Potatoes, wheat, sunflower seeds, broccoli, carrots, 
turnips, chard, beans and other vegetables grown on ca 800 m2 provide a balanced diet, Table 5.3. It 
is important that cultivation is carefully planned so that none of the harvest is wasted.  The most 
intensive period is during sowing in spring and harvesting in autumn.  Out of the total time involved 
over the growing season, ca one third is spent on tending the growing crops, a third on harvesting 
and a third on taking care of the harvested products. 
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Table 5.3. Total harvest from the experiment at Ekhaga farm and the dietary requirements  
for one person with a vegetarian diet. 
Crop/product Harvest 1998 
Kg/1000m2 
Harvest 1999 
Kg/1000m2 
Requirement/person 
year and kg 
Root vegetables and 
onions 
290 1 000 240 
Cabbages 84 133 30 
Leafy vegetables 92 266 6 
Courgettes, 
tomatoes 
10 200 21  
(tomatoes) 
Cereals (flour) -* 3 180 
Oil plants (seeds for 
fats) 
-* 17 32 
Peas and beans 10 20 30 
Fruit and berries -* -* 200 
*no harvest.  Source: SLU Forskning 75, 1999, Ullmark. 
 
 
Kitchen gardening plays a significant role in food production in many countries and in many 
countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, it is crucial for food supply.  In the event of a nuclear 
accident this could cause considerable problems with protection from radiation. Authorities should 
provide clear recommendations for the measures to be taken regarding cultivation in the case of 
radioactive fall-out. 
 
Crops grown in the other Nordic countries of Finland and Norway are described in sections 5.2 and 
5.3. Information from Denmark and Iceland was unavailable. 
 
 
 
5.2. Kitchen gardening in Finland 
 
In Finland 59 % of households have their own gardens, and 25 % of households use their gardens 
for growing vegetables and potatoes for household use according to an interview study made by 
Gallup Food and Farm Facts Ltd, in 2004. The number of households growing some products in 
their gardens was 1 140 000 in 2004. Summer houses are included in this number of gardens. The 
number and percentage of households growing different types of vegetables, apples, berries or 
potato are given in Table 5.4-5.6*. 
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Table 5.4. The number of households with gardens, growing different types of 
 products in Finland 
Product type Number of households Percentage of households, % 
Bush berries 755 000 49 
Apple 600 000 39 
Strawberry 416 000 27 
Lettuce 570 000 37 
Herbs 460 000 30 
Onion 460 000 30 
Potato 460 000 30 
Root vegetables 355 000 23 
Tomato 308 000 20 
Cucumber 185 000 12 
Cabbage 108 000 7 
Others 123 000 8 
Total number of 
households  
 
1 140 000 
 
74 
*Gallup Food and Farm Facts Ltd, Home Gardening, 2004 
 
 
The mean area of gardens is 882 m2, and the mean area used for growing vegetables and potato is 
291 m2. The mean size of the area used for growing vegetables and potato varied from 218 m2 to 
465 m2 according to the house type. 
 
 
Table 5.5. Areas of gardens in Finland. 
Area of garden, m2 Percentage of 
households 
Area for vegetables 
and potato, m2 
Percentage of 
households 
< 100 26 < 20 16 
100 - 250 18 20 - 40 24 
251 - 500 17 41 - 60 14 
501 - 1000 20 61 - 80 1 
1001 - 2000 11 81 - 100 14 
> 2000 8 101 - 200 11 
  201 - 500 11 
  > 500 10 
Mean:   882 100 291 100 
*Gallup Food and Farm Facts Ltd, Home Gardening, 2004 
 
 
Ten percent of households in metropolitan area grew vegetables in their gardens, in the countryside 
46 %. The mean areas for growing vegetables were also smaller in the metropolitan area (53 m2) 
than in the countryside (465 m2). 
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Table 5.6. Gardens by residential areas in Finland. 
Residential 
area 
Proportion 
of house-
holds with 
garden, % 
Area of 
garden, m2 
Percentage of 
households 
growing 
vegetables and 
potato 
Area for 
vegetables 
and potato, 
m2 
Metropolitan 
area 
36 382 10 53 
Urban area 52 641 17 195 
Densely 
populated area 
78 1057 37 207 
Countryside 83 1301 46 465 
*Gallup Food and Farm Facts Ltd, Home Gardening, 2004 
 
 
 
5.3. Kitchen gardening in Norway 
 
A Norwegian kitchen garden refers to what is grown in the gardens of detached houses, summer 
houses and allotments. Approximately one million households in Norway have the use of a kitchen 
garden. The total cultivated area in Norway is 115 000 ha with the possibility of cultivating a 
further 300 000 ha, see Table 5.7. The calculations show that although ca 60% of the Norwegian 
population has access to kitchen gardens not everyone makes use of them. 
 
Table 5.7. Cultivated area in kitchen gardens and harvest in tons in 1979 in Norway. 
Crop/Product Area 
hectares 
Number of trees 
and bushes 
Total harvest in 
tons (net) 
Potatoes 13 500  31 860  
Vegetables 
(Carrots and 
cabbage) 
94 100 124 035 
Strawberries  4 700    3 410 
Raspberries  3 050    1 618 
Fruit trees  2 695 000  33 015 
Berry bushes 4540 000  1 802 
Total 115 350  
Source: NLV F-145, 1984 
 
The Norwegian data are from the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, so it can be 
assumed that the situation is somewhat different today. The area under cultivation ought to be larger 
in Norway if calculated in the same way as for Sweden and Finland. 
 
 
 
5.4. Countermeasures for kitchen gardens 
 
The principles for recommendations and application of countermeasures issued by the International 
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) are valid for contaminated kitchen garden land. 
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Justification: Countermeasures should be introduced if they are expected to achieve more good than 
harm. Optimisation: The quantitative criteria used for the introduction and withdrawal of 
countermeasures should be such that benefit for the public is optimised. 
 
Countermeasures can be implemented at different times of the year. It is possible to avoid 
radioactive contamination of kitchen garden plants in the very earliest phase of emergency, before 
the fallout has taken place. The more common situation, however, will be to reduce the 
contamination after the fallout event, during the fallout year and also later in the following years. If 
the fallout takes place in winter there is a longer time for preparation and choice of countermeasures 
than if the fallout comes just before the vegetation period. If the fallout takes place during the 
vegetation period the situation will be most serious. 
 
 
5.4.1. Avoidance of contamination before deposition   
 
The time for avoiding contamination of plants prior to radioactive fallout is often very short. It will 
be a question of some hours up to some days. One measure to implement as quickly as possible is to 
harvest plant products, which are ready for consumption. Another measure is to cover soil or plant 
products with plastic sheets. Also pathways and grass lawns could be covered with plastic sheets. If 
fallout comes as wet deposition with rain, it would be valuable to prepare so that the contaminated 
water is drained from the kitchen garden area.  
 
 
5.4.2. Reduction of contamination after fallout  
 
The choice of measures depends on the magnitude of the fallout, in what season of year it takes 
place and when the garden plant products are to be harvested. Sampling and determination of 
activity concentration in growing garden plants should be the first step. This will make it possible to 
decide if the plant products can be used for consumption or if they should be discarded as waste. 
 
Discarded plant products should be removed from the kitchen garden. It may be necessary to 
arrange a temporary deposit in a place outside or in a corner of the garden area. This temporary 
deposit can be covered by dose-reducing material to reduce external radiation and leaching. Another 
measure that can be recommended is to remove the contaminated soil layer from the garden land. 
Removal of a 5-cm surface soil layer within an area of 100 m2 corresponds to a volume of 5 m3. It 
may also be necessary to remove contaminated gravel on the surface of pathways within a kitchen 
garden. If contaminated pathways and drives to houses consist of bitumen or are stone-covered, 
they could be hosed and brushed down with water, and the contaminated water drained from the 
garden area.  
 
If the initial radioactive fallout is low enough to allow continued use of kitchen gardens, or if this 
has been achieved by removal of contaminated soil, it is still possible to reduce the soil-to-plant 
transfer of radioactivity by K-fertilization and by liming (Rosén, 1991). This may be of special 
importance for berry bushes. Wood ash containing fallout nuclides should not be used as fertilizer 
in kitchen gardens. When cultivating the garden land, nuclides are mixed into a larger soil volume. 
This will reduce the soil-to-plant transfer. 
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If the fallout is deposited with snow or on a snow layer in winter, it is advisable to remove the 
contaminated snow layer as soon as possible. In such a case the municipality should allocate a 
suitable deposit for contaminated snow.  This countermeasure is described in Appendix A.    
 
 
5.4.3. Blanching 
 
There are a few measures that can be taken to reduce the content of caesium in vegetables grown in 
kitchen gardens. Generally vegetables should be boiled and the water thrown away (Andersson et 
al, 2000).  This will eliminate some of the caesium and in some cases also strontium present in the 
vegetables.  Experiments have shown that Cs-134 can be reduced by up to 33% and Sr-85 by up to 
38%, see Table 5.8 (Bengtsson, 1992).  If blanching is repeated a couple of times there is an 
improved effect.  The method has also been tested for fungi with high caesium contents.  Similar 
experiments on fungi have been done in Finland at the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) by Kostianen (2005). 
 
Table 5.8. Reduction of Cs-134 and Sr-85 in vegetables after blanching 
Vegetables     Reduction %               Reduction %  
 Cs-134  Sr-85  
Peas 33     38 
French beans 26   6  
Carrots 31         5 
Potatoes 27   - 
Wheat (cereal) 6  - 
Oats (cereal) 8  - 
Source: Bengtsson, 1992 
 
 
5.4.4. Countermeasure datasheet material for kitchen gardens  
 
Appendix B presents some detailed information in datasheet format for some countermeasures that 
are deemed to specifically be suited for treatment of contaminated kitchen garden areas and their 
products.  The information is based on a previous Nordic review (Andersson et al., 2000).  In 
addition, also some of the countermeasures described in Chapter 3 / Appendix A are suited for 
application to reduce contamination in kitchen garden products.  These are:  
 
• Pruning/felling of trees and bushes   
• Top soil removal (manually)   
• Triple digging of soil   
• Snow removal from open areas   
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5.5. Transfer of radionuclides from the kitchen garden to man in Sweden 
 
Dose coefficients for ingestion of radionuclides for (children and) adults will be used for calculation 
of yearly intake of different kitchen garden products for the Nordic countries. 
 
The question is whether products from the kitchen garden can be a radiation problem. Normally 
limits for food products contaminated with radiocaesium from Chernobyl apply to products which 
are bought on the market.  Food products obtained by hunting, fishing, picking berries and 
mushrooms are usually consumed by the hunters’ and the fishermen’s families, and in such cases 
there are no limits – it is up to those concerned to decide whether they are going to consume the 
product or not. The same applies to those who produce food in kitchen gardens. The production of 
vegetables in private gardens is presented in Table 5.2. As can be seen the most important products 
are potatoes with 25 kg per family. In the following discussion we concentrate on two products 
representing food products with tuber or roots (potatoes and root uptake) or leafy products (lettuce 
and direct deposition on leaves). Production from the kitchen garden shown in Table 5.2 is in mean 
values and, as also can be seen in Table 5.3, it is possible to produce all the food needed during one 
year in the kitchen garden of 800 m2. This includes an annual production of 240 kg of potatoes and 
6 kg of leafy vegetables. Obviously there is a need for relevant recommendations and information 
giving answers to many questions, such as what kind of countermeasure can be taken and how 
dangerous is it to eat the products. 
 
In Table 5.9 and 5.10 we have assumed that the deposition of radionuclides occurs in spring and the 
uptake of radionuclides is by root uptake for the potatoes and by interception on leaves for lettuce. 
The discussion only deals with radiocaesium and a ground deposition of Cs-137 of 10 000 Bq per 
m2, which is a fairly low ground deposition.  
 
The results of countermeasures are rather difficult to assess due to the variation in soil properties in 
kitchen gardens. The calculations are based on a fairly high transfer factor and apply to sandy and 
peaty soils. Generally the nutrient status in kitchen gardens is rather good.  
 
The first question to answer is if the contamination of food products in kitchen gardens is important 
from the radiation protection point of view. In Table 5.9 we show a calculation of possible activity 
concentrations of Cs-137 in lettuce where we assume that 30 % of the deposition will be intercepted 
by the lettuce leaves. We assume the same activity and concentration during the first month, and 
thereafter acceptable levels from the radiation protection point of view.  
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Table 5.9. Calculation of transfer of and dose from Cs-137 by lettuce 
Ground deposition of Cs-137 is 10 000 Bq m-2 coming in spring. 
Lettuce or other leafy vegetables. 
The interception by lettuce leaves is 30 %. 
Biomass 1 kg (fw) per m-2. 
0.3 x 10 000 = 3 000 Bq kg-1 f.w. 
Consumption per person during one month is 0.5 kg (fw) and the intake during one month is 0.5 x 3 
000 Bq per kg = 1 500 Bq. 
Intake of 1 500 Bq of Cs-137 per person during the critical period (one month after fall- out). 
In the acute phase, (with Cs-137 and Cs-134) intake of 40 000 Bq of Cs-137 corresponds to a 
radiation dose of 1 mSv. 
Intake of 1 500 Bq corresponds to 1 500/40 000 mSv = 0.0375 mSv. 
If we assume that the whole Swedish population is affected, the collective dose will be 0.0375 x 10-
3 x 9 x 106  = 337 person Sv to the Swedish population. 
According to ICRP risk estimates this corresponds to 17 cases of radiation-induced lethal cancers in the 50 years after 
the fallout. 
 
 
Table 5.10. Calculation of transfer of and dose from Cs-137 by potatoes 
Ground deposition 10 000 Bq m-2. 
Potatoes (Root Uptake). 
Transfer factor TFg 2.5 x 10-3 kg m-2  (IAEA,1994). 
2.5 x 10-3 10 000 = 25 Bq kg-1. 
The annual consumption of kitchen-garden-produced potatoes is 25 kg per family (Table 2). 
25 x 25 = 625 Bq intake of Cs-137 per family. 
The annual consumption is 240 kg per person (Table 3). 
25 x 240 = 6 100 Bq per person. 
The first example 625 Bq corresponds to 0.015 mSv per family or 0.005 mSv per person. If we 
assume that the whole Swedish population is affected, the collective dose will be 0.005 x 10-3 x 9 
x 106  = 45 personSv to the Swedish population.  
The second example 6 100 Bq corresponds to 6100/40 000 Bq or 0.15 mSv. In the second case (6 
100 Bq) the collective dose will be 1 350 personSv. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             56 
Table 5.11. Calculation of an optimization of the radiation protection action. 
The farmer will receive 2 SEK per kg of potatoes. 
To reduce the dose by 1 mSv could cost 500 SEK. 
The farmer must deliver 250 kg potatoes to receive 500 SEK. 
Intake of 40 000 Bq in the acute phase corresponds to 1 mSv. 
An acceptable annual dose from Cs-137 is supposed to be 1 mSv. 
A relevant limit for Cs-137 is 40 000 / 250  = 160 Bq per kg. 
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6.  Management of waste generated by countermeasures 
 
As shown in the datasheets in Appendix A, a suite of 17 countermeasures for dose reduction in 
radioactively contaminated inhabited areas have been selected as the generally most appropriate 
and applicable for Nordic conditions.  Some of these countermeasures generate radioactive waste, 
which should be optimally managed and disposed of.  The following sections describe a number of 
techniques identified for this purpose.   
 
The descriptions are given according to the type of waste generated, as this will determine the 
management routes.  It should be noted that in the texts below it is in general assumed that 
permanent waste disposal would be required.  However, there may be situations where the dose rate 
from the waste is to a great extent governed by contributions from short-lived radionuclides.  In 
such cases it may be advantageous to first store the waste for some time in temporary repositories 
and postpone any labour-intensive handling, e.g., to transport, treat and dispose of waste in 
permanent repositories, as worker doses could then be substantially reduced.  Also, at least some 
types of permanent repositories could take considerable time to construct, which would give a 
demand for simple, yet safe temporary storage facilities (vessels of suitable material and 
dimensioning for the particular purpose, given the specific activity and physicochemical properties 
of the waste).     
 
 
6.1. Waste from decontamination of open (soil) areas 
 
Topsoil removal procedures, including turf harvesting, can results in the generation of very large 
volumes of waste, which must be handled in a way that is cost-effective and safe.  As mentioned 
above, current legal demands in the Nordic countries may restrict the applicability of the most cost-
effective waste disposal strategies, even though the solutions would be considered safe.   
 
To provide an adequate degree of safety, repositories must be constructed with a view to several 
potentially problematic aspects. 
 
The waste deposit must thus be constructed in a way that prevents effectively against external 
radiation.  Since the self-attenuation of radiation in soil is great, this problem can generally be 
overcome even with very simple repository designs.  An example of this is the creation of simple, 
uncovered waste pile 'hills' in connection with a decontamination exercise in the Chernobyl-
contaminated Novozybkov area in Russia in 1995 (Roed et al., 1996).  The primary radionuclide of 
concern was here 137Cs.  It was found that the dose rate to a person standing on top of one of these 
hills containing contaminated topsoil removed from a vast area was only 15 % higher than that in 
the surrounding contaminated area.  By covering the contamination with, e.g., a layer of 
uncontaminated soil excavated from deeper soil layers of the same area, this dose rate can be 
greatly reduced.   Further, the formation of a 'hill' or bank of earth in the area will shield well 
against radiation from contamination far away.   
 
The waste deposit must also be constructed in a way that prevents effectively against downward 
contaminant migration, e.g., to the groundwater.  It should further be ensured that the site will not 
be exposed to flooding (e.g., close to a river), and that the area is not prone to earthquakes.  Old 
gravel pits should not be exploited for this purpose, as they will often provide too little distance to 
the groundwater.  Several simple and inexpensive designs may be envisaged to achieve the 
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objective, depending on the characteristics of the primary contaminants.  For instance, Junker et al. 
(1998) suggested a construction of a repository, where the dominant problem was a radiocaesium 
contamination.  Here, it was firstly assessed at the location in question that there is a distance of at 
least 3 m to the groundwater level.  The radioactive waste was then placed on top of a 30 cm thick 
layer of clay.  This clay layer will very effectively capture and retain any radiocaesium that may 
migrate downwards, due to the highly selective and very strong binding capacity of common clay 
minerals.  A thick (ca. 1 mm) plastic membrane on top of the waste layer prevents rainwater from 
reaching the contamination and causing migration.  On top of the plastic membrane a 30 cm gravel 
draining layer was constructed, to drain away rainwater.   At the top of the repository, an at least 50 
cm thick layer of fertile soil was placed.  Grass was grown in this soil to prevent against erosion.  
The entire construction gives a shielding through a solid layer of at least 80 cm.  This reduces the 
external radiation from the radioactive waste layer by at least 3 orders of magnitude (Jacob & 
Paretzke, 1986).  In addition, as mentioned above, the self-attenuation of the contaminated soil will 
be great.  A ditch should be dug around the repository to collect the drained-off rainwater.  The 
dimensions of the repository could be as great as 400 by 400 metres. 
 
Also other, more simple designs have been suggested and tested in limited scale in Norway and in 
large scale in the former Soviet Union (Lehto & Paajanen, 1994).  Based on the work of Salbu et al. 
(1994), the total costs of disposal of contaminated soil in a relatively simple repository (including 
worker salaries and use of machines) is estimated to be of the order of 2000-3000 Euro for each ha 
of land from which a topsoil layer of ca. 3-5 cm thickness is removed.   The estimate is assuming 
that repositories will be constructed in the contaminated area.  Waste repositories should generally 
be constructed in the contaminated areas, to minimise transport expenses.  Thereby, also doses to 
transport workers can be minimised.  Further, it will probably be considered most reasonable by the 
population that the repository problems are shared by the whole affected population rather than 
imposed massively on a specific selected part of the inhabitants living near a large, centralised 
repository. 
 
If other contaminants migrating more easily than caesium pose a problem, various stabilisation and 
solidification techniques can be applied to reduce this problem (Brodersen, 1993).   It should 
however be stressed that such solutions will generally be expensive.  The three classical matrix 
materials are cement, bitumen and polymers.  Cement solidification of soil can however be 
problematic, as the properties of the resulting cement mixture are not very promising.  
 
Due to the self-attenuation of the soil, the external dose rate to workers is unlikely to differ greatly 
from that to other people spending time outdoors in the area.  However, the amount of time spent 
outdoors will be likely to be comparatively great for these workers, and as buildings provide a 
(highly variable) shielding against radiation, the dose rate is expected to be significantly higher 
outdoors than indoors.    
 
If the open area was covered by a thick layer of snow at the time of the deposition, and the first 
subsequent thaw has not yet set in, there is a unique opportunity to remove the contamination before 
it reaches the underlying soil, with much more severe penalties.  Removal of snow in an urban or 
industrial area may lead to extremely large amounts of waste (Qvenild & Tveten, 1984).  It would 
generally not be considered realistic in practice to melt all this snow and extract the contamination, 
although simple filtration designs would be expected to have a large effect.  Alternatively, the snow 
masses may be dumped in the vast oceans, where the impact on the ecosystem would be considered 
to be limited.  It should be secured that the snow is not disposed of in, e.g., lakes where the waste 
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may give rise to significant sediment contamination problems or lead to contamination of drinking 
water.  As the snow may thus need to be transported over large distances, the transport expenses 
could well be high.   
 
 
 
 
6.2. Waste from removal of vegetation 
 
The removed vegetation may here be grass or turf or other vegetation (shrubs, bushes and trees) 
removed from lawns and parks.  These wastes may have relatively high specific activity.  This is 
particularly true for grass if it is cut early after a dry contamination has occurred.  When the grass 
decomposes, it will compact, giving rise to even higher specific activity. 
 
Also leaves on a tree or shrub may have high specific activity right after contamination.  This 
problem and its impact on worker doses is described in detail under the heading 'operator safety' in 
the relevant datasheets. Protection of workers may occur either through shielding with metal 
between the worker and the waste, by increasing the distance (e.g., by remote controlled operation) 
and/or limiting the number of individual work hours. 
 
A number of methods may be envisaged to make use of some types of the removed biomass, 
depending on the contamination level.  For instance, aerobic degradation (composting) will produce 
material that may be useful for soil fertilising, whereas anaerobic degradation produces gas that 
may be used in energy production.  Core wood from contaminated trees may, particularly early after 
an accident, where the contamination will largely be confined to the outer surface, be applied in 
industry, e.g., for making furniture.  The IAEA have published a report, which provides estimates of 
the conversion factors between biomass (wood) contamination levels and annual doses that would 
be received due to the contamination, assuming conditions that are believed to adequately reflect 
'typical' situations (Balonov et al., 2001).  In ICRP publication 82 (1999) it is recommended that the 
annual individual dose contribution from these sources does not exceed 1 mSv. However, it should 
be stressed that intervention exemption levels in use currently vary widely between countries, and 
may be considerably lower than the recommended 1 mSv limit. 
 
The wood pulping process in connection with paper manufacturing may significantly reduce the 
contamination in the paper product.  A special wood pulping treatment has been described by Roed 
et al. (1995) giving a decontamination factor of as much as 50-100.   
 
An option for comparatively strongly contaminated wood, wood waste and other biomass (e.g., 
shrubs) is to chip it and combust it in safely designed power plants, which provide adequate 
protection of workers as well as of the environment. Thereby, energy is generated and at the same 
time the mass of the waste would be reduced by a factor of 10-100 by the combustion. The 
technology required to produce energy from biomass has been established a long time ago. In more 
forest-intensive European countries, such as Finland, wood combustion accounts for approximately 
19 % of the energy consumption (15 % large scale and 4 % small-scale wood firing).   
 
The magnitude of stack releases from a combustion plant depends on the boiler temperature as well 
as on the applied aerosol filter type. For instance, Mustonen et al. (1989) reported that four Finnish 
plants equipped with electrostatic filters for fly ash precipitation were found to have aerosol 
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collection efficiencies (mass) in the range between 71 % and 99.7 %. According to Hedvall et al. 
(1996), Swedish biomass-fuelled power plants emit between 1.4 % and 10 % of the caesium in the 
applied Chernobyl-contaminated fuel to the atmosphere from the stack in the form of flue gas.  
Such releases may be greatly reduced by applying a baghouse filter.  An efficient baghouse filter 
design has been proposed by Junker et al. (1998), essentially consisting of eight modules, each with 
250 GORE-TEX membrane needle felt filter bags (each being 6 m long and having a surface area of 
about 2 m2) and a hopper for collection of fly ash removed from the filters. 
 
If 1,000,000 tonnes of biomass with a specific activity of 500 Bq kg-1 were combusted annually in a 
plant releasing as much as 10 % of the caesium in the fuel to the atmosphere, this would be 
expected to lead to an integrated dose over a life-time to individuals staying 1 km from the power 
plant of only some 20 µSv (Junker et al., 1998).  This could be reduced several orders of magnitude 
by installing a baghouse filter (Roed et al., 2000). 
   
Doses to workers at a power plant fired with contaminated biomass have been investigated in detail, 
assuming a typical bio-energy power plant construction (Andersson et al., 1999).  It was concluded 
that if people are working throughout an entire working year only ½ m away from the locations at 
the power plant with the highest dose rate (which would grossly over-estimate the worker dose), 
annual doses of 2-3 mSv can be expected if the biomass (wood) is taken from an area contaminated 
by ca. 1 MBq m-2 of 137Cs.   In any case, worker doses should be assessed/minimised. 
 
According to the recommendations of Junker et al (1998), the ash from combustion can be disposed 
of in thick plastic 'big bags' with typical volumes of ca. 2 m3.  These are placed in a ground 
repository of the type described for disposal of contaminated soil (see above).  Without combustion, 
the biomass repositories would need to be 10-100 times bigger, and the wood would still need to be 
chipped.  
 
Also spreading of ash for fertilising fields has been suggested.  The fertiliser may in some soils 
significantly reduce contaminant uptake to plants, and the total effect could thus reduce dose, 
depending on the ash contamination level.  The legality and acceptability of this (or any other) 
solution should of course first be assessed.  
 
 
 
 
6.3. Waste from decontamination of streets 
 
Street cleaning by fire-hosing generates waste, which can not be collected, but must be led to the 
drains.  In contrast, street vacuum sweeping leads to collection of the loosened contamination in a 
vessel.  This material can be subjected to special waste management procedures.  The removed 
street dust may have high specific activity.  This is because the contamination on streets will largely 
be confined to the thin street dust layer (Andersson et al., 2002).  It is therefore important that 
workers at a disposal site, as well as transport workers, are adequately protected against the 
radiation from this type of waste.   Calculations have shown that in an area with a contamination 
level of 1 MBq m-2, containers of street dust may give a dose rate to operators (drivers) of 50-100 
µSv h-1 (Ulvsand et al., 1997).  Further, modern vacuum sweepers are often equipped with a water 
tank in which the dust is collected.  This type of vacuum sweeper is preferable, as the water 
attenuates the radiation from the contamination in the collected dust.   
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Disposal of street dust may occur in a repository similar to those suggested for contaminated soil 
(see above).  It has been shown (de Preter, 1990) that the number of highly selective caesium 
sorption sites in street dust, which to some extent originates from erosion and weathering of urban 
surfaces, does not differ greatly from what was found in, e.g., micaceous tile samples.  In other 
words, the same mechanisms in mica that strongly bind and retain particularly caesium in the soil 
are generally responsible for strong fixation also in street dust.  This means that downward 
migration of caesium ions in a street dust layer will be very limited. If other contaminants migrating 
more easily than caesium pose a problem, various stabilisation and solidification techniques can be 
applied to reduce this problem (Brodersen, 1993).  
 
 
 
6.4. Waste from decontamination of walls 
 
Although contaminated waste will be generated by the two countermeasures suggested for treatment 
of walls, the waste will not be possible to collect, and so waste management is in this case as such 
not possible.  However, as the cleaning liquid containing the contaminants will be washed down 
on/in the ground below the building, the waste can be subsequently removed together with, e.g., a 
topsoil layer, which would probably have to be removed anyway, since airborne contamination 
usually leads to much higher levels on ground surfaces than on walls. 
 
 
 
6.5. Waste from decontamination of roofs 
 
Solid waste removed by either one of the two suggested roof cleaning methods may include 
loosened particles from the roof materials, sludge (e.g., from the roof gutter, which would also be 
decontaminated), algae and moss. Many of these materials will normally retain contamination 
(particularly caesium, but also a range of other radionuclides such as ruthenium, barium and 
lanthanum) well, and the volume of this solid waste will thus be difficult to reduce by extraction.  
As the waste arises from wet roof treatment procedures, the solid waste will initially be present in 
rather large volumes of water.  However, nearly all contamination (depending on radionuclides – 
not true for iodine) can be easily removed by simple filtration, as most of the contamination will be 
associated with the solid part of the waste (Fogh et al., 1999).  
 
For filtration of caesium-contaminated matter, a filter material that has been successfully tested in 
practice (for water containing contaminants) is the commercially available polymer fibre textile 
called 'TYPAR', with a pore size of 0.14 mm.  The cost of this material is only ca. 0.50 Euro per m2 
(Roed et al., 1996).  Also a material like gauze might be applicable here.  If the waste water from 
operation of a roof cleaning device on a mainly caesium-contaminated roof is filtered in situ, the 
water will be sufficiently clean of contamination to allow recycling in the decontamination 
operation (Roed et al., 1996).  In practice the cleaning and recycling of water may be carried out 
through very simple means.  Roed et al. (1996) described a set-up, where the waste water from 
cleaning a roof was collected in the roof gutter and led through a down-pipe into a large vessel.  
Inside this vessel, a plastic coated metal net was covered with 'TYPAR', which only the liquid 
fraction of the waste could penetrate.  On the other side of the filter the water was pumped into 
another vessel, from which it could be recycled for the roof-cleaning operation. 
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The dry waste should be collected, e.g., in thick polypropylene bags, which may be disposed of in 
repositories in the ground (see above description for soil areas).   The waste may in some cases have 
relatively high specific activity, and worker doses should be assessed/minimised. Legal demands 
concerning toxicity of asbestos materials must be taken into account in connection with handling 
and disposal of the waste. 
 
 
 
6.6. Waste from indoor decontamination  
 
The effect of cleaning procedures applied on indoor surfaces may be significant, particularly early 
after a contamination has occurred.  The specific activity of dust collected in vacuum-cleaner filters 
or on cloths may vary greatly, mainly depending on the deposition mode (if contamination occurs in 
heavy rain, indoor contamination will generally not constitute a problem at all) and contaminant 
particle size (Roed, 1985).   The contamination level in the vacuum-cleaner filters should in very 
heavily contaminated areas be assessed prior to disposal.  If the contamination level exceeds the 
maximum permissible level, this waste should be collected, e.g., in thick polypropylene bags, which 
may be disposed of in repositories in the ground (see above description for soil areas).   The waste 
may in some cases have relatively high specific activity, and worker doses in connection with 
disposal should be assessed / minimised.   
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7.  Legal, social, ethical and communication implications of 
dose-reductive countermeasures in residential areas 
 
This section is aimed at giving an introduction to the non-radiological factors that need to be 
considered by decision-makers in the development of a justified and optimised strategy for clean-up 
in inhabited areas.  The first section addresses the legal concerns that might set constraints on 
possibilities for implementation of countermeasures.  The second section deals with issues of social 
and ethical nature, as well as the very important communication strategies that need to accompany 
any remediation strategy.  It should be noted that this chapter gives advice taking into account the 
findings of a number of case studies, mostly conducted by radiological experts together with experts 
on communication, social sciences and ethics.  It should be mentioned that in connection with the 
URBHAND exercise, very different feedback was received to this chapter - mostly very positive, 
although a single end-user representative felt very strongly that advice of this type should not be 
given in a report authored by radiological experts.  However, although only very few radiological 
experts are also experts at non-radiological sciences, they are generally the only ones that can 
introduce direct hands-on experience on such questions into the decision-making process, as they 
are the ones who have been in charge of implementing countermeasure trials on realistic scales in 
populated areas, and have often had extensive dialogue with the locals affected by the 
countermeasure implementation.              
 
 
7.1. Legal perspectives 
 
Although the radiation level in a contaminated residential area may in a given situation be deemed 
unacceptably high by the responsible authorities, the interests in mitigating this problem by 
introducing some dose-reductive countermeasures may conflict with other interests of society.  
These latter interests may have been expressed in the form of legislation, which seemed 
unambiguously reasonable prior to the contamination.  The question of whether dispensation may 
be given in a particular case to bypass legislation, if the benefits clearly outweigh the disadvantages, 
can not be addressed in generic terms.  However, it is certain that by current legislation, some 
methods that are legal in one Nordic country would not be legal in another.  Although focusing on 
rural countermeasures rather than urban, the HUGINN exercise that was conducted in 2000 under 
the NKS framework showed clear differences in legislative restrictions on some countermeasures.  
An identified issue of relevance in the present context is that current Finnish legislation prohibits 
dumping of contaminated snow in the ocean.  An other legal issue example is the simple high 
pressure water hosing method for roofs.   Contrary to alternative techniques, this method may 
spread loosened roof material debris in the area, thereby possibly constituting a problem in relation 
to asbestos treatment legislation.  This problem can be overcome by selecting a countermeasure that 
involves abrasion in closed media.   
 
There could be a number of other problems in relation to legislation, depending on the specific 
circumstances, under which the countermeasures are applied.  For instance, directives protecting 
habitats of flora or fauna in national parks may be violated by some soil treatment techniques, and it 
may not be allowable to subject protected historical buildings to very abrasive treatment.  Legal 
restrictions could be of both local and international nature, and should be carefully studied in 
advance of an emergency by the responsible local authorities, so that any potential problems can be 
identified and eliminated from operational preparedness.   
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International legislation of possible relevance includes a number of European conventions and 
directives, and UN (e.g., IAEA) conventions and declarations, for instance on environmental issues.  
It should be stressed that international laws may be interpreted differently in different countries.  
Also legislation defining the rights of affected populations and workers must be respected.  Here 
international agreements such as the Århus Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters may place 
restrictions on the use of suggested countermeasures.  This may again prompt a 'trade-off' decision 
that can be accepted by the involved parties, as countermeasure acceptability and effectiveness do 
not always go hand in hand.   
 
Guidelines for worker protection and responsibilities are given through the EURATOM Basic 
Safety Standards Directive (EURATOM, 1996) (Council Directive 96/29/EURATOM -  for full 
details see europa.eu.int/comm/energy/nuclear/radioprotection/doc/legislation/9629_en.pdf; an 
excerpt of the text is given in Brown et al., 2007).  These articles concern radiological protection.  
Also, a number of international labour standards have been formulated by the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO, 2007), setting the minimum standards of basic labour rights in general, which 
can all be found on the organisation’s web page (www.ilo.org).  The ILO standards are generally 
ratified by the Nordic countries and must thus be followed.  Of particular interest are here 
Convention C115 on radiological protection, Convention C29 on forced labour and Convention 
C155 on occupational safety and health.  These Conventions have to a large extent been 
implemented in national legislations in the Nordic countries (see e.g., the Danish worker protection 
law:  http://www.au.dk/da/regler/2005/lb268/#k8; the Swedish Work Environment Ordinance: 
http://www.av.se/inenglish/lawandjustice/workact/ordiance.aspx; Norwegian working 
environmental law: http://www.regjeringen.no/nn/dep/fad/Dokument/NOU-ar/2004/NOU-2004-
5/13.html?id=384991#note11; national labour laws for all Nordic countries: 
http://www.fedee.com/natlaw.html#denmark). 
 
It should specifically be noted that waste management options, which would from a technical 
perspective be deemed safe and sufficient, may not comply with current legislation.  It is important 
in the event of a large emergency, where a requirement may be the removal of vast amounts of 
contaminated topsoil, that the waste is regarded as an inherent part of the strategy for dose 
reduction, and its management thus evaluated in the same optimisation process as the other 
elements of the strategy.    
 
 
 
 
Some issues to consider in relation to legality: 
 
• Does current national legislation permit application of the countermeasure? 
• Could countermeasure implementation indirectly lead to violation of other legal issues? 
• Might legality constraints change in an actual emergency situation? 
• How are international legal aspects implemented / interpreted locally? 
• Have legality aspects been considered of both countermeasures and associated waste 
management methods? 
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7.2. Social, ethical and communication perspectives 
  
Social, ethical and communication-related issues in connection with a major emergency situation 
and the subsequent remediation are often closely interlinked, and it is important for the decision-
maker to keep track of these perspectives throughout the different phases of an emergency to 
constantly be on top of the situation.   
 
 
7.2.1. Different types of social problems 
 
Social problems may arise as a direct consequence of the impacts on society, for instance in the 
form of adverse general effects on the infrastructure and restrictions on the use of contaminated 
areas, with resulting economical penalties, e.g., due to loss of production, tourism, and functionality 
of vital organisations such as hospitals.  Such problems, although often difficult to quantify in terms 
that are comparable with other costs, are essential to include in the process of optimisation of 
remediation.  Other, equally important, social problems may pertain to the psychological well-being 
of individuals living in or otherwise affected by the contaminated areas.  These types of problems 
are among the most important of all to address, as they could ultimately lead to very significant 
social disruption.   
 
 
7.2.2. Communication and risk perception 
 
The key to preventing mass-desertion/disruption of contaminated areas is communication.  A 
crucial issue in this context is maintaining the public's trust in the authorities' ability to cope with 
the situation and make the right decisions.  Investigations have shown that radioactivity is 
something that Nordic populations generally have considerable fear of.  However, compared with 
other populations, they also have a high awareness of the risks of radioactivity (Sjöberg et al., 
2000).   
 
It has been reported that personal and general risks are perceived rather differently, particularly 
when the hazards relate to situations where people believe that they have high control (Sjöberg et 
al., 2000).  When an individual expresses confidence in an organisation, he exposes himself to the 
dangers that he expects the organisation to control (Dubreuil et al., 2000).  In this context, it has 
been found that Nordic populations put their greatest trust in the key expert organisations in their 
country (Sjöberg et al., 2000).  However, as they identify broadcast news on radio and TV as the 
most important and trusted sources of information in an emergency situation, they accept that the 
key advise is not given directly by experts, but through 'filters' of decision-makers and other 
implicated authorities.  It is here problematic that only slightly more than half of the respondents to 
an inquiry in Sweden believe that authorities would give full and correct information on a nuclear 
emergency and its implications.  A similar fraction of the Swedish population believe that the 
authorities would take appropriate measures to protect the public (Sjöberg et al., 2000).   
 
 
7.2.3. Trust building 
 
The above is the 'initial' situation that Nordic decision-makers face in the event of an emergency.  
Some key instruments for decision-makers in subsequently maintaining and increasing the trust are 
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openness, correctness and consistency in decisions and information supplied to the public, and the 
inclusion of affected persons and organisations in dialogues to identify optimal solutions to the 
problems.  It is imperative that people are not led to believe that something is hidden or that the 
truth about some important aspect has somehow been twisted.  Also, if decisions (e.g., on 
countermeasures) implemented in one region differ significantly from those implemented in a 
neighbouring region (perhaps in a neighbouring country), the populations should immediately and 
carefully be explained why.  The establishment of a common Nordic basis for decision making is an 
effective instrument in avoiding national decisions that may seem illogical by comparison. 
 
Much can be learned from the Chernobyl accident, where communication efforts were generally 
inadequate, and misunderstandings and misinterpretations were frequent.  For instance, when the 
authorities several times over increased or lowered intervention levels, it would have the natural 
effect that the population comes to believe that no level of radiation can be considered safe.  Myths 
about neglected and deliberately hidden effects of the accident arose in great numbers.  It is perhaps 
more surprising that an inquiry revealed that almost 2 % of the Swedish population believe they 
have an illness problem that was caused by the Chernobyl accident (Sjöberg et al., 2000).  This 
shows that there is still room for improvements of the public perception and awareness of the 
effects of radiation.  Answers to a Norwegian questionnaire indicate that well-educated people in 
general have a significantly lower risk perception than the rest of the population (Salt et al., 1999).  
This suggests that knowledge in general may reduce risk perception, and highlights the need for 
generally comprehensible information.  This questionnaire also revealed that risk perception varies 
significantly between different communities in Europe. 
 
Malicious radioactivity dispersion is likely to have a very different impact on society than 
accidents, depending on how the spreading is accomplished.  If it is for instance released from an 
aeroplane, a rather large population may become affected.  A small explosive is likely to spread 
contamination over a limited area, but individual doses could be very high (Andersson, 2005), 
depending on the construction.  It is difficult to say anything general about the consequences of 
such terrorist acts, but the fact that such an emergency would be the result of an intentional action, 
which could in principle be repeated any time and anywhere, is bound to lead to a high level of 
anxiety.  As the 'scare' effect is in such cases likely to be a disproportionately great source of social 
disruption, it is extremely important that decision-makers have developed an effective public 
communication strategy, which can rapidly be implemented.   
 
 
7.2.4. Issues associated with ethical principles      
 
An important ethical principle is the right of any individual to influence decisions that can impact 
on his well-being.  For instance, it is the duty of any organisation involved in the remediation work 
to obtain the free, informed consent of any worker that is subjected to additional risk (Oughton, 
2004; ILO, 2005).  Economical compensation to volunteers is not an unproblematic solution, for 
instance because the opportunities thus given to some people to profit from the situation may be 
perceived negatively by others.  A similar ethical (and legal) principle relates to the public rights to 
decide over how personal properties are treated.  This principle was not violated when the Russian 
army in 1989 attempted to decontaminate 93 settlements with a total population of 90,000 in the 
contaminated Bryansk region.  However, this was one of the reasons for the very poor dose-
reductive effect obtained in this case.  In these open, rural settlements a large fraction of the 
external dose rate comes from contamination outside the individual land-lot.  This means that if a 
                                                                                             67 
person disallows his area to be treated, then his neighbours will still receive a relatively high dose 
rate even though they have had their own areas treated.   
 
An other concern of ethical nature is whether all individuals can/should be protected equally well 
against radiation resulting from an incident.  Since people live in different types of areas, which do 
not offer equal opportunities to apply countermeasures to reduce doses equally, this is in practice 
impossible.  It would also be reasonable to treat, e.g., schools, children's playgrounds, sand-boxes 
and indoor surfaces that toddlers are particularly likely to be close to exceptionally thoroughly.  
Children should be protected exceptionally well against radiation, as the probability of developing 
radiation induced fatal cancer is on average about twice as high for 0-10 year olds as for adults.  As 
available resources could in practise well be limited, it would also make sense to prioritise treatment 
of densely populated areas before the less populated.  For instance, some rural road surfaces would 
contribute very little to dose.  It should however be stressed that ranking some living areas higher 
than other in a countermeasure strategy, for instance if limited resources are available, may be the 
cause of disputes, again pinpointing the need for continuous dialogue with the affected population.   
 
It can also be argued that it is unreasonable that clean-up workers receive increased doses with the 
objective of reducing doses to other members of society (Oughton, 2004).  If dose rates are 
dominated by short-lived radionuclides, implementation of countermeasures may be postponed to a 
suitable time, to avoid exposing workers unduly.  In general, extra individual doses over a day to a 
clean-up worker would be estimated to be of the order of 2-3 times higher than that to an individual 
living in the area.  Given that a dose rate reduction by a factor of 10 would be considered very high, 
doses received by the workers from long-lived radionuclides over the limited clean-up period would 
be rather small compared to the doses that an individual would subsequently receive by living in the 
area for some time.  Higher doses may be received in connection with a few techniques, where 
waste is concentrated to contain a relatively high level of radioactivity.  Examples are grass cutting 
and street vacuum sweeping.  These additional worker doses are described in the relevant method 
datasheets.  Possible solutions to limit individual exposure, if required, include provision of 
shielding between waste collector vessels and operators, and restrictions on individual working 
times.   
 
 
 
7.2.5. Dissemination of technical knowledge 
 
After the Chernobyl accident, a wide range of countermeasures were tested in the contaminated 
areas of the former Soviet Union.  Under the European framework alone, sixteen research projects 
were conducted in the 1990's, involving some eighty Western European research groups and twenty 
research groups from the three most severely affected republics.  On this background it has been 
concluded that 'the wider dissemination of the results will have very practical and positive 
implications for the affected populations of the three republics' (Roed et al., 2001).  It was however 
also concluded that there was a great need for communication strategies to disseminate this 
knowledge not only to relevant authorities, but also very importantly to the public, to improve the 
public perception and awareness of remedial actions that can be initiated by the population, to 
improve their own conditions.  Knowledge on what locals can do themselves to improve their 
situation may have great psychological value, and possibly prevent desertion of the affected areas.  
Such methods are generally perceived as positive as they would conform with the basic ethical 
principles of autonomy, liberty and dignity (Oughton, 2004).  The countermeasure suite in this 
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report comprises a number of such techniques, which can be implemented by local inhabitants on 
their own property.  This, however, does not mean that it is in general a good idea for the local 
inhabitants to carry out as many of the countermeasures as possible.  Clearly, some important 
countermeasures require a higher level of expertise in order not to jeopardise the result, and for 
instance procedures involving work on a roof top could introduce a comparatively high safety risk 
to inexperienced workers. 
 
 
7.2.6. Preparing for optimal countermeasure implementation 
 
To ensure that a countermeasure is applied correctly and optimised, it is necessary to make a series 
of investigations to determine the nature and extent of the contamination problem.  For instance, in 
connection with the decontamination efforts of the Russian army in 1989, as mentioned above, a 
major problem was that when contaminated topsoil was removed, prior investigations as to how 
deep the contamination lay were neglected.  In some cases, where the contamination peaked a few 
centimetres down, the removal of a thin layer of topsoil actually led to an increase in dose rate.  An 
other problem is that the countermeasures are in practise not carried out by radiation experts who 
can easily comprehend the rationale behind the implementation of a countermeasure.  For instance, 
topsoil removal would often be carried out by contractor companies, exploiting their expertise in 
manoeuvring a mini-bulldozer.  However, such operators are used to carry out the procedure with a 
completely different objective.  Whereas a typical 'contractor' task may be to remove soil so that the 
ground is plane, the objective in connection with a decontamination operation would be to remove a 
homogeneous, thin surface layer and avoid mixing of soil layers and smearing of contaminated 
topsoil on cleaned areas.  Such differences should be explained carefully and it would be beneficial 
if at least the first runs could be supervised by persons that are well informed of the objectives and 
potential pitfalls and know how the countermeasure diverges from common practise.  Therefore, an 
effective operational preparedness would comprise a number of methodological instructors, who 
have attended courses and are familiar with the special rationale of emergency management.  
Further, it would be beneficial to have leaflets with basic information on countermeasures available 
in the event of an emergency, so as to ensure that particularly those countermeasures that need to be 
implemented early to be effective will not be delayed unduly.  Such basic information could be 
derived at different ‘user levels’ on the basis of the data sheet material in this handbook. 
 
It is also extremely important to develop a public communication strategy to demystify the various 
implementations by explaining their rationales and discussing their implications and extent of 
application.  The European STRATEGY project (Howard et al., 2005) has formulated a generic 
communication strategy, involving various stages of public dialogue, reviewing and entering 
dialogue outputs into a decision support model and various subsequent stakeholder reviews prior to 
implementation of countermeasures.  A scheme of this type is desirable because it has the potential 
to ensure that all relevant aspects are brought up and any potential communication problems may be 
identified and resolved prior to countermeasure implementation.  However, such a process is time-
consuming and can only be considered for countermeasure strategies that do not require early 
planning.  Some countermeasures which greatly impinge on long-term doses need to be 
implemented early to be effective.    
 
Last but not least, the responsible preparedness organisations should identify the countermeasures 
that would be deemed most suitable for inclusion in local preparedness plans, given, e.g., the 
climate, topography, population density and availability of equipment.  For each of these selected 
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countermeasures it would be extremely useful to have identified practical plans to overcome 
foreseeable problems prior to any implementation.  Persons and organisations that would be 
responsible for the practical implementation, supervision, radiological control measurements and 
dissemination of relevant information to operators and the public should be identified and made 
aware of their duties.  It should be assessed that the responsible persons possess the required 
operator skills and sufficient knowledge of any potential health aspects to be aware of and as far as 
possible reduce hazards.  Also, it is important to keep track of material resources, in the forms of 
required equipment, utilities, consumables, infrastructure, etc., to ensure that they are sufficient and 
can be made ready for implementation within the relevant time-frame.  Also for instance 
demographic information databases may be highly beneficial in estimating the effect of a 
countermeasure for a specific area.  All this requires implementation in an operational preparedness, 
and requires active selection of information material from this handbook and other sources prior to 
an emergency situation. 
 
 
 
 
 
      Some issues to consider in relation to social, ethical and communication factors: 
 
• Has it been considered which direct costs the countermeasure implementation will have 
on society? 
• Which indirect, economical, social, psychological and ethical problems could arise from 
countermeasure implementation, and which problems would be solved? 
• How could the problems be addressed, with respect to re-establishment of societal 
functions and minimisation of penalties?  
• Have adequate steps been made towards establishment of strategies for communication in 
an emergency, e.g., with the public and media? 
• Have local assessments of risk perception been adequately considered in development of 
communication strategies? 
• Do implementation plans contain sufficient level of stakeholder dialogue to avoid social 
disruption / problems? 
• Is there risk that ethical key issues could be violated? 
• Is the decision-making platform sufficiently matured to eliminate the risk of implements 
that could be seen as contradictory? 
• Has it been ensured that affected persons are adequately informed of any additional risks 
that might arise and given a reasonable choice? 
• Is the level of information given to operators sufficient to ensure optimal countermeasure 
implementation? 
• Have practical methodological requirements been identified in local context, and has this 
knowledge been communicated out so that availability (also of technical support, e.g., for 
measurements) is secured prior to an emergency? 
                                                                                             70 
8. Application examples for countermeasure strategy 
development 
 
This chapter provides a couple of worked examples, aimed at illustrating how the information 
written in some of the other chapters can be used to narrow down the possible choices, so as to 
facilitate strategical decision-making for dose reduction in the intermediate to late phase following 
contamination of an inhabited area.  Different types of incidents can lead to very different concerns 
determining the choices.  For instance, a major reactor accident is, as demonstrated by the 
Chernobyl accident, likely to give a more homogeneous and widespread contamination pattern over 
an area than would a ‘dirty bomb’ device.  To cover different aspects of decision making, therefore, 
two different worked examples are given in this chapter. It should be stressed that these are, for the 
purpose of illustration, simplified examples, and that in reality the contamination level and 
distribution over an area, for which a given decision-maker might be in charge, could vary 
considerably (e.g., due to rainfall pattern), demanding different countermeasure strategies with 
different degrees of disruptive influences on the area.  Therefore, geographical information systems 
and dose maps, as included in the standard European decision support systems like ARGOS and 
RODOS, would be valuable in selecting appropriate strategies for different parts of a contaminated 
region.  In the case of a terror attack, such areas could be very small, depending on the 
characteristics of the applied dispersion device.  Also, different types of environments would 
require different countermeasure strategies, as outlined above.      
   
 
8.1.  A worked example involving a reactor accident scenario  
 
For the sake of briefly demonstrating the use of some of the information in Chapters 3-7, let us 
assume that a reactor accident on the 15th of July has resulted in an atmospheric release of 
radionuclides, and it rained while the contaminated plume passed over a city area.  This has been 
found to lead to a contamination level of 1 MBq m-2 of 137Cs on the grassed reference surface (for 
simplicity we will assume that the contributions of other radionuclides to the long term external 
dose are negligible).  The question is: how severe is the long-term situation for the persons staying 
in the affected city area, and what could be done about it?   
 
Let us assume that a given area consists mainly of terrace houses that would be adequately 
described by the third housing environment in section 4.2.  Table 4.6 gives time-integrated doses 
received by inhabitants of such an environment from outdoor sources over different periods of time.  
As can be seen, the external dose over 70 years for the given contamination level of 137Cs is 
estimated to 2.8 10-8 Sv per Bq m-2.  With 1 MBq m-2, this becomes 28 mSv.  Correspondingly, it is 
seen that the external dose over the first year would be estimated to 2.3 mSv.  As mentioned in 
section 4.1, more flexible and possibly more accurate modelling incorporating also other 
radionuclides could be made with the model instruments that are currently under development.   
 
As we are dealing with a predominantly wet deposition, indoor contamination levels will contribute 
very little to dose (see section 4.3).   Doses from contamination on humans (see section 4.4) are 
only likely to have importance in a dry deposition scenario, as the time people would spend 
outdoors in the rain would be likely to be limited compared with the time it takes for the 
contaminated plume to pass.  Doses from inhalation of contaminants during the passage of the 
contaminated plume would not be significant in a wet deposition situation, where near-ground air 
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concentrations will be strongly depleted by the rain.  In a densely populated city area, kitchen 
garden production (see Chapter 5) would be likely to have little significance. 
 
As the contamination resulted from a reactor accident, it can be assumed that the relative 
distribution of the contaminants will be as indicated by Table 4.5 (wet deposition), although in 
reality measurements of the contamination levels on the various surfaces would probably have been 
made in compliance with section 2.6.  By multiplication of the values in Table 4.3 for terrace 
houses by the contamination level on the grassed reference surface and the relative source strength 
factors from Table 4.5, it is seen that in this case, more than half of the dose received over the first 
year by an average inhabitant of the contaminated area is due to contamination on the open 
(grassed) areas.  It is also seen that the corresponding fraction of the dose integrated over 70 years 
would be of the order of 90 %.  As efficient countermeasures exist for reduction of dose 
contributions from contaminated open (grassed) areas (see Chapter 3 and Appendix A), it is clear 
that this is where the greatest dose saving could be made.   
 
If we look at the countermeasure datasheets in Appendix A, there are eight different methods that 
could in general be considered for open (grassed) areas: 
 
 
1. Lawn mowing   
2. Turf harvesting   
3. Top soil removal (manually)   
4. Top soil removal (mechanically)   
5. Triple digging of soil   
6. Deep ploughing of soil   
7. Skim-and-burial ploughing of soil   
8. Snow removal from open areas   
 
 
As indicated in the individual countermeasure descriptions, some of these methods would not be 
relevant for this particular case.  Let us assume that we look for methods to be applied in garden 
areas of relatively limited areas.   
 
Grass cutting is not relevant here, as it is a method that only has significant effect if the 
contamination is dry.  Turf harvesting might be considered, but requires a specialised machine that 
may not be available.  Snow removal is clearly not the solution, as we are in the month of July.  
Finally, the ploughing procedures could be applied in large park areas, but require much open space 
and would thus not be relevant for limited garden lots.  This leaves us with the following three 
options: 
 
1. Top soil removal (manually) 
2. Top soil removal (mechanically) 
3. Triple digging of soil 
 
Which of these is the most suitable for the particular case largely depends on the total costs and 
benefits, but it also needs to be assessed if any of the methods would be in conflict with the local 
legislation and general acceptability (see Chapter 7).  If we look at the detailed method descriptions 
in the countermeasure datasheets (Chapter 3), it is evident that the two topsoil removal methods 
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have equal effectiveness in reducing dose.  The difference lies in whether the soil is removed by 
hand or by machines (e.g., mini-bulldozers).  If we look at the intervention costs, it is apparent that 
the mechanical version is the least expensive.  However, it requires the use of machinery, which 
must be available within a reasonable time-frame.  As the 137Cs is very long-lived, much dose can 
however be saved, by implementation of this countermeasure even after several years (see Table 
4.5).   
 
Looking again at the datasheets, the main differences between digging and soil removal procedures 
are that by digging, the dose reduction is obtained without actually removing the contamination 
from the soil area – it is simply buried, whereby a shielding effect is obtained.  This may not be 
acceptable to property owners and other stakeholders (this is something it could in general well be 
worth investigating locally in advance of a contaminating incident).  Also other method-specific 
potential constraints and limiting factors are listed in the datasheets, which should be considered in 
relation to the given situation.  Digging also involves rather much hard physical work, compared 
with a method like mechanical topsoil removal.  On the other hand, contrary to topsoil removal, it 
would not generate waste.  Management of waste would result in additional elements on the cost 
side.  Both methods would have a significant adverse aesthetic effect on the treated garden area.  
This adverse effect could to some extent be described in terms of the costs of re-establishment of 
the gardens. 
 
A cost-benefit analysis to 'measure' one countermeasure against another would require evaluation of 
the magnitude of essentially all cost and benefit aspects of the countermeasure implementation.  If, 
for instance, we look at triple digging, the equipment is inexpensive, so that intervention costs can 
largely be calculated from the labour costs alone (20 euros per m2 multiplied by the size of the 
treated area).  The obvious benefit of the countermeasure is a reduction of the dose rate 1m above 
the surface by a factor of 5-10.  By multiplication of the relevant value in Table 4.3 by the reference 
surface contamination level, the relative source strength from Table 4.5 (for soil areas: 1.0) and the 
dose reduction factor from the relevant datasheet, it will be possible to find how great a dose saving 
to an average individual living in the area this would correspond to in the particular case.   The total 
averted dose is equal to the sum of the averted doses to individuals living in the treated area.  It 
could be convenient to express the value of this dose saving in monetary units, as suggested in 
section 3.2.  The value that would be assigned to a saved dose unit would be politically driven, and 
likely to vary between the Nordic countries.  An example is that the Swedish ministries in 1998 
recommended a value corresponding to 350,000 SEK per Sv (RIB, software published by the 
Swedish Rescue Service).  Somehow, social and ethical factors also need to enter the decision 
matrix.  Factors like reassurance, disruption, loss of productivity and loss of property value (see 
Chapter 7) may be highly important to consider in optimising countermeasure implementation.  
Such factors can be difficult to quantify in terms that are readily comparable, and it is clearly 
something decision-makers will need to consider carefully, as soon as possible.  It is currently 
considered to incorporate a special user-friendly prioritising system in European decision support 
systems, to facilitate optimisation with respect to all important factors.   
 
Compared with digging, soil removal procedures will have one important extra cost-element: waste 
management.  In the individual datasheets, the amounts of all types of wastes originating from the 
introduction of countermeasures are estimated per m2 area treated.  By multiplying with the relevant 
surface area sizes in the environment, the total amounts of waste generated can be estimated.  In 
Chapter 6, some suggested waste management options are described.  If a simple, yet safe, waste 
repository is constructed for 500 m3 removed soil, this will cost an additional 3000 euro.  This cost 
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should also be included in the consideration of justification and optimisation of countermeasures.  If 
repositories can for some reason not be constructed locally in the contaminated area, extra costs for 
waste transport need to be added.     
 
Similar cost-benefit considerations should be made for treatment of other types of contaminated 
surface in the inhabited area.  If the net benefit is positive, the implementation of the 
countermeasure strategy is justified.  In town centres, open soil areas would be small compared with 
those assumed in the calculations above, and so other surfaces would be comparatively more 
important.  Even if a method does not save much dose, its implementation would still be justified, if 
the cost is sufficiently low.  An example of this could be vacuum-sweeping of streets.  The dose that 
can be averted by this method would often be limited, as natural weathering processes will anyhow 
lead to a rapid decline in contamination levels on streets.  However, it is extremely easily carried 
out, with very small costs, and thus still attractive, although it often needs to be combined with 
countermeasures for other surfaces that can effectively reduce the doses to inhabitants of the area. 
 
When countermeasures are to be carried out in practise, it is important to consider protection of 
workers.  For instance, if short-lived radionuclides had contributed much to the dose rate in the 
earliest few days or weeks (as is not assumed to be the case here), countermeasure implementation 
could be delayed for a while, to avert unnecessary worker doses.  Information on operator safety 
precautions in connection with the implementation of the countermeasures can be found in the 
individual datasheets.  Sections 3.2 and 4.6 gives some generic information of relevance in this 
context. 
 
Also the role of monitoring in ensuring the optimal outcome of the countermeasure strategy should 
be carefully considered (see Section 2.6).  A countermeasure strategy implemented without careful 
monitoring could have disastrous effects. 
 
Chapter 7 gives important information on items to be considered in advance of a contaminating 
incident, particularly in relation to non-radiological factors.   
 
 
 
8.2.  A worked example involving a ‘malicious dispersion’ scenario (terror attack)  
 
A problem with predicting the impact on a population of a terror attack is that many very different 
scenarios are conceivable, and the available data on nuclear incidents relates specifically to other 
types of incidents, such as large accidents at nuclear installations.  Moreover, existing preparedness 
models are currently not equipped with parameter sets that allow adequate estimation of 
consequences.  Adequate prediction of the consequences of a ‘dirty bomb’ would require detailed 
consideration of for instance relevant dispersion mechanisms and their implications for contaminant 
aerosol characteristics, effective 'release' heights, and deposition patterns in the inhabited 
environment.  Nevertheless, there are obvious similarities between incidents involving atmospheric 
dispersion of radioactivity, and much of the information in this handbook on, e.g., decision 
frameworks, recovery options, protection of workers and waste management has been written in a 
way that would apply to essentially any type of contaminating incident.  Also, this handbook, 
probably as the first of its kind, contains guidance on estimation of doses from a ‘dirty bomb’ 
scenario, assuming that contamination levels on the ground are known (either measured or 
estimated through the use of sophisticated urban scale dispersion models). 
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One of the recently most discussed potential means of malicious dispersion of radioactive matter is 
the so-called 'dirty bomb', where a conventional bomb disperses contaminants.  This would 
typically have greatest effect in a city area, and in dry weather.  Undoubtedly, any terrorist would be 
aware of this, so these would be the likely conditions.  There are many 'orphaned' sources in the 
world, which no longer serve a purpose and are not kept track of.  They could thus rather easily fall 
into the hands of terrorist organisations.  This is for instance the case in the former Soviet Union, 
where military sources have found their way into illegal trading after the collapse of the old regime.  
One example is that in the winter of 2002, three residents of Tsalenjikha in Georgia suffered severe 
radiation sickness and skin burns after having found a 90Sr source in the forest (Falkor News, 2005).  
This source had in the Soviet days been in use to power a thermoelectric generator for a 
communication tower in a remote nature area.  Such generators were also widely used in 
lighthouses, beacons, and other unmanned facilities (STONY, 2005).  Although also other 
radionuclides would be suited for dispersal by a 'dirty bomb', 90Sr is advantageous over most in that 
it is a pure beta emitter.  This means that only little shielding material would be required to enable 
safe handling of the bomb prior to its detonation.   
 
If a terrorist detonates a 90Sr 'dirty bomb', it will generate a haze of contaminated particles, which 
will deposit over an area of the city.  The magnitude and shape of the affected area would depend 
on factors such as the size of the blast, wind conditions, and 'roughness' elements of the area 
(buildings, vegetation, etc.).  The terrorist would be likely to inform the authorities/public of the 
incident, at least when it has occurred, as the inherent scare effect would be desired.  This means 
that the authorities would know that something has been dispersed by the bomb, but perhaps not 
exactly what.  
 
When a monitoring crew has been sent out, it will soon be apparent that rapid screening of large 
areas, in accordance with section 2.4, is exceedingly difficult, since the range in air of the beta 
particles emitted by 90Sr is short.  On the other hand, it will be very clear where the point of 'release' 
is, and a somewhat slow monitoring effort with handheld beta detectors can take place at increasing 
distance, to map the probably rather inhomogeneous distribution of contaminants on different 
surfaces.  In this context, a local scale dispersion model working from actual meteorological data 
would be helpful in obtaining an overview of the situation (such a model is currently under 
development for the ARGOS decision support system).  A rough measure of the dose rate to freely 
exposed skin from a given level of contamination on the ground can be obtained using the 
conservative conversion factor of 4 10-13 Sv h-1 per Bq m-2 (see section 4.2).  As mentioned in 
section 4.2, corresponding doses to inner organs would be very much lower.  As mentioned also in 
section 4.2, the dose rate from contamination on soil would be likely to be reduced considerably 
over a limited period of time, due to slight penetration of the contaminants into the soil.  If the large 
contaminant particles were not readily soluble (solubility of strontium compounds vary widely), 
they would probably rather rapidly be removed from impermeable surfaces (e.g., streets) by wind 
and weather.  If they were more readily soluble, the contamination would be likely to become 
incorporated in environmental surfaces/particles.  The dose rate conversion factor given in section 
4.2 would, due to the short range of beta particles, only apply during periods where persons would 
be staying unshielded, near (within about a metre of) the contaminated surface.   
 
It would be recommended to screen persons that were present in the area during a period after the 
incident (section 2.6.3).  Doses from contamination on human skin – even over a short period of 
time - can be high (see section 4.4).  However, it should be considered that the size distribution of 
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contaminant particles originating from a 'dirty bomb' incident would be likely to be very different 
from that after a nuclear power plant accident.  A very large fraction of the particles would be likely 
to be in the ca. 2-20 µm size range, but most of the activity would probably be associated with 
larger particles in the 100 µm range, depending on the construction of the bomb and the 
physicochemical form of the applied radionuclides (Andersson, 2005).  By far the most exposed 
persons are those who were outdoors during the incident (or indoors with open windows).  This is 
because the major part of the contamination is associated with large particles, and the typical 
relationship between indoor and outdoor air concentrations of large particles will be extremely little.  
Only the smallest of the particles would be likely to be able to enter a dwelling if air ducts (doors, 
windows) are closed, and resultant doses to indoor persons could for this fraction of the 
contaminants probably adequately be estimated using the factors given in Table 4.8.  Outdoors, also 
very large particles would deposit strongly on persons, and this could give significant doses, 
although such particles would not be expected to stay on the skin very long.  Doses can, according 
to aerosolisation processes, be estimated using Tables 4.9 and 4.10.  To limit doses from 
contamination on skin, possibly exposed persons should be instructed as early as possible to wash 
and scrub their body very thoroughly.  However, unnecessary countermeasures in this direction 
would be likely to result in considerable undue anxiety and disruption.  
 
As for external doses from indoor contamination, it should again be considered that only a limited 
fraction of the contaminants (the smallest particles) would be able to enter a dwelling.  However, 
due to the generally very limited depth of penetration of contaminants into indoor surfaces, external 
doses received from indoor contamination of 90Sr might well be of the same order of magnitude as 
those from outdoor contamination (Andersson, 2005).   
 
Doses from inhalation of resuspended contaminants would be expected to be small, both since the 
dose conversion factors given in Table 4.13 are in general rather small, and because the largest 
particles carrying most of the activity would not be inhalable.  
 
Needless to say, workers should be protected in compliance with the principles referenced in 
sections 3.2 and 7.1.   
 
As for countermeasures, essentially the same methods would be available, as would be considered 
for, e.g., a power plant accident scenario (see Chapter 3, Appendix A and section 8.1).  However, if 
deposited contaminant particles are very large, the efficiency of some countermeasures would be 
likely to be significantly higher than the current version of the datasheets describe (see, e.g., Clark 
& Cobbin, 1964).  Also, given that a 'dirty bomb' incident would be expected to affect much smaller 
areas than would for instance a nuclear power plant explosion, it might be desired to further 
increase the dose reducing effect in the affected area, even if it requires much more expenditure per 
unit area.  Also, the contamination pattern would be expected to be less homogeneous after a ‘dirty 
bomb’ than after a major nuclear accident that occurred at some distance, and assessments based on 
only few measurements could possibly underestimate the problems connected with a ‘dirty bomb’ 
detonation.  This means that some relatively expensive methods that would not be considered for 
large scale operations, and are thus not currently in the countermeasure database, could become 
attractive.  Here, for instance, experience from decontamination on-site in nuclear installations 
might be exploited.  The implementation of countermeasures would still be subject to cost-benefit 
optimisation (see Chapter 3), but the society's willingness to pay to reduce the adverse 
consequences of the incident may well differ between different types of incidents (see section 7.2, 
also for other 'social' factors).      
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Conclusions 
 
A handbook has been written with the purpose of providing extensive information and background 
data to decision-makers on how to establish a countermeasure strategy for remediation of inhabited 
areas contaminated by airborne releases of radionuclides.  The contamination may originate from a 
large nuclear power plant accident or from the detonation of a ‘dirty bomb’ for malicious dispersion 
of radioactive matter.  The data presented needs careful consideration and elaboration in the local 
context in order to establish a preparedness for inhabited areas that is operational and can select the 
optimal countermeasure strategies with respect to the full range of site/case specific factors.  Factors 
that would need to be assessed locally include the value assigned to a saved unit of dose, and the 
extent and importance of societal impact (positive/negative) of countermeasure implementation.  
Communication is a key instrument in avoiding social disruption, and some advice on 
communication aspects is given.  The handbook consists of a series of chapters addressing the 
various important aspects to be considered in connection with remediation of contaminated 
inhabited areas.  These span from descriptions of the current responsibilities of the key players in 
the countermeasure strategy development in each Nordic country, over instruments to identify the 
extent of the radiological problem to be addressed, to comprehensive descriptions of potentially 
suitable countermeasure options and their implications, e.g., with respect to waste generation and 
management, implementation costs and other factors that will need to enter the decision matrix. 
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Appendix A: Countermeasure datasheets for inhabited areas 
in general 
 
The generic URBHAND countermeasure template format is shown below, and the descriptions for 
the 17 individual countermeasures that have been selected as most appropriate for Nordic 
contaminated inhabited areas in general are shown in the following pages of this appendix.   
 
 
Name of countermeasure 
Method description  
Surface type / scale   
Relevant contaminants  
Time of implementation  
Requirements: 
• Equipment / remedies and their costs  
• Consumables and other practical requirements  
• Operator skills and costs  
• Operator safety  
• Other practical constraints   
• Factors influencing costs  
Effectiveness: 
• Countermeasure effectiveness  
• Factors influencing effectiveness and averted 
dose/risk 
 
Waste: 
• Amount and type  
• Waste management recommendations  
• Specific waste problems   
Further constraints, concerns, side-effects and 
other costs 
 
State of testing  
Key references  
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Roof cleaning by pressurised hot water trolley 
Method description The cleaning is done through rotating nozzles 
driven by hot water (ca. 65 °C), at high pressure. 
Contrary to ordinary high pressure hosing, this 
system is closed so that contaminant spreading is 
minimised.  The device is mounted on a trolley 
that can be drawn up across the roof.  It is 
operated from the top of the roof.  The loosened 
contamination will be washed to the roof gutter 
system and can be collected from the drain pipe, 
if desired. 
Surface type / scale  Contaminated roofs.  Can be applied on a large 
scale if equipment can be made available within 
a reasonable timeframe considering important 
radionuclide half-lives. 
Relevant contaminants Cs (and other long-lived gamma emitting 
radionuclides) 
Time of implementation Should be carried out as early as possible, when 
the radiological situation is clear, but worker 
doses must be considered. Could be postponed 
for several years and still have effect on, e.g., Cs, 
depending on roof material and removable 
debris/growth. 
Requirements: 
• Equipment / remedies and their costs Roof cleaning trolley (ca. 500 EURO) and high 
pressure hot water generator (40,000 EURO). 
• Consumables and other practical 
requirements 
30 l m-2 of water.  Power supply.  Possibly 
mobile lifts for operation from the roof (variable 
costs).  
• Operator skills and costs No particular worker skills, but some instructions 
needed.  Estimated to ca. 10 minutes per m2 roof 
for each of 2 workers. Workers could be e.g., fire 
brigade, professional roof workers, civil defence 
or possibly volunteers.  
• Operator safety Lifeline. Safety helmets.  Water proof safety 
clothing recommended. Inhalation hazard is 
negligible. Should not be carried out as self help, 
because of risk of falling from the roof. 
• Other practical constraints Care must be taken not to block drains with 
moss, etc. 
• Factors influencing costs Distance to and transport options for equipment 
and consumables.  Type of possible mobile lifts 
(height of building).  Worker effectiveness. 
Worker wages.  Area size influences costs per 
unit area. 
Effectiveness: 
• Countermeasure effectiveness Reduction of Cs contamination by 50-85 %.  
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• Factors influencing effectiveness and 
averted dose/risk 
Radionuclide (Cs is strongest bound to surface).  
Contaminant aerosol type (size, solubility). 
Compliance with described procedure.  Roof 
material (lowest effect for slate, clay and 
concrete roofs, best effect for silicon-treated slate 
and aluminium/ iron).  Amount of water/time 
used and pressure. Care taken to wash 
contamination to the roof gutter rather than 
translocating it on the roof.  Increased water 
temperature (to e.g., 80 °C) will increase the 
effect. As time passes, some of the contamination 
will become more firmly fixed to the roof 
material.  If a surface layer of moss/algae covers 
the roof at the time of the contamination, almost 
all the contamination may be removable.  
Contamination in neighbouring areas influences 
avertable individual doses.  Collective averted 
doses depend on population density and 
behaviour.   
Waste: 
• Amount and type Generates some 30 l m-2 of liquid waste, with ca. 
0.2 kg m-2 of solid waste containing nearly all 
contamination. Solid waste contamination level: 
ca. 7000 Bq m-3 per Bq m-2). Waste may be toxic 
(asbestos). 
• Waste management recommendations After filtration in a simple filter the water can be 
disposed of. Simple repositories should be 
constructed. Costs related to transport and 
disposal must be considered. 
• Specific waste problems  Public acceptability and legal feasibility of waste 
treatment and storage route should be assessed. 
Further limitations, concerns, side-
effects and other costs 
Influences public reassurance. Visual 
improvement (nice clean roof).  Clear 
information material for users and affected 
persons must be available before application of 
method. 
State of testing Tested on selected roofs of different types in the 
laboratory and in the CIS after the Chernobyl 
accident, on realistic scale.   
Key references K.G. Andersson, G.V. Antsipov, G.A. Astashko, 
M.I. Balonov, A.N. Barkovsky, O.M. Bogachev, 
V. Yu. Golikov, I.A. Kenik, L.N. Kovgan, S.A. 
Matveenko, A. Kh. Mirkhairdarov, J. Roed & P. 
Zombori: "Guide on decontamination of rural 
settlements in the late period after radioactive 
contamination with long-lived radionuclides", 
IAEA Working Document TC Project 
RER/9/059, IAEA, Vienna, 84 p., 2001. 
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Roof cleaning by high pressure water 
Method description High pressure washing with 'professional' 
equipment (typically at about 150 bar) can often 
loosen much of the contamination on a roof.  A 
continuous water flow must be applied to ensure 
that the removed contaminants are washed to the 
roof gutter system.  The waste stream can be 
collected from the drain pipe, if desired.   
Surface type / scale  Contaminated roofs.  Can be applied on a large 
scale if equipment can be made available within 
a reasonable timeframe considering important 
radionuclide half-lives. 
Relevant contaminants Cs (and other long-lived gamma emitting 
radionuclides) 
Time of implementation Should be carried out as early as possible, when 
the radiological situation is clear, but worker 
doses must be considered. Could be postponed 
for several years and still have effect on, e.g., Cs, 
depending on roof material and removable 
debris/growth. 
Requirements: 
• Equipment / remedies and their costs 'Mobile' pressure washer (ca. 80 kg) with turbo 
nozzle and hose pipes (ca. 3,000 EURO).   
• Consumables and other practical 
requirements 
20 l m-2 of water.  Power supply.  Possibly 
mobile lifts or scaffolding for operation on the 
roof (variable costs).  
• Operator skills and costs No particular worker skills, but some instructions 
needed.  Estimated to ca. 1-2 minutes per m2 roof 
(alternatively, fire-hosing at 0.1-0.2 minutes per 
m2). Workers could be e.g., fire brigade, 
professional roof workers, civil defence or 
possibly volunteers.  
• Operator safety Lifeline. Safety helmets.  Water proof safety 
clothing and safety glasses recommended. Dust 
formation will be limited due to the water. 
Should not be carried out as self help, because of 
risk of falling from the roof. 
• Other practical constraints Care must be taken not to block drains with 
moss, etc.  Frost (may require water heating). 
• Factors influencing costs Distance to and transport options for equipment 
and consumables.  Type of possible mobile lifts 
or scaffolding (height of building).  Worker 
effectiveness. Worker wages.  Area size 
influences costs per unit area. 
Effectiveness: 
• Countermeasure effectiveness Reduction of Cs contamination by 40-80 %.  
                                                                                             88 
• Factors influencing effectiveness and 
averted dose/risk 
Radionuclide (Cs is strongest bound to surface).  
Contaminant aerosol type (size, solubility). 
Compliance with described procedure.  Roof 
material (lowest effect for slate, clay and 
concrete roofs, best effect for silicon-treated slate 
and aluminium/ iron).  Amount of water/time 
used and pressure. Care taken to wash 
contamination to the roof gutter rather than 
translocating it on the roof.  Increased water 
temperature (to e.g., 80 °C) will increase the 
effect. As time passes, some of the contamination 
will become more firmly fixed to the roof 
material.  If a surface layer of moss/algae covers 
the roof at the time of the contamination, almost 
all the contamination may be removable.  
Contamination in neighbouring areas influences 
avertable individual doses.  Collective averted 
doses depend on population density and 
behaviour. 
Waste: 
• Amount and type Generates some 20 l m-2 of liquid waste, with ca. 
0.2 kg m-2 of solid waste containing nearly all 
contamination. Solid waste contamination level: 
ca. 7000 Bq m-3 per Bq m-2). Waste may be toxic 
(asbestos). 
• Waste management recommendations After filtration in a simple filter the water can be 
disposed of. Simple repositories should be 
constructed. Costs related to transport and 
disposal must be considered. 
• Specific waste problems  Public acceptability and legal feasibility of waste 
treatment and storage route should be assessed. 
Further limitations, concerns, side-
effects and other costs 
Influences public reassurance. Visual 
improvement (cleaner roof).  Clear information 
material for users and affected persons must be 
available before application of method. 
State of testing Tested on selected roofs of different types in the 
laboratory and in the CIS and in Europe after the 
Chernobyl accident, on realistic scale.   
Key references J. Roed & K.G. Andersson:  "Clean-up of Urban 
Areas in the CIS Countries Contaminated by 
Chernobyl Fallout", J. Environmental 
Radioactivity vol.33, no.2, pp. 107-116, 1996. 
K.G. Andersson & J. Roed: "A Nordic 
Preparedness Guide for Early Clean-up in 
Radioactively Contaminated Residential Areas", J. 
Environmental Radioactivity vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 
207-223, 1999. 
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Wall cleaning by high pressure water 
Method description High pressure washing with 'professional' 
equipment (typically at about 150 bar) can often 
loosen much of the contamination on a wall.  A 
continuous water flow must be applied to ensure 
that the removed contaminants are washed off 
the wall and to the ground.  The washing must be 
done in a sequence from the top down to the 
bottom of the wall. Alternatively, fire-hosing 
may be applied at (hydrant pressure), but with 
less effect. 
Surface type / scale  Contaminated outer walls.  It should be 
considered that water may possibly penetrate 
wooden walls. Can be applied on a large scale in 
densely populated or very strongly contaminated 
areas if equipment can be made available within 
a reasonable timeframe considering important 
radionuclide half-lives. 
Relevant contaminants Cs (and other long-lived gamma or beta emitting 
radionuclides) 
Time of implementation Should be carried out as early as possible, when 
the radiological situation is clear, but worker 
doses must be considered. Could be postponed 
for several years and still have effect on, e.g., Cs. 
Requirements: 
• Equipment / remedies and their costs 'Mobile' pressure washer (ca. 80 kg) with turbo 
nozzle and hose pipes (ca. 3,000 EURO).  
Alternatively, fire-hosing equipment (ca. 1,000 
EURO). 
• Consumables and other practical 
requirements 
20 l m-2 of water.  Power supply.  Possibly 
mobile lifts or scaffolds for operation on tall 
buildings (variable costs).  
• Operator skills and costs No particular worker skills, but some instructions 
needed.  Estimated to ca. 1-2 minutes per m2 roof 
(alternatively, fire-hosing at 0.1-0.2 minutes per 
m2). Workers could be e.g., fire brigade, 
professional construction workers, civil defence 
or possibly volunteers.  
• Operator safety Water proof safety clothing and safety glasses 
recommended. For tall buildings: lifeline and 
safety helmets.  Dust formation will be limited 
due to the water.  
• Other practical constraints If there is no drain in the ground to take up the 
waste water, basements may be damaged.  Frost 
(may require water heating).  The treatment may 
necessitate repair or plastering of the wall. 
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• Factors influencing costs Distance to and transport options for equipment 
and consumables.  Type of possible mobile lifts 
or scaffolds (height of building).  Worker 
effectiveness. Worker wages.  Area size 
influences costs per unit area. 
Effectiveness: 
• Countermeasure effectiveness Reduction of Cs contamination by 40-80 %.  
• Factors influencing effectiveness and 
averted dose/risk 
Radionuclide (Cs is strongest bound to surface).  
Contaminant aerosol type (size, solubility). 
Compliance with described procedure.  Wall 
material generally has little influence, although 
plastered walls may be slightly easier to clean. 
Amount of water/time used and pressure. Care 
taken to wash contamination completely off the 
wall.  Increased water temperature (to e.g., 80 
°C) will increase the effect. As time passes, some 
of the contamination will become more firmly 
fixed to the wall material.  Contamination in 
neighbouring areas influences avertable 
individual doses.  Collective averted doses 
depend on population density and behaviour. 
Waste: 
• Amount and type Generates some 20 l m-2 of liquid waste, with ca. 
0.4 kg m-2 of solid waste containing nearly all 
contamination. Solid waste contamination level: 
ca. 4000 Bq m-3 per Bq m-2).  The waste is 
virtually impossible to collect. 
• Waste management recommendations The only way to remove the washed-off material 
from the area is to clean the (often much stronger 
contaminated) underlying surface subsequently. 
• Specific waste problems  - 
Further limitations, concerns, side-
effects and other costs 
Influences public reassurance. Visual 
improvement (cleaner wall).  Clear information 
material for users and affected persons must be 
available before application of method. 
State of testing Tested on selected walls of different types in the 
laboratory and in the CIS and in Europe after the 
Chernobyl accident, on realistic scale.   
Key references J. Roed & K.G. Andersson:  "Clean-up of Urban 
Areas in the CIS Countries Contaminated by 
Chernobyl Fallout", J. Environmental 
Radioactivity vol.33, no.2, pp. 107-116, 1996. 
K.G. Andersson & J. Roed: "A Nordic 
Preparedness Guide for Early Clean-up in 
Radioactively Contaminated Residential Areas", J. 
Environmental Radioactivity vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 
207-223, 1999. 
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Wall cleaning by wet sandblasting 
Method description As the contamination will be confined to a very 
thin layer of the wall, this can be removed by 
sandblasting.  Sandblasting should be wet to 
suppress dust.  The sandblasting must be done in 
a sequence from the top down to the bottom of 
the wall, to avoid translocation of contaminants. 
Surface type / scale  Contaminated outer walls.  Can be applied on a 
large scale in densely populated or very strongly 
contaminated areas if equipment can be made 
available within a reasonable timeframe 
considering important radionuclide half-lives. 
Relevant contaminants Cs (and other long-lived gamma emitting 
radionuclides) 
Time of implementation Should be carried out as early as possible, when 
the radiological situation is clear, but worker 
doses must be considered. Could be postponed 
for several years and still have effect on, e.g., Cs. 
Requirements: 
• Equipment / remedies and their costs 'Mobile' pressure washer (ca. 80 kg) with hose 
pipe and sandblasting device injecting sand into 
the water stream (ca. 3,000 EURO).   
• Consumables and other practical 
requirements 
50 l m-2 of water.  2 kg m-2 of sand.  Power 
supply.  Possibly mobile lifts or scaffolds for 
operation on tall buildings (variable costs).  
• Operator skills and costs Skills of construction/decontamination workers 
can be exploited.  In any case, some instructions 
needed.  Estimated to ca. 3-4 minutes per m2 
roof. Workers could be e.g., fire brigade, 
professional construction workers, civil defence 
or possibly volunteers.  
• Operator safety Water proof safety clothing and safety glasses 
recommended. For tall buildings: lifeline and 
safety helmets.  Dust formation will be limited 
due to the water, but respiratory protection is 
required.  
• Other practical constraints If there is no drain in the ground to take up the 
waste water, basements may be damaged.  Frost 
(may require water heating).  The treatment may 
necessitate repair or plastering of the wall. 
• Factors influencing costs Distance to and transport options for equipment 
and consumables.  Type of possible mobile lifts 
or scaffolds (height of building).  Worker 
effectiveness. Worker wages.  Area size 
influences costs per unit area. 
Effectiveness: 
• Countermeasure effectiveness Reduction of Cs contamination by 75-85 %.  
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• Factors influencing effectiveness and 
averted dose/risk 
Radionuclide (Cs is strongest bound to surface).  
Contaminant aerosol type (size, solubility). Sand 
type (ideally quartz sand of 0.5-2 mm grains). 
Compliance with described procedure.  Wall 
material generally has little influence. Amount of 
water/sand/time used and pressure. Care taken to 
wash contamination completely off the wall.  
Contamination in neighbouring areas influences 
avertable individual doses.  Collective averted 
doses depend on population density and 
behaviour. 
Waste: 
• Amount and type Generates some 50 l m-2 of liquid waste, with ca. 
3 kg m-2 of solid waste containing nearly all 
contamination. Solid waste contamination level: 
ca. 500 Bq m-3 per Bq m-2).  The waste is 
virtually impossible to collect. 
• Waste management recommendations The only way to remove the washed-off material 
from the area is to clean the (often much stronger 
contaminated) underlying surface subsequently. 
• Specific waste problems  - 
Further limitations, concerns, side-
effects and other costs 
Influences public reassurance. Visual 
improvement (very clean wall).  Clear 
information material for users and affected 
persons must be available before application of 
method. 
State of testing Tested on selected walls of different types in the 
laboratory and in the CIS and in Europe after the 
Chernobyl accident, on realistic scale.   
Key references J. Roed & K.G. Andersson:  "Clean-up of Urban 
Areas in the CIS Countries Contaminated by 
Chernobyl Fallout", J. Environmental 
Radioactivity vol.33, no.2, pp. 107-116, 1996. 
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Pruning/felling of trees and bushes 
Method description Trees and bushes in leaf at time of dry deposition 
can 'filter' much contamination out of the air and 
thus become strongly contaminated.  Pruning of 
trees to remove leaves/needles can save much of 
this dose contribution, but must be initiated very 
early, as natural leaf-fall from deciduous trees 
will reduce the tree contamination by often 
several orders of magnitude.  For conifers, needle 
shedding will occur over 3-5 autumns.  Only a 
very small proportion of the contamination in the 
ground below will over a long time be taken up 
and accumulated in the tree.  Pruning is generally 
not possible for coniferous trees, which must be 
felled. 
Surface type / scale  Highly contaminated garden or park areas with 
trees and shrubs (in leaf). 
Relevant contaminants Cs (and other long-lived gamma emitting 
radionuclides). 
Time of implementation Should be carried out within weeks, and before 
first leaf-fall.  Worker doses must be considered.  
Requirements: 
• Equipment / remedies and their costs Variable, e.g., chainsaws (200-1000 EURO), 
cutters (100 EURO), axes (100 EURO), rope (30 
EURO), ladder (200 EURO).  Waste 
transportation trucks (depending on distance to 
repository). 
• Consumables and other practical 
requirements 
Power supply / petrol for chainsaws and other 
motorised equipment. 
• Operator skills and costs Variable - strongly depends on amount and type 
of vegetation.  Could be 10-50 h for a 'typical' 
500 m2 garden area, incl. loading to truck.  The 
experience of professional forestry workers, tree 
surgeons and gardeners would be valuable, but 
the procedure could be carried out by unskilled 
workers with some instruction.  
• Operator safety Respiratory protection, covering clothing, safety 
helmets, lifeline (for tall trees).  
• Other practical constraints Felling of large trees in confined urban spaces 
may be a complicated and slow process. 
• Factors influencing costs Worker effectiveness/skills and wages, season, 
vegetation type, height and density, applied 
equipment type, degree of pruning/felling, 
distance to equipment and consumables.  Area 
size influences costs per unit area. 
Effectiveness: 
• Countermeasure effectiveness Proportional to the degree of pruning.  If all 
leaves are removed, the dose rate contribution is 
reduced by several orders of magnitude.   
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• Factors influencing effectiveness and 
averted dose/risk 
Whether trees were in leaf at time of 
contamination. Time and amount of precipitation 
during/since contamination.  Window areas of 
nearest dwellings - much radiation from trees 
will pass through thin windows rather than 
shielding walls.  Contamination on vegetation 
that is not deciduous is most important to treat, as 
it will persist over years.  Contamination in 
neighbouring areas influences avertable 
individual doses.  Collective averted doses 
depend on population density and behaviour. 
Waste: 
• Amount and type Highly variable, depending on season, type and 
height/density of vegetation and extent of 
pruning or felling (generally large amounts).  
• Waste management recommendations If trees are felled early, the core wood is not 
contaminated and can be used, e.g., for domestic 
firing.  Leaf material must be safely disposed of. 
• Specific waste problems  Public acceptability and legal feasibility of waste 
treatment and storage route should be assessed. 
Further limitations, concerns, side-
effects and other costs 
Influences public reassurance. Adverse aesthetic 
consequences of vegetation removal.  Clear 
information material for users and affected 
persons must be available before application of 
method.  Vegetation removal may to some extent 
be necessary to allow subsequent garden soil 
decontamination. 
State of testing Tested on a small scale in Europe and CIS after 
the Chernobyl accident.   
Key references O. Guillitte and C. Willdrodt: "An assessment of 
experimental and potential countermeasures to 
reduce radionuclide transfers in forest 
ecosystems", Sci. Tot. Env. 137, pp. 273-288, 
1993. 
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Road cleaning by vacuum sweeping 
Method description In the Nordic countries, vacuum sweepers are 
used by municipalities to clean roads on a routine 
basis.  Vacuum sweeper manufacturers are 
represented in all the Nordic countries.  The 
typical ride-on vacuum sweeper has 2 or 3 
rotating brushes.  The loosened dust is removed 
by a vacuum device and collected in a vessel, 
mostly behind the operator seat.  The vessel 
could be shielded to reduce external dose to the 
operator.  Water is generally applied on the road 
to control dust.  With novel vacuuming systems 
it has been assessed that resuspension in air of 
particles in the < 10µm range can be further 
reduced by a factor of 20.  
Surface type / scale  Contaminated roads and walkways, particularly 
in densely populated areas.  Can be applied on a 
large scale if equipment can be made available 
within a reasonable timeframe considering 
important radionuclide half-lives and the short 
natural weathering half-life of road 
contamination.   
Relevant contaminants Cs (and other long-lived gamma emitting 
radionuclides) 
Time of implementation Should generally be done within few weeks to be 
effective, but worker doses from short-lived 
radionuclides must be considered.  
Requirements: 
• Equipment / remedies and their costs Vacuum sweeping machine (110,000 EURO).  
Larger and more expensive vacuum sweepers 
(trucks) exist, but are not more effective.  Waste 
transportation trucks (depending on distance to 
repository). 
• Consumables and other practical 
requirements 
0.1 m3 of water per h (spraying for dust control).  
Typical machines have 2.5 m3 water vessels. 5-6 
l per h of petrol.   
• Operator skills and costs Ca. 10-4 h per treated m2 (excl. emptying of waste 
and making the machine ready).   Experienced 
operators will usually be available in 
municipalities where machines are available. 
• Operator safety Respiratory protection if the street contamination 
level is very high.  Here it will also reduce the 
operator external dose if the dust collection 
vessel (typically ca. 2 m3) contains water that can 
add to shielding.  Metal shielding may also be 
inserted between operator and collection tank.  
Without shielding/water the operator dose over 1 
hour will typically correspond to that from 
staying in the contaminated area for 2-4 days. 
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• Other practical constraints Maximum slope of street where the machine can 
be applied is according to manufacturer 30 %.  
• Factors influencing costs Vacuum sweeper size.  Distance to and transport 
options for equipment and consumables.  Worker 
effectiveness/skills. Worker wages.  If vacuum 
sweeping is carried out on a regular basis in the 
area, extra implementation costs would largely 
be limited to waste handling and disposal. 
Effectiveness: 
• Countermeasure effectiveness Reduction of Cs contamination by 50-70 % by 
early application.  
• Factors influencing effectiveness and 
averted dose/risk 
Radionuclide (Cs is strongest bound to surface).  
Contaminant aerosol type (size, solubility).  Road 
surface type (dust particle size and loading). 
Time of operation (must be applied within weeks 
as contaminant binding to surface will increase, 
and natural weathering through traffic will rather 
rapidly remove street contaminants).   
Homogeneity of treatment.  Water spraying will 
increase effect slightly.  Road gutters must be 
cleaned carefully.  Operator protection (see 
above).  Compliance with described procedure.  
Collective averted doses depend on population 
density and behaviour. 
Waste: 
• Amount and type Generates some 100-200 g m-2.  Waste 
contamination level: ca. 7000 Bq m-3 per Bq m-2.  
• Waste management recommendations Simple repositories should be constructed. Costs 
related to transport and disposal must be 
considered. 
• Specific waste problems  Specific activity of waste is relatively high 
(needs consideration in handling).   Public 
acceptability and legal feasibility of waste 
treatment and storage route should be assessed. 
Further limitations, concerns, side-
effects and other costs 
Influences public reassurance. Cleans the street 
of dirt.  Clear information material for users and 
affected persons must be available before 
application of method. 
State of testing Applied in the CIS after the Chernobyl accident.  
Small scale tests made in Denmark and USA to 
find, e.g., influence of street dust loading and 
application of water.   
Key references K.G. Andersson & J. Roed: "A Nordic 
Preparedness Guide for Early Clean-up in 
Radioactively Contaminated Residential Areas", J. 
Environmental Radioactivity vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 
207-223, 1999.   
J. Roed: "Deposition and removal of radioactive 
substances in an urban area", Nordic Liaison 
Committee for Atomic Energy, NORD 1990:111, 
ISBN 87 7303 514 9, 1990. 
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Road cleaning by fire hosing 
Method description Ordinary fire hosing can, if applied early, remove 
much of the contamination on a road.  The water 
can be taken from a hydrant (if available) or 
pumped from local water bodies (e.g., a lake). 
Surface type / scale  Contaminated roads and walkways, particularly 
in densely populated areas.  Can be applied on a 
large scale if equipment can be made available 
within a reasonable timeframe considering 
important radionuclide half-lives and the short 
natural weathering half-life of road 
contamination.   
Relevant contaminants Cs (and other long-lived gamma emitting 
radionuclides) 
Time of implementation Should generally be done within few weeks to be 
effective, but worker doses from short-lived 
radionuclides must be considered.  
Requirements: 
• Equipment / remedies and their costs Hose pipe (complete with fittings: ca. 700 
EURO).  A petrol driven pump, if required, costs 
ca. 6000 EURO.  The equipment is likely to be 
readily available 
• Consumables and other practical 
requirements 
5 m3 of water per h.  10 l per h of petrol if pump 
is needed.   
• Operator skills and costs Ca. 0.01-0.02 h per treated m2 (excl. handling of 
waste).   The local fire brigade are experts, but 
also others can contribute after little instruction 
(e.g., civil defence, military, local inhabitants).  
• Operator safety Water resistant clothing recommended, 
particularly for heavily contaminated areas. 
• Other practical constraints Should not be applied at very low frost 
temperatures. 
• Factors influencing costs Distance to and transport options for equipment 
and consumables.  Worker effectiveness. Worker 
wages.  Need for a pump. 
Effectiveness: 
• Countermeasure effectiveness Reduction of Cs contamination by 50-75 % by 
early application.  
• Factors influencing effectiveness and 
averted dose/risk 
Radionuclide (Cs is strongest bound to surface).  
Contaminant aerosol type (size, solubility).  Road 
surface type (dust particle size and loading). 
Time of operation (must be applied within weeks 
as contaminant binding to surface will increase, 
and natural weathering through traffic will rather 
rapidly remove street contaminants).   
Homogeneity of treatment.  Road gutters must be 
cleaned carefully.  Compliance with described 
procedure.  Collective averted doses depend on 
population density and behaviour. 
Waste: 
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• Amount and type Generates some 50 g m-2 waste, which is 
impossible to collect.  Waste contamination 
level: ca. 30000 Bq m-3 per Bq m-2.  
• Waste management recommendations The waste should be led to the drains with the 
run-off water.  It is important to clean road sides 
carefully to avoid accumulation of waste here. 
• Specific waste problems  - 
Further limitations, concerns, side-
effects and other costs 
Influences public reassurance. Cleans the street 
of dirt.  Clear information material for users and 
affected persons must be available before 
application of method. 
State of testing Small scale tests made in Denmark and USA to 
find, e.g., influence of street dust loading and 
application of water.   
Key references K.G. Andersson & J. Roed: "A Nordic 
Preparedness Guide for Early Clean-up in 
Radioactively Contaminated Residential Areas", J. 
Environmental Radioactivity vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 
207-223, 1999.   
L. Warming: "Weathering and decontamination of 
radioactivity deposited on concrete surfaces", Risø 
National Laboratory, RISØ-M-2473, 1984. 
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Lawn mowing 
Method description If contaminants in grassed areas are to a great 
extent deposited on grass rather than the 
underlying soil (notably in case of dry 
deposition), rapid cutting and removal of the 
grass can greatly reduce dose rate and prevent 
soil contamination which would be a 
considerably greater problem.  The grass should 
be cut as close to the soil surface as possible. 
Surface type / scale  Contaminated grass covered areas, such as 
gardens and parks.  Can be applied on a large 
scale if equipment can be made available within 
a reasonable timeframe considering important 
radionuclide half-lives and the short natural 
weathering half-life of road contamination.   
Relevant contaminants Cs (and other long-lived gamma emitting 
radionuclides) 
Time of implementation As the natural transfer process of contamination 
from grass to soil has a half-life of only few 
weeks (greatly dependant on rainfall), the 
method should be implemented as early as 
possible to be effective (certainly before first 
heavy rain).  However, worker doses from short-
lived radionuclides must be considered.  
Requirements: 
• Equipment / remedies and their costs Lawn mower with clippings collector (ca. 1000 
EURO).   Waste transportation trucks (depending 
on distance to repository). 
• Consumables and other practical 
requirements 
Ca. 25 l per ha of petrol.   
• Operator skills and costs Can be carried out by any available personnel. 
Could be applied as ‘self-help’ after instruction 
from authorities.  Typically 15 h per treated ha 
(plus 20-40 h per ha if grass must be collected 
manually by rakes).    
• Operator safety Protective clothes. Respiratory protection if the 
contamination level is very high and the area is 
dry.   
• Other practical constraints -  
• Factors influencing costs Mower type (ideally motorised and with 
collector).  Distance to and transport options for 
equipment and consumables.  Worker 
effectiveness. Worker wages.  Area size 
influences costs per unit area. 
Effectiveness: 
• Countermeasure effectiveness Reduction of contamination by 50-90 % by early 
application in case of dry contamination.  
Generally low effect for wet contamination. 
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• Factors influencing effectiveness and 
averted dose/risk 
Contaminant aerosol type (size, solubility).  Time 
of operation (must be applied within weeks to 
have any effect).   Grass length and growth 
density.  Cutting height.  Evenness of ground 
surface.  Extent of removal of the cut grass.  
Homogeneity of treatment.  Compliance with 
described procedure (incl. operator safety 
recommendations).  Contamination in 
neighbouring areas influences avertable 
individual doses.  Collective averted doses 
depend on population density and behaviour. 
Waste: 
• Amount and type Highly variable, depending on length and density 
of grass cover and cutting height.  Typically 
some 1-2 m3 per ha.  This gives a waste 
contamination level of ca. 5-10000 Bq m-3 per Bq 
m-2.  
• Waste management recommendations Simple repositories should be constructed. Costs 
related to transport and disposal must be 
considered. 
• Specific waste problems  Specific activity of waste is relatively high 
(needs consideration in handling).   Without 
shielding the dose to the driver of a waste 
transport truck over 1 hour will typically 
correspond to that from staying in the 
contaminated area for 1-2 days.  Public 
acceptability and legal feasibility of waste 
treatment and storage route should be assessed.  
Further limitations, concerns, side-
effects and other costs 
Influences public reassurance. Clear information 
material for users and affected persons must be 
available before application of method. 
State of testing Tested in Europe on a small scale.   
Key references K.G. Andersson & J. Roed: "A Nordic 
Preparedness Guide for Early Clean-up in 
Radioactively Contaminated Residential Areas", J. 
Environmental Radioactivity vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 
207-223, 1999.   
H. Maubert, I. Vovk, J. Roed, G. Arapis & A. 
Jouve: "Reduction of soil-plant transfer factors: 
mechanical aspects", Sci. Tot. Env. 137, pp. 163-
168, 1993. 
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Turf harvesting 
Method description In the early phase after an emergency practically 
all contamination deposited on soil will be in the 
upper few centimetres.  Later on, a downward 
migration will set in, depending on, e.g., 
contaminant and soil characteristics.  The 
contaminated upper soil layer can be removed by 
a turf harvester (standard equipment in grass 
nurseries), that cuts off thin turf rolls or slabs. 
Surface type / scale  Contaminated grass covered areas, such as 
gardens and parks.  Can be applied on a large 
scale if equipment can be made available within 
a reasonable timeframe considering important 
radionuclide half-lives and the short natural 
weathering half-life of road contamination.   
Relevant contaminants Cs (and other long-lived gamma emitting 
radionuclides) 
Time of implementation Should generally be carried out as early as 
possible, when the radiological situation is clear, 
but worker doses must be considered.  Can still 
after a decade save a significant fraction of the 
70 y dose from 137Cs contamination.  
Requirements: 
• Equipment / remedies and their costs Turf harvester (ca. 10,000 EURO).  Many 
different designs are available.  Some also 
require the use of a tractor.  Waste transportation 
trucks (depending on distance to repository). 
• Consumables and other practical 
requirements 
Ca. 20 l per ha of petrol.   
• Operator skills and costs Grass nursery workers or agricultural workers, 
who are familiar with soil treatment machines 
and could operate the turf harvester after a few 
hours of instruction/practice. Care must be taken 
to remove soil to the optimal depth.  Ca. 70 h per 
ha including loading to waste transport truck. 
• Operator safety Protective clothes. Respiratory protection if the 
contamination level is very high and the area is 
dry.   
• Other practical constraints -  
• Factors influencing costs Harvester type and size.  Layer depth. Vegetation 
that requires prior removal.  Distance to and 
transport options for equipment and 
consumables.  Worker skills/effectiveness. 
Worker wages.  Area size influences costs per 
unit area. 
Effectiveness: 
• Countermeasure effectiveness Reduction of contamination by 70-90 % if 
applied optimally and in time.   
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• Factors influencing effectiveness and 
averted dose/risk 
Contaminant aerosol type (size, solubility).  
Uniformity of contamination depth.  Time of 
operation.   Cutting depth - must be optimised 
relative to thorough measurements of vertical soil 
profile of most important contaminant(s).  
Evenness of ground surface.  Homogeneity of 
treatment.  Worker protection (see above).  
Compliance with described procedure.  
Contamination in neighbouring areas influences 
avertable individual doses.  Collective averted 
doses depend on population density and 
behaviour. 
Waste: 
• Amount and type Depends on cutting depth.  If a 2 cm thick layer 
is removed: ca. 30 kg m-2.  Waste contamination 
level: ca. 50 Bq m-3 per Bq m-2.  
• Waste management recommendations Simple repositories should be constructed. Costs 
related to transport and disposal must be 
considered. 
• Specific waste problems  Public acceptability and legal feasibility of waste 
treatment and storage route should be assessed.  
Further limitations, concerns, side-
effects and other costs 
Influences public reassurance. Clear information 
material for users and affected persons must be 
available before application of method.  May 
increase soil erosion risk and significantly reduce 
fertility.  Adverse aesthetic effect on the area. 
State of testing Tested on relatively large areas of virgin land in 
the CIS.   
Key references K.G. Andersson, A. Rantavaara, J. Roed, K. 
Rosén, B. Salbu and L. Skipperud:  "A guide to 
countermeasures for implementation in the event 
of a nuclear accident affecting Nordic food-
producing areas", NKS/BOK1.4 project report 
NKS-16, ISBN 87-7893-066-9, 76 p., 2000. 
P. Hubert, L. Annisomova, G. Antsipov, V. 
Ramsaev, V. Sobotovitch (eds.): "Strategies of 
decontamination", European Commission, ISBN 
92-827-5195-3, Luxembourg, 1996. 
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Top soil removal (manually) 
Method description In the early phase after an emergency practically 
all contamination deposited on soil will be in the 
upper few centimetres.  Later on, a downward 
migration will set in, depending on, e.g., 
contaminant and soil characteristics.  The 
contaminated upper soil layer can be removed 
manually with a spade after careful assessment of 
the contamination depth. 
Surface type / scale  Contaminated open (soil) areas, such as gardens 
and parks.  Can be applied on a large scale if it 
can be carried out within a reasonable timeframe 
considering important radionuclide half-lives and 
the short natural weathering half-life of road 
contamination.   
Relevant contaminants Cs (and other long-lived gamma emitting 
radionuclides) 
Time of implementation Should generally be carried out as early as 
possible, when the radiological situation is clear, 
but worker doses must be considered.  Can still 
after a decade save a significant fraction of the 
70 y dose from 137Cs contamination.  
Requirements: 
• Equipment / remedies and their costs Spade (ca. 20 EURO).  Waste transportation 
trucks (depending on distance to repository). 
• Consumables and other practical 
requirements 
-   
• Operator skills and costs Any available personnel.  Could be applied as 
‘self-help’ after instruction from authorities.  
Care must be taken to remove soil to the optimal 
depth.  Ca. 0.1 h per m2 including loading to 
waste transport truck. 
• Operator safety Protective clothes. Respiratory protection if the 
contamination level is very high and the area is 
dry.   
• Other practical constraints -  
• Factors influencing costs Layer depth. Vegetation that requires prior 
removal.  Worker effectiveness. Worker wages.  
Area size influences costs per unit area. 
Effectiveness: 
• Countermeasure effectiveness Reduction of contamination by 90-95 % if 
applied optimally and in time.   
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• Factors influencing effectiveness and 
averted dose/risk 
Contaminant aerosol type (size, solubility).  
Uniformity of contamination depth.  Time of 
operation.   Soil characteristics (dry or sandy soil 
layers will be more difficult to remove fully, and 
clay content will limit downward migration).  
Cutting depth - must be optimised relative to 
thorough measurements of vertical soil profile of 
most important contaminant(s).  Evenness of 
ground surface.  Homogeneity of treatment.  
Worker protection (see above).  Compliance with 
described procedure.  Contamination in 
neighbouring areas influences avertable 
individual doses.  Collective averted doses 
depend on population density and behaviour. 
Waste: 
• Amount and type A removal of a 5 cm topsoil layer will produce 
about 70 kg m-2 waste.  Waste contamination 
level: ca. 20 Bq m-3 per Bq m-2.  
• Waste management recommendations Simple repositories should be constructed. Costs 
related to transport and disposal must be 
considered. 
• Specific waste problems  Public acceptability and legal feasibility of waste 
treatment and storage route should be assessed.  
Further constraints, concerns, side-
effects and other costs 
Influences public reassurance. Clear information 
material for users and affected persons must be 
available before application of method.  May 
increase soil erosion risk and significantly reduce 
fertility.  Adverse aesthetic effect on the area. 
State of testing Tested on relatively large areas in the CIS.  
Carried out by CIS authorities after Chernobyl, 
but with little effect, since it was not optimised in 
relation to contamination depth, and not 
consistently applied over a large area. 
Key references C.L. Fogh, K.G. Andersson, A.N. Barkovsky, 
A.S. Mishine, A.V. Ponamarjov, V.P. Ramzaev & 
J. Roed: "Decontamination in a Russian 
Settlement", Health Physics 76(4), pp. 421-430, 
1999. 
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Top soil removal (mechanically) 
Method description In the early phase after an emergency practically 
all contamination deposited on soil will be in the 
upper few centimetres.  Later on, a downward 
migration will set in, depending on, e.g., 
contaminant and soil characteristics.  The 
contaminated upper soil layer can be removed 
with 'Bobcat' mini-bulldozers, which require 
rather little space in, e.g., a garden (or similar 
equipment), after careful assessment of the 
contamination depth. 
Surface type / scale  Contaminated open (soil) areas, such as gardens 
and parks.  Can be applied on a large scale if it 
can be carried out within a reasonable timeframe 
considering important radionuclide half-lives and 
the short natural weathering half-life of road 
contamination.   
Relevant contaminants Cs (and other long-lived gamma emitting 
radionuclides) 
Time of implementation Should generally be carried out as early as 
possible, when the radiological situation is clear, 
but worker doses must be considered.  Can still 
after a decade save a significant fraction of the 
70 y dose from 137Cs contamination.  
Requirements: 
• Equipment / remedies and their costs 'Bobcat' mini-bulldozer or similar (40,000 
EURO).  Waste transportation trucks (depending 
on distance to repository). 
• Consumables and other practical 
requirements 
Ca. 50 l ha-1 of petrol.  
• Operator skills and costs Contractors or municipal workers who know how 
to operate the machinery.  Others could be 
instructed within a day.  Care must be taken to 
remove soil to the optimal depth and not 'smear' 
the treated soil with contamination.  Ca. 100 h 
per ha including loading to waste transport truck. 
• Operator safety Protective clothes. Respiratory protection if the 
contamination level is very high and the area is 
dry.   
• Other practical constraints -  
• Factors influencing costs Layer depth. Vegetation that requires prior 
removal.  Size and type of machine.  Distance to 
and transport options for equipment and 
consumables.  Worker effectiveness/skills. 
Worker wages.  Area size influences costs per 
unit area. 
Effectiveness: 
• Countermeasure effectiveness Reduction of contamination by 90-95 % if 
applied optimally and in time.   
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• Factors influencing effectiveness and 
averted dose/risk 
Contaminant aerosol type (size, solubility).  
Uniformity of contamination depth.  Time of 
operation.   Soil characteristics (dry or sandy soil 
layers will be more difficult to remove fully, and 
clay content will limit downward migration).  
Cutting depth - must be optimised relative to 
thorough measurements of vertical soil profile of 
most important contaminant(s).  Evenness of 
ground surface.  Homogeneity of treatment.  
Worker protection (see above).  Compliance with 
described procedure.  Contamination in 
neighbouring areas influences avertable 
individual doses.  Collective averted doses 
depend on population density and behaviour. 
Waste: 
• Amount and type A removal of a 5 cm topsoil layer will produce 
about 70 kg m-2 waste.  Waste contamination 
level: ca. 20 Bq m-3 per Bq m-2.  
• Waste management recommendations Simple repositories should be constructed. Costs 
related to transport and disposal must be 
considered. 
• Specific waste problems  Public acceptability and legal feasibility of waste 
treatment and storage route should be assessed.  
Further constraints, concerns, side-
effects and other costs 
Influences public reassurance. Clear information 
material for users and affected persons must be 
available before application of method.  May 
increase soil erosion risk and significantly reduce 
fertility.  Adverse aesthetic effect on the area. 
State of testing Tested on relatively large areas in the CIS.   
Key references C.L. Fogh, K.G. Andersson, A.N. Barkovsky, 
A.S. Mishine, A.V. Ponamarjov, V.P. Ramzaev & 
J. Roed: "Decontamination in a Russian 
Settlement", Health Physics 76(4), pp. 421-430, 
1999. 
J. Roed, K.G. Andersson, A.N. Barkovsky, C.L. 
Fogh, A.S. Mishine, S.K. Olsen, A.V. 
Ponomarjov, H. Prip, V.P. Ramzaev, B.F. 
Vorobiev.: "Mechanical Decontamination Tests in 
Areas Affected by the Chernobyl Accident", Risø-
R-1029, ISBN 87-550-2361-4, 101 p., 1998. 
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Triple digging of soil 
Method description In the early phase after an emergency, practically 
all contamination deposited on soil will be in the 
upper few centimetres.  Later on, a downward 
migration will set in, depending on, e.g., 
contaminant and soil characteristics.  Triple 
digging is a manual digging method, by which 
the top (contaminated) layer (ca. 5 cm) is buried 
at a depth of ca. 45 cm, with the upper surface 
facing down.  The bottom ca. 20 cm layer is 
placed on top of this, with the intermediate ca. 20 
cm layer at the very top (not inverted).  Thereby, 
the contaminated soil is buried deep and shielded 
well against, and the adverse impact on fertility 
is minimised (compared with ordinary digging).  
The contamination depth must first be carefully 
assessed through measurements.  
Surface type / scale  Contaminated open (soil) areas, such as gardens 
and parks.  Can be applied on a large scale if it 
can be carried out within a reasonable timeframe 
considering important radionuclide half-lives and 
the short natural weathering half-life of road 
contamination.   
Relevant contaminants Cs (and other long-lived gamma emitting 
radionuclides) 
Time of implementation Should generally be carried out as early as 
possible, when the radiological situation is clear, 
but worker doses must be considered.  Can still 
after a decade save a significant fraction of the 
70 y dose from 137Cs contamination.  
Requirements: 
• Equipment / remedies and their costs Spade (ca. 20 EURO).   
• Consumables and other practical 
requirements 
- 
• Operator skills and costs Any available personnel.  Could be applied as 
‘self-help’ after instruction from authorities.  
Care must be taken to optimise thickness of the 3 
soil layers.  Ca. 0.4 h per m2. 
• Operator safety Protective clothes. Respiratory protection if the 
contamination level is very high and the area is 
dry. 
• Other practical constraints -  
• Factors influencing costs Layer depth. Soil type, moisture and season 
influence how easy it is to dig.  Vegetation that 
requires prior removal.  Worker effectiveness. 
Worker wages.  Area size influences costs per 
unit area. 
Effectiveness: 
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• Countermeasure effectiveness Reduction of dose rate contribution 1m above the 
surface from 137Cs (and most other relevant 
contaminants) by 80-90 % if applied optimally.  
If edible crops are grown in the soil the method 
may reduce consumption dose, depending on 
crop root system. 
• Factors influencing effectiveness and 
averted dose/risk 
Contaminant aerosol type (size, solubility).  
Uniformity of contamination depth.  Time of 
operation.   Soil characteristics (dry or sandy soil 
layers will be more difficult to exchange, and 
clay content will limit downward migration).  
Top layer digging depth - must be optimised 
relative to thorough measurements of vertical soil 
profile of most important contaminant(s).  
Evenness of ground surface.  Homogeneity of 
treatment.  Worker protection (see above).  
Compliance with described procedure.  
Contamination in neighbouring areas influences 
avertable individual doses.  Collective averted 
doses depend on population density and 
behaviour. 
Waste: 
• Amount and type -  
• Waste management recommendations - 
• Specific waste problems  -  
Further constraints, concerns, side-
effects and other costs 
Influences public reassurance.  It must be 
accepted that the contamination is not removed 
from the area.  In fact it will be very complicated 
to remove after triple digging.  Clear information 
material for users and affected persons must be 
available before application of method.  May 
increase soil erosion risk and possibly reduce 
fertility, although the latter effect will be minimal 
by optimised application.  The area must not 
subsequently be deep-tilled, due to risk of 
bringing contaminants back to the surface.  Since 
Cs is strongly bound in soil, it is no problem to 
bring it closer to the groundwater level, but with 
other more mobile contaminants there may be a 
problem that should be considered.  Adverse 
aesthetic effect on the area. 
State of testing Tested on relatively large areas in the CIS.   
Key references J. Roed, K.G. Andersson, C.L. Fogh, A.N. 
Barkovski, B.F. Vorobiev, V.N. Potapov, A.V. 
Chesnokov: "Triple Digging - a Simple Method 
for Restoration of Radioactively Contaminated 
Urban Soil Areas", J. Environmental Radioactivity 
vol.45, no.2, pp. 173-183, 1999. 
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Deep ploughing of soil 
Method description In the early phase after an emergency, practically 
all contamination deposited on soil will be in the 
upper few centimetres.  Later on, a downward 
migration will set in, depending on, e.g., 
contaminant and soil characteristics.  By deep 
ploughing to ca. 45 cm with an ordinary 
mouldboard plough, the contaminated soil layer 
is buried deep.  This provides good shielding 
against radiation from the contaminated soil area. 
The contamination is also placed out of reach of 
some types of plants.   
Surface type / scale  Large contaminated open (soil) areas, such as 
parks.  Can be applied on a large scale.   
Relevant contaminants Cs (and other long-lived gamma emitting 
radionuclides). 
Time of implementation Should generally be carried out as early as 
possible, when the radiological situation is clear, 
but worker doses must be considered.  Can still 
after a decade save a significant fraction of the 
70 y dose from 137Cs contamination.  
Requirements: 
• Equipment / remedies and their costs Plough (ca. 2,000 EURO).  Powerful tractor (ca. 
50,000 EURO). 
• Consumables and other practical 
requirements 
Ca. 15 l ha-1 petrol. 
• Operator skills and costs Agricultural workers, who are used to ploughing.  
Must be instructed about the specific objective.   
Ca. 1.5 h per ha-1. 
• Operator safety Protective clothes and respiratory protection – 
particularly if the contamination level is very 
high and the area is dry. 
• Other practical constraints -  
• Factors influencing costs Soil type, moisture and season influence work 
rate.  Worker effectiveness/skills. Worker wages.  
Area size influences costs per unit area. 
Effectiveness: 
• Countermeasure effectiveness Reduction of dose rate contribution 1m above the 
surface from 137Cs (and most other relevant 
contaminants) by 80-90 % if applied optimally.  
If edible crops are grown in the soil the method 
may reduce consumption dose, depending on 
crop root system. 
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• Factors influencing effectiveness and 
averted dose/risk 
Contaminant aerosol type (size, solubility).  
Uniformity of contamination depth.  Time of 
operation.   Soil characteristics (dry or sandy soil 
layers will be more difficult to exchange, and 
clay content will limit downward migration).  
Evenness of ground surface.  Homogeneity of 
treatment.  Worker protection (see above).  
Compliance with described procedure.  
Collective averted doses depend on population 
density and behaviour.  Resuspension of 
contaminants may in the very early phase 
influence the countermeasure effectiveness. 
Waste: 
• Amount and type -  
• Waste management recommendations - 
• Specific waste problems  -  
Further constraints, concerns, side-
effects and other costs 
Influences public reassurance.  It must be 
accepted that the contamination is not removed 
from the area.  In fact it will be very complicated 
to remove after deep ploughing.  Clear 
information material for users and affected 
persons must be available before application of 
method.  May increase soil erosion risk and 
significantly reduce fertility.  The area must not 
subsequently be deep-tilled, due to risk of 
bringing contaminants back to the surface.  Since 
Cs is strongly bound in soil, it is no problem to 
bring it closer to the groundwater level, but with 
other more mobile contaminants there may be a 
problem that should be considered.  Adverse 
aesthetic effect on the area. 
State of testing Tested on large areas in the CIS and on 
somewhat smaller areas in Denmark.   
Key references Vovk, IF, Blagoyev, VV, Lyashenko, AN & 
Kovalev, IS: "Technical approaches to 
decontamination of terrestrial environments in 
the CIS", Sci. Tot. Env. 137, 49-64, 1993. 
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Skim-and-burial ploughing of soil 
Method description In the early phase after an emergency, practically 
all contamination deposited on soil will be in the 
upper few centimetres.  Later on, a downward 
migration will set in, depending on, e.g., 
contaminant and soil characteristics.  By skim-
and-burial ploughing, the thin contaminated 
topsoil layer is buried deep in the soil profile.  
This provides good shielding against radiation 
from the contaminated soil area.   The 
contamination is also placed out of reach of some 
types of plants.  This special plough has two 
plough shares: one that skims off the top layer 
(typically 5 cm; must be optimised according to 
measurements of the contaminant depth) and 
places it at a depth of ca. 45 cm, and another that 
lifts a subsoil layer (ca. 50 cm deep) above the 
'topsoil', without inverting it.  Thereby the 
adverse effect on soil fertility is minimised.   
Surface type / scale  Large contaminated open (soil) areas, such as 
parks.  Can be applied on a large scale, although 
the ploughs are not readily available.  They can 
be constructed over a period that is short 
compared with the time that the relevant doses 
would be received over.   
Relevant contaminants Cs (and other long-lived gamma emitting 
radionuclides). 
Time of implementation Should generally be carried out as early as 
possible, when the radiological situation is clear, 
but worker doses must be considered.  Can still 
after a decade save a significant fraction of the 
70 y dose from 137Cs contamination.  
Requirements: 
• Equipment / remedies and their costs Skim-and-burial plough (ca. 4,000 EURO).  
Powerful tractor (ca. 50,000 EURO). 
• Consumables and other practical 
requirements 
Ca. 15 l ha-1 petrol. 
• Operator skills and costs Agricultural workers, who are used to ploughing.  
Must be instructed about the specific objective.   
Ca. 3 h per ha-1. 
• Operator safety Protective clothes and respiratory protection – 
particularly if the contamination level is very 
high and the area is dry. 
• Other practical constraints -  
• Factors influencing costs Soil type, moisture and season influence work 
rate.  Worker effectiveness/skills. Worker wages.  
Area size influences costs per unit area. 
Effectiveness: 
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• Countermeasure effectiveness Reduction of dose rate contribution 1m above the 
surface from 137Cs (and most other relevant 
contaminants) by 82-92 % if applied optimally.  
If edible crops are grown in the soil the method 
may reduce consumption dose, depending on 
crop root system. 
• Factors influencing effectiveness and 
averted dose/risk 
Contaminant aerosol type (size, solubility).  
Uniformity of contamination depth.  Time of 
operation.   Soil characteristics (dry or sandy soil 
layers will be more difficult to exchange, and 
clay content will limit downward migration).  
Evenness of ground surface.  Homogeneity of 
treatment.  Worker protection (see above).  
Compliance with described procedure.  
Collective averted doses depend on population 
density and behaviour.  Resuspension of 
contaminants may in the very early phase 
influence the countermeasure effectiveness. 
Waste: 
• Amount and type -  
• Waste management recommendations - 
• Specific waste problems  -  
Further constraints, concerns, side-
effects and other costs 
Influences public reassurance.  It must be 
accepted that the contamination is not removed 
from the area.  In fact it will be very complicated 
to remove after deep ploughing.  Clear 
information material for users and affected 
persons must be available before application of 
method.  May reduce fertility, although this 
adverse effect is minimised.  The area must not 
subsequently be deep-tilled, due to risk of 
bringing contaminants back to the surface.  Since 
Cs is strongly bound in soil, it is no problem to 
bring it closer to the groundwater level, but with 
other more mobile contaminants there may be a 
problem that should be considered.  Adverse 
aesthetic effect on the area. 
State of testing Tested in areas up to 1 ha in the CIS and in 
Denmark.   
Key references Roed, J, Andersson, KG & Prip, H: "The Skim 
and Burial Plough: a New Implement for 
Reclamation of Radioactively Contaminated 
Land", J. Environmental Radioactivity vol.33, 
no.2, pp. 117-128, 1996. 
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Snow removal 
Method description Some Nordic areas will over a large part of the 
year be covered by snow.  If a thick snow cover 
is contaminated (either through dry deposition or 
deposition in snowfall), the top layer of the snow 
(ca. 5 cm) can be removed together with virtually 
all the contamination.  Thereby the contaminants 
would never reach the underlying surface (where 
the problem would be much more severe).  The 
method requires early application, certainly 
before the first thaw.   It can be accomplished 
with, e.g., 'Bobcat' mini-bulldozers, front-loaders 
or tractors with scrapers on open areas.  
Alternatively, the snow can, with much greater 
effort, be removed with hand tools (manual 
scrapers, shovels).  This would be required if 
contaminated snow were to be removed from a 
roof.  
Surface type / scale  Contaminated open areas - particularly gardens, 
parks and other soil areas, but also paved areas 
and roofs of buildings.  Can be applied on a large 
scale if it can be carried out within a reasonable 
timeframe considering important radionuclide 
half-lives and the time-frame determining the 
method effectiveness.   
Relevant contaminants Cs (and other long-lived gamma emitting 
radionuclides) 
Time of implementation Should generally be carried out as early as 
possible (before first thaw), when the 
radiological situation is clear, but worker doses 
must be considered.  Can still after a decade save 
a significant fraction of the 70 y dose from 137Cs 
contamination.  
Requirements: 
• Equipment / remedies and their costs Open areas: 'Bobcat' mini-bulldozer or similar 
(40,000 EURO).  (possible alternatives: front-
loader (80,000 EURO), tractor with scraper 
(50,000 EURO)). 
Roofs:  manual scrapers, shovels.   
Waste transportation trucks (depending on 
distance to dumping site). 
• Consumables and other practical 
requirements 
Ca. 50 l ha-1 of petrol for 'Bobcat'.  
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• Operator skills and costs Contractors or municipal workers who know how 
to operate the machinery or work on a roof.  
Others could be instructed within a day.  Care 
must be taken to remove snow to the optimal 
depth and not 'smear' the underlying surface with 
contamination.  Open areas: ca. 40 h per ha 
including loading to waste transport truck.  
Roofs: ca. 10 minutes per m2 roof. 
• Operator safety Protective clothes, boots and gloves.  In dry frost 
and storm also respiratory protection.  
• Other practical constraints -  
• Factors influencing costs Layer depth. Vegetation that requires prior 
removal.  Size and type of machine.  Distance to 
and transport options for equipment and 
consumables.  Worker effectiveness/skills. 
Worker wages.  Area size influences costs per 
unit area. 
Effectiveness: 
• Countermeasure effectiveness Reduction of contamination by 90-98 % (both on 
open areas and roofs) if applied optimally and in 
time (influences uptake to subsequently grown 
crops in open areas accordingly).   
• Factors influencing effectiveness and 
averted dose/risk 
Contaminant aerosol type (size, solubility).  
Uniformity of contamination depth.  Time of 
operation.   Cutting depth.  Evenness of ground 
surface.  Homogeneity of treatment.  Worker 
protection (see above).  Compliance with 
described procedure.  Contamination in 
neighbouring areas influences avertable 
individual doses.  Collective averted doses 
depend on population density and behaviour. 
Waste: 
• Amount and type A removal of a 5 cm top snow layer will produce 
about 50 kg m-2 waste.  Waste contamination 
level: ca. 20 Bq m-3 per Bq m-2.  
• Waste management recommendations May be disposed of in the sea or in other water 
bodies where the environmental impact is 
negligible (must be considered carefully as e.g., 
some lakes are reservoirs for drinking water).  
Costs related to transport and disposal must be 
considered. 
• Specific waste problems  Public acceptability and legal feasibility of waste 
treatment and storage route should be assessed.  
Further constraints, concerns, side-
effects and other costs 
Influences public reassurance. Clear information 
material for users and affected persons must be 
available before application of method.   
State of testing Tested in realistic scale in Norway.    
Key references C. Qvenild & U. Tveten: "Decontamination and 
winter conditions", Institute for Energy 
Technology, Kjeller, Norway, ISBN 82-7017-
067-4, 1984. 
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Indoor floor and wall decontamination 
Method description Airborne contaminants can penetrate into 
buildings and give rise to considerable indoor 
contamination (depending on physico-chemical 
characteristics of contaminants and indoor 
surfaces as well as dwelling type and deposition 
mode).  This can give high dose contributions 
from floor/indoor walls, particularly over the first 
year.  Over longer periods of time outdoor 
contaminants may also be tracked in by humans.  
Thorough vacuum cleaning of door mats and 
washing of uncovered floors on a regular basis 
can reduce this dose, and also washing of indoor 
walls (or removal of wall paper) can in strongly 
contaminated areas be recommended. 
Surface type / scale  Contaminated walls and floors of dwellings.  
Particularly floors, as most of the airborne 
contamination from an outdoor incident, and 
virtually all tracked-in contamination will deposit 
here.  Can be applied on a large scale.   
Relevant contaminants Cs (and other long-lived gamma  or beta emitting 
radionuclides) 
Time of implementation Should generally be carried out as early as 
possible, when the radiological situation is clear, 
but worker doses must be considered.  In 
strongly contaminated areas, careful regular floor 
cleaning would be recommended over years. 
Requirements: 
• Equipment / remedies and their costs Ordinary household vacuum cleaner (ca. 200 
EURO).  Cloth/ washing sponge (ca. 1 EURO).   
• Consumables and other practical 
requirements 
About four vacuum cleaner filter bags per 100 m2 
per year, and variable costs for water and 
cleaning detergent.  
• Operator skills and costs Could be applied as ‘self-help’ after instruction 
from authorities.  Vacuuming takes about 0.5 
minute per m2, washing typically 2-4 minutes per 
m2, depending on orientation of surface.   
• Operator safety Respiratory protection recommended in strongly 
contaminated areas.  Water-proof plastic gloves 
recommended for washing.  
• Other practical constraints -  
• Factors influencing costs Worker effectiveness. Vacuum cleaner type.  
Strategy for walls (cleaning or wallpaper 
removal). 
Effectiveness: 
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• Countermeasure effectiveness Within short time (few days), particles smaller 
than ca. 3 µm will become attached to or 
clustered in larger particles.  These can (contrary 
to the smaller particles) effectively be removed 
by vacuum cleaning (removal efficiency: more 
than 90 %).  Tracked-in soil particles are large 
and easily removed.  Washing of floors and walls 
will typically remove 30-60 % of the 
contamination.  Removal of wallpaper can 
remove virtually all contamination from a wall. 
• Factors influencing effectiveness and 
averted dose/risk 
Surface type.  Time of operation.  Dust loading at 
the time of deposition.  Vacuum cleaner type 
(preferably equipped with efficient outlet filter).  
Cleaning detergents.  Care taken to carefully 
clean the whole surface.  Contaminant aerosol 
type (size, solubility).  Cleaning frequency. 
Human (or animal) activities in dwelling affect 
amounts and types of house dust to which 
contaminants may attach.  Collective averted 
doses depend on population density and 
behaviour.   
Waste: 
• Amount and type Contaminated vacuum cleaner filters (variable, 
but generally high specific activity).  Perhaps 
some 40 g m-2 per year.  Contaminated cloths or 
sponges.  Contaminated washing water can be 
led to the drains.  
• Waste management recommendations Simple repositories should be constructed. Costs 
related to transport and disposal must be 
considered. 
• Specific waste problems  Public acceptability and legal feasibility of waste 
treatment and storage route should be assessed.  
Further constraints, concerns, side-
effects and other costs 
Influences public reassurance. Clear information 
material for users and affected persons must be 
available before application of method.   
State of testing Small-scale tests have been made both before 
and after the Chernobyl accident.    
Key references Allott, R.W., Kelly, M. & Hewitt, C.N.: "A model of 
environmental behaviour of contaminated dust and its 
application to determining dust fluxes and residence 
times", Atmospheric Environment 28(4), pp. 679-687, 
1994. 
Roed, J.: "Relationships in indoor/outdoor air 
pollution", Risø Natinal Laboratory, Risø-M-2476, 
1985. 
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Indoor furniture decontamination 
Method description Airborne contaminants can penetrate into 
buildings and give rise to considerable indoor 
contamination (depending on physico-chemical 
characteristics of contaminants and indoor 
surfaces as well as dwelling type and deposition 
mode).  This can give high dose contributions 
from contaminated furniture, e.g. regularly used 
sleep sofas, which come into very close contact 
with persons.  Early vacuum cleaning of soft 
(upholstered) furniture can reduce this dose, but 
if (part of) the contamination has penetrated into 
the upholstering, it may be recommendable to get 
rid of the furniture.  Dusting of hard furniture 
(e.g., tables and cupboards) can also reduce dose.  
Surface type / scale  Contaminated furniture in dwellings.  Can be 
applied on a large scale.   
Relevant contaminants Cs (and other long-lived gamma or beta emitting 
radionuclides) 
Time of implementation Should generally be carried out as early as 
possible, when the radiological situation is clear, 
but worker doses must be considered.   
Requirements: 
• Equipment / remedies and their costs Ordinary household vacuum cleaner (ca. 200 
EURO).  Cloth (ca. 1 EURO).  Waste 
transportation trucks (depending on distance to 
repository). 
• Consumables and other practical 
requirements 
Vacuum cleaner filter bags (since it would also 
be recommended to vacuum clean the floor 
regularly and over a long time period, the extra 
amount of dust from cleaning furniture once 
would probably add little to the cost).  
• Operator skills and costs Could be applied as ‘self-help’ after instruction 
from authorities.  Vacuuming takes about 1 
minute per m2 furniture surface.  Dusting (with 
cloth) can be done in half that time. 
• Operator safety Respiratory protection recommended in strongly 
contaminated areas.   
• Other practical constraints -  
• Factors influencing costs Worker effectiveness. Vacuum cleaner type.   
Effectiveness: 
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• Countermeasure effectiveness Within short time (few days), particles smaller 
than ca. 3 µm will become attached to or 
clustered in larger surface particles (unless they 
have penetrated upholstering).  These large 
contaminant particles on furniture surfaces can 
(contrary to the smaller particles) effectively be 
removed by vacuum cleaning (removal 
efficiency: more than 90 %).  Tracked-in or 
blown-in soil particles are large and easily 
removed.  Dusting of hard surfaces can remove 
20-95 % of the contamination, depending on 
particle characteristics. 
• Factors influencing effectiveness and 
averted dose/risk 
Surface type.  Time of operation.  Dust loading at 
the time of deposition.  Vacuum cleaner type 
(preferably equipped with efficient outlet filter).  
Care taken to carefully clean the whole surface.  
Contaminant aerosol type (size, solubility).  
Human (or animal) activities in dwelling affect 
amounts and types of house dust to which 
contaminants may attach.  Collective averted 
doses depend on population density and 
behaviour.   
Waste: 
• Amount and type Contaminated vacuum cleaner filters (variable, 
but generally high specific activity).  Only a few 
g m-2.  Contaminated cloths.  If upholstered 
furniture is disposed of (only in very strongly 
contaminated areas), this would add much waste. 
• Waste management recommendations Simple repositories should be constructed. Costs 
related to transport and disposal must be 
considered. 
• Specific waste problems  Public acceptability and legal feasibility of waste 
treatment and storage route should be assessed.  
Further constraints, concerns, side-
effects and other costs 
Influences public reassurance. Clear information 
material for users and affected persons must be 
available before application of method.   
State of testing Small-scale tests have been made before and 
after the Chernobyl accident.    
Key references Allott, R.W., Kelly, M. & Hewitt, C.N.: "A model of 
environmental behaviour of contaminated dust and its 
application to determining dust fluxes and residence 
times", Atmospheric Environment 28(4), pp. 679-687, 
1994. 
Roed, J.: "Relationships in indoor/outdoor air 
pollution", Risø National Laboratory, Risø-M-2476, 
1985. 
 
                                                                                             119 
Appendix B: Countermeasure datasheets for kitchen gardens 
 
In addition to some of those countermeasures described in Appendix A, which may, as stated in 
section 6, be useful in reducing both external doses and doses from consumption of food grown in 
an inhabited area, a selection of four countermeasures specifically aimed at reducing doses from 
consumption of food produced in kitchen garden lots in inhabited areas are described in the 
following pages.  The information is based on a previous Nordic review (Andersson et al., 2000). 
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Liming of soil 
Method description Strontium behaves in soil like the macro nutrient 
Ca. Liming increases pH and reduces root uptake 
of 90Sr. Effect of liming depends on actual pH or 
base saturation and on CEC of the soil. Liming 
releases K+ to the soil solution and slightly 
reduces root uptake of 137Cs. 
Surface type / scale  Kitchen gardens from which contamination enters 
the food chain by uptake to crops.  Can be 
practised on a large scale. 
Relevant contaminants Radiostrontium 
Time of implementation Liming can be made at any time when it is 
possible to mix the lime material with soil by 
harrowing or turning soil. 
Requirements: 
• Equipment / remedies and their costs Spreading device (dependent on size of area), 
spade (20 Euro) for turning soil. 
• Consumables and other practical requirements Lime (1-8 tonnes CaO per ha). 
• Operator skills and costs 1 operator ca. 0.02 man-days m-2 (incl. digging) 
plus loading and transport of lime.  No specific 
skills needed.  Could be applied as ‘self-help’ 
after instruction from authorities. 
• Operator safety Protective clothes.  Respiratory protection if the 
contamination level is very high and the area is 
dry.  
• Other practical constraints  Liming may induce manganese deficiency (oats).  
• Factors influencing costs Soil type, moisture and season influencing how 
easy it is to turn the soil.  Vegetation that requires 
prior removal.  Worker effectiveness.  Worker 
wages.  Area size influences costs per unit area.  
Fertiliser transportation costs. 
Effectiveness: 
• Countermeasure effectiveness Impact on 90Sr: Liming from pH 5 to pH 7 may 
decrease plant uptake of 90Sr by a factor 2 on 
sandy soils, 3 on loamy soils and 4 on clay 
soils, from pH 4 to pH 6 by a factor 6 on 
organic soils. Liming in excess of pH 7/6 has 
no effect.  
Impact on 137Cs. Liming may also decrease 
uptake of 137Cs by a factor 1.3-1.6 (max. ca. 3). 
Corrective liming lasts for at least 5 years. 
Maintenance liming every 5 years, to pH 7 on 
mineral soils and to pH 6 on organic soils, is 
recommended (0.5-2 tonnes CaO ha-1). 
• Factors influencing effectiveness and averted 
dose/risk 
Soil characteristics - effective on acid soils (see 
also above comments on soil pH). Contaminant 
aerosol type.  Homogeneity of treatment.  Worker 
protection (see above).  Compliance with 
described procedure.   
Waste: 
• Amount and type - 
• Waste management recommendations - 
• Specific waste problems  - 
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Further constraints, concerns, side-effects and 
other costs 
Crop yield may be increased by solving acidity 
problems. Liming prevents some diseases that 
attack crops.  K- and Mg-fertilisation may be 
required to maintain optimal ionic equilibrium in 
soil and plant. 
State of testing Applied on a large scale in the former Soviet 
Union after the Chernobyl accident.  Routine soil 
management technique. 
Key references Rapport FOA 4 C-4395-28, Stockholm, 1969. 
Report 31, Radiobiology, Uppsala, ISBN 91-, 
1975. Technical report series No363, ISBN 92-0-
100-894-5, 1994. 
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Potassium fertilisation 
Method description Caesium behaves in the soil solution like the 
macro nutrient K. Binding of 137Cs in soil is very 
complex. Fixation of carrier free fallout 137Cs 
increases with content of clay and decreases with 
content of organic matter. K-fertilisation 
decreases plant uptake of 137Cs. 
Surface type / scale  Kitchen gardens from which contamination enters 
the food chain by uptake to crops.  Can be 
practised on a large scale. 
Relevant contaminants Radiocaesium 
Time of implementation K-fertilisation is mandatory and should be made 
as soon as possible after fallout both on grass land 
and arable soils; on arable soils together with soil 
management operations (turning of soil). 
Requirements: 
• Equipment / remedies and their costs Spreading device (dependent on size of area). 
Spade (20 Euro) for turning soil.   
• Consumables and other practical requirements Potassium fertiliser (100-200 kg K ha-1).   
Repeated treatment may be necessary. 
• Operator skills and costs 1 operator ca. 0.02 man-days m-2 (incl. digging) 
plus loading and transport of lime.  No specific 
skills needed.  Could be applied as ‘self-help’ 
after instruction from authorities. 
• Operator safety Protective clothes.  Respiratory protection if the 
contamination level is very high and the area is 
dry. 
• Other practical constraints  K-fertilisation during growth season can usually 
only be made after removal of existing crop stand. 
• Factors influencing costs Soil type, moisture and season influencing how 
easy it is to turn the soil.  Vegetation that requires 
prior removal.  Worker effectiveness.  Worker 
wages.  Area size influences costs per unit area.  
Fertiliser transportation costs. 
Effectiveness: 
• Countermeasure effectiveness Impact on 137Cs and 134Cs: Effect of K-
fertilisation on 137Cs uptake by crops is highly 
dependent on the actual K-status in soil.  
In potassium deficient soils the uptake reduction 
may be by a factor of up to 5.  It may be required 
to repeat the treatment in following years. 
• Factors influencing effectiveness and averted 
dose/risk 
Soil characteristics (K status, soil type). 
Contaminant aerosol type.  Homogeneity of 
treatment.  Worker protection (see above).  
Compliance with described procedure.   
Waste: 
• Amount and type - 
• Waste management recommendations - 
• Specific waste problems  - 
Further constraints, concerns, side-effects and 
other costs 
Mg-fertilisation and liming may be required to 
maintain optimal ionic equilibrium in soil and 
plant.  Fertiliser must not contain ammonium.  
Crop yield increases on soils with originally low 
potassium status. 
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State of testing Applied on a large scale in the former Soviet 
Union after the Chernobyl accident.   Routine soil 
management technique. 
Key references Rapport FOA 4 C-4557-A3, Stockholm, 1973. 
Technical report series No363, ISBN 92-0-100-
894-5, 1994. SLU-REK-78, ISBN91-576-5134-5, 
1996. 
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Supplement fodder with micas or zeolites 
Method description Give micas and/or zeolites as a supplement to 
fodder to reduce uptake of Cs in the animal by 
reducing absorption. 
Surface type / scale  Meat and milk of animals kept in small land areas 
in inhabited environments.  Can be practised on a 
large scale when supplements are available. 
Relevant contaminants Radiocaesium 
Time of implementation Medium and long term after deposition. 
Unlimited period. 
Requirements: 
• Equipment / remedies and their costs - 
• Consumables and other practical requirements Micas and/or zeolites. 
• Operator skills and costs Personnel to collect the herd and to feed and 
monitor the animals. (8 hours for 30 days – 2500 
to 6500 Euro).  Could be applied as ‘self-help’ 
after instruction from authorities. 
• Operator safety  
• Other practical constraints  Clay minerals cannot be fed directly in semi-
natural ecosystems and are not sufficiently 
effective to be used in salt licks or boli. 
• Factors influencing costs Costs of producing fodder with supplements. 
Effectiveness: 
• Countermeasure effectiveness A reduction of 50 – 80% in the transfer of 
radiocesium to milk and meat of cows, sheep and 
reindeer can be achieved at daily doses of about 
500 mg – 2 g. 
• Factors influencing effectiveness and averted 
dose/risk 
Contamination level/ need for supplements 
(feeding high levels of clays or zeolites may be 
problematic for the animal in terms of appetite 
and loss of weight.  Different minerals have 
different binding efficiencies.  Homogeneity of 
treatment.  Worker protection (see above).  
Compliance with described procedure. 
Waste: 
• Amount and type - 
• Waste management recommendations - 
• Specific waste problems  - 
Further constraints, concerns, side-effects and 
other costs 
Inappropriate for use as a countermeasure for 
freely grazing ruminants.  Can be used during 
decontamination feeding.   
State of testing Has been applied for some time in Nordic 
countries after the Chernobyl accident, but was 
here not deemed to be highly cost-effective. 
Key references Hove, K., (1993) The Science of the Total 
Environment, 137, 235-248, Andersson, I. (1989) 
Swedish J. Agr. Res. 19: pp. 85-92, 
Andersson, I. (1990) Swedish J. Agr. Res. 20: pp. 
35-42. 
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Parboiling mushrooms 
Method description Parboiling fresh mushrooms in excess of 
water (about fourfold volume of water 
compared to mushrooms). Boiling time at 
least 3 minutes, discarding the water and 
rinsing mushrooms with plenty of cold 
water. Major part, about 90% of 
radiocaesium will be removed from 
Lactarius type mushrooms. All species 
can be parboiled to remove caesium. 
Surface type / scale  Edible mushrooms to be parboiled or not 
after the normal instructions of consumer 
guidance.  Can be practised on a large scale. 
Relevant contaminants Particularly radiocaesium, but also effective for 
other radionuclides present in mushrooms. 
Time of implementation Unlimited period, as long as additional 
reduction of ingestion dose from 
mushrooms is needed. 
Requirements: 
• Equipment / remedies and their costs Kettle with sufficient volume. 
• Consumables and other practical requirements Cost for electricity and water. 
• Operator skills and costs Working time for the treatment of mushrooms 
increases, if species not parboiled normally are 
treated.  Could be applied as ‘self-help’ after 
instruction from authorities. 
• Operator safety - 
• Other practical constraints  The volume ratio of water and 
mushrooms should be at least 4 to get the 
expected result. Mushroom species with 
thick and hard surface cover may need 
longer treatment than 3 minutes. 
• Factors influencing costs Boiling time required.   
Effectiveness: 
• Countermeasure effectiveness Internal DRF: The fraction of initial 
activity remaining in edible part of 
mushrooms is about 10 %. Specific for Cs, but all 
radionuclides will be removed to some 
degree. 
• Factors influencing effectiveness and averted 
dose/risk 
With a repeated treatment the remaining activity 
fraction becomes 5% or less. 
Waste: 
• Amount and type Boiling water (not highly active) 
• Waste management recommendations Can be led through ordinary drain system. 
• Specific waste problems  - 
Further constraints, concerns, side-effects and 
other costs 
The taste of mushrooms does not disappear, as the 
best aromatic constituents are not water soluble.  
Consumption of mushrooms can continue after 
rather heavy fallout, if parboiling is used for most 
types of mushrooms. 
State of testing Applied widely in domestic households after the 
Chernobyl accident.  Routine food preparation 
method. 
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Key references Rantavaara A. Proceedings of the Seminar on 
radioactivity transfer during cooking and culinary 
preparation, Cadarache 1989. Report XI-3508/90, 
CEC, DG XI, 1990, p. 69 - 94. 
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Appendix C: Organisational structure of Nordic emergency 
management regarding remediation of radioactively 
contaminated inhabited areas  
 
 
This appendix describes the organisations that are involved in the remediation of radioactively 
contaminated inhabited areas in the different Nordic countries. The descriptions are from the year 
2005. The national descriptions are compared in order to outline differences and similarities. 
   
 
C.1 Introduction 
 
Recovering from the disaster of a radioactively contaminated living environment is a process that 
involves many authorities at governmental, provincial, and municipality level. This appendix 
describes the organisational structures in the Nordic countries in this respect.  
 
Such descriptions are valuable for each country to have as they tell or remind the national 
stakeholders – residents, authorities, business representatives – who is in charge of what. Whereas 
such descriptions have been available for the co-operation, information exchange and assistance 
between Nordic authorities (The Nordic Manual, 2006), for the early emergency management (NKS 
Internet database, 2001) and for agricultural countermeasures (Brink & Lauritzen, 2001), a 
description was missing for the remediation of contaminated inhabited areas. One purpose of the 
present description is to fill this gap and to provide those that are concerned or otherwise interested 
with relevant information.   
 
Another purpose is to foster mutual understanding within the Nordic countries by outlining 
organisational differences and similarities. Differences might be found, for example, in the political 
level (national, regional, local) at which certain activities are performed or in the degree of 
centralisation (or inversely de-centralisation) of organisational structures. Other distinctive features 
are whether there are permanently staffed crisis centres as opposed to organisations that reduce their 
regular agenda in order to free resources for the crisis management. In addition, the former have 
often a much broader agenda and deal not merely with radiation accidents.  
 
The focus is on the organisational structure of emergency management, which is understood to 
comprise all activities related to the management of the situation. Organisational structures and 
activities related to the improvement of the process of emergency management, like training and 
exercise, development of the legal framework, guidance or support tools, which are essential parts 
of emergency preparedness, are – although occasionally mentioned in the national descriptions – 
not further considered.  
 
It is recognised that a radioactively contaminated living environment and clean-up actions in 
settlements pose severe social problems in addition to being of radiological concern. The report 
strives to address the issue holistically. However, the author and contributors cannot deny their 
belonging to the radiation protection community. 
 
The central part of this appendix is formed by the different national descriptions, which tabulate the 
involved organisations and their tasks or responsibilities in the crisis management. It follows a 
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discussion section, in which the Nordic emergency management is looked at from different angles. 
The first view is guided by generic activities of the recovery process, like coordination and 
supervision, technical support and advice, decision making, implementation of actions and 
feedback, and information and communication. Another view focuses on the different aspects that 
need consideration and organisations involved.  
 
 
C.2 Organisations and their responsibilities during remediation in different Nordic countries 
 
This section presents – in a separate table for Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden – the 
organisations and institutions involved in the remediation process and the responsibilities they have 
in that process. These organisations can be anything from committees that convene for a particular 
purpose, over constantly operating crisis centres to institutions that provide their normal expertise 
without having any emergency mode of operation. The information was provided by radiation 
protection practitioners of each country, and reflects the situation of the year 2005.   
 
As the actual response organisation typically depends on the extent, phase and type of disaster, a 
minimum amount of context was provided in form of a scenario that outlined a severe nuclear 
accident at a domestic or foreign NPP that let – in conjunction with unfavourable weather 
conditions – to a considerable contamination of inhabited areas within the own territory. Urgent 
rescue operations, relocation, or access restrictions were not deemed necessary, but otherwise the 
highest activation level of the response organisation was envisaged. The scenario tried to make it 
possible to concentrate on the organisational structure pertaining to clean-up actions without 
interference from rescue operations, which might follow a different command line.  
 
The author highlighted keywords of the given national descriptions in order to facilitate comparison 
in the Discussion section; and he greyed out responsibilities that do not directly concern 
remediation of contaminated areas as described in the scenario.      
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Table C.1. Organisations that are involved in remediation in Denmark and their respective 
responsibilities (situation of 2005)  
Organisations Responsibilities 
Danish Emergency Management 
Agency (DEMA/ 
Beredskabsstyrelsen), 
Nuclear Division 
(NCA, National Competent 
Authority) 
• Primary responsibility for preparedness and response to nuclear 
emergencies, including the national operations centre 
• Its duty officer initiates appropriate emergency response action 
• coordinates all responses to nuclear emergencies, assisted by experts from 
the other authorities involved 
• coordinates all countermeasures in cooperation with the Ministry of Interior 
and Health, the National Institute of Radiation Hygiene and the Ministry of 
Agriculture 
• responsible for decision support systems for predicting and presenting 
predicted as well as measured radiation levels 
• responsible for all nuclear 24/7 monitoring systems 
• directs measurement teams (airborne and car borne automatic measurement 
systems with isotope identification and with hand held metering devices) 
• responsible for training of measurement teams in the use of measurement 
equipment 
• establishes questions-and-answers centres to enable the authorities to 
respond to a large number of enquiries from the public 
• Internet information servers are used to keep the public informed 
Ministry of Defence • a liaison officer will be present at the national operations centre in case of a 
nuclear emergency  
• helicopters will be used for airborne measurements 
• military forces may be used to assist rescue services 
National Institute of Radiation 
Hygiene 
• supplies expertise in radiation protection 
 
Ministry of Interior and Health  • Health services and hospitals 
Risø National Laboratory • Supplies expertise in nuclear engineering, measurement techniques, 
prognostication and clean-up operations 
• Checks radiation levels in food and fodders 
Ministry of Family and Consumer 
Affairs 
• supplies expertise in limiting the levels of radioactivity in food 
• suggests measures to ensure that food is “safe” 
International Contact Point (at 
national police headquarters)  
• National warning point 
• Alerts DEMA duty officer in case of an emergency outside Denmark 
• Assists in initiating emergency response 
Danish Meteorological Institute 
(DMI) 
• Expert assistance to the national command post in case of a nuclear 
emergency 
• Supplies data for prognostication of nuclear contamination 
First responders from 
DEMA’s rescue service 
Local rescue services 
Volunteer services 
• mobile measurement teams with hand held measuring devices 
• decontamination units 
• are trained to take appropriate action to minimize the consequences of a 
nuclear or radiological emergency 
Police • a liaison officer will be present at the national operations centre in case of a 
nuclear emergency  
• assists in issuing warnings to the public and other normal police matters 
National broadcasting corporation 
(DR) and press service (Ritzau) 
• Are by law bound to promulgate messages to the public in case of an 
emergency 
• Representatives are present at the national command post in case of a 
nuclear emergency 
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The emergency planning and response preparedness of Denmark follows IAEA requirements 
(IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2). Primary responsibility rests in Denmark with the 
Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) under the Ministry of Defence. While no 
specific plans exist for the longer term recovery operations, institutional arrangements are in hand 
which would allow for a coordinated and controlled transition from emergency response to recovery 
operations.  
 
The relations between the Danish authorities (situation of 2005) are shown in this figure: 
 
The Armed Forces 
 
 
Police: 
Police regions and districts 
Rescue Preparedness: 
Rescue Corps 
Regions and Municipalities 
Other National and Municipal 
Authorities and Institutions 
Ministry of Defence
Council of Ministers 
Advisory Committee of Senior Officials
National Commissioner
of the Police 
Chief of Defence,
Denmark
Danish 
Meteorological Institute 
National Food 
Agency 
Plants Directorate 
Ritzau's News 
Agency 
National Board of Health 
Institute of Radiation Hygiene 
Risø National Laboratory 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Ministry of Fisheries, 
Agriculture and Food 
Veterinary Service 
Danish
Broadcasting Corporation 
Others, if required 
DEMA's Central Emergency Command
EMA chief emergency control officer 
 
 
 
The organisation of the National Operations centre (situation of 2005) is shown below: 
 
 
  
  
Chief in command
Strategy group
 
A c c iden t  d ep a r tment
 
Op e r a t i o n   g r o u p
E x p e r t   g r o u p   
  
Information departme n t  
 Contact to Ministries gro u p   
Media group
Question/answer servic e   
Sec r eta r ia t  
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Table C.2. Organisations that are involved in remediation in Finland and their respective 
responsibilities (situation of 2005) 
 
 
Organisations Responsibilities 
Council of State (Government), and Ministries 
• Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
• Ministry of the Environment 
• Ministry of Transport and Communications  
• Ministry of the Interior 
• Ministry of Trade and Industry 
• National Food Agency 
• Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry  
• Political decisions on clean-up actions and compensation issues 
are made by the Council of State especially when large areas are 
contaminated and high costs would incur. Otherwise, decisions 
on clean-up actions are made by the relevant administrative 
sectors (depending on the extent of contamination) on the 
governmental, provincial or municipal level.  
• The Information Unit of the Council of State and the Ministries 
disseminate information to media1 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) • monitor contamination, e.g. car-borne deposition survey, 
laboratories for foodstuffs and environmental samples, etc. 
• assess health consequences for public and clean-up workers 
• evaluate different clean-up options 
• evaluate long term effects of remediation 
• give recommendations for protective measures and clean-up 
actions 
• disseminate information to media concerning radiation 
protection issues1  
• advise industry, trade, transport on radiation issues 
• give advice for waste disposal 
State Provincial Offices • supervise and coordinate between governmental level and 
municipalities  
• allocate resources, e.g. direct activities of subordinate authorities 
Social and health authorities 
• Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, and its 
regional sections 
• responsible for general safety of public health and social security 
• disseminate information to media about issues concerning public 
health and social security1 
Environmental authorities 
• Ministry of the Environment 
• Regional environmental centres  
• make strategic plans at national level and sets targets for 
environmental protection 
• ensure that waste management obeys environmental legislation 
Rescue authorities 
• Ministry of the Interior 
• Regional rescue services 
• Municipal and voluntary fire brigades 
• provide logistic services and executive assistance, e.g. 
equipment and personnel 
Defence Forces  • provide logistic services and executive assistance: clean-up 
equipment, personnel, personal protection material, dosimeters 
• perform airborne deposition mapping  
General management of the municipalities, 
comprising  
• municipal manager  
• environmental authority 
• social and health authority 
• construction authority 
• waste management authority 
• implement on actually performed clean-up actions (where, when, 
how, who) based on decision of  Council of State and Ministries 
• request resources from State Provincial Office 
• hire services and equipment needed, e.g. transport services, front 
loader 
• advise residents 
• organise waste disposal 
Local laboratories (40 municipal laboratories) • monitor foodstuffs and environmental samples 
Nuclear insurance pool • liability questions2 
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1 In Finland it is generally practice that authorities at governmental, provincial, and municipality level inform the media 
on issues that belong to their responsibility. 
  
2 Nuclear liabilities are regulated in Finland by the Nuclear Liability Act (484/1972). Finland is a contracting party to 
the Paris and Brussels Conventions on Nuclear Liability. According to the internationally agreed principles manifested 
in these Conventions, the liability for damage lies with the operator of the nuclear installation. The principles ensure 
that a person entitled to compensation can receive the compensation for a suffered damage according to the nuclear 
liability regulations. The liability of the operator, however, is limited to a prescribed maximum amount. If the damage 
as a consequence of the accident exceeds this amount, the country in which the damaged nuclear facility is located, 
covers the additional costs to a certain limit. The last instance paying compensations to those suffered will finally be – 
but also to a limited extent – the community of all contractors to the above mentioned Conventions. At the end of 2005 
the Finnish Nuclear Liability Act has been amended, but not yet set into force, to include the principle of unlimited 
liability of the licensee and also to increase the amount of available resources to pay compensation for the suffered 
damages. The setting into force of the amendment is waiting for the ratification of the recently amended Paris and 
Brussels Conventions. 
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Table C.3. Organisations that are involved in remediation in Norway and their respective 
responsibilities (situation of 2005)  
Organisations Responsibilities 
Ministries:  
Ministries of Health, Justice and Police, 
Defence, Foreign Affairs, the 
Environment, Agriculture, Fisheries, 
Trade and Industry, Education and 
Research, Ministry of Labour and 
Government Administration, and the 
Ministry of Transport and 
Communications 
• emergency preparedness in their area of competence 
• in order to deal effectively with the early phase of a nuclear accident, 
the Ministries have transferred responsibility for remedial actions to the 
Crisis Committee for Nuclear Accidents 
Ministerial Coordination Committee • ensuring cooperation and coordination between the different Ministries 
• Ministry of Health head the Committee 
Crisis Committee (CC) • deciding and implementing remedial actions in case of a nuclear 
incident or an impending nuclear accident representing a potential 
threat to Norway  
• organise the evacuation of the population if the situation represents a 
direct threat to health and life  
• provide shelter 
• administer stable iodine 
• block and secure contaminated areas 
• in the short term restrict production and distribution of foodstuffs 
• give advise on dairy products  
• advice industry, trade, transport 
• national coordination 
Norwegian Radiation Protection 
Authority (NRPA) 
• functions as national warning point (NWP) and national competent 
authority (NCA) 
• functions as secretary and leader of the Crises Committee 
• alerting the Nuclear Emergency Organisation 
• organise a 24-hrs Officer on Duty Service 
• give advice/recommendations for clean-up actions 
CC Information Group • compose information strategies 
• propose and implement information actions on behalf of CC in the 
different stages of an accident 
• assist CC mediating coordinated information to the public and the 
media 
Advisors to the CC • submit and make available all information, data and measurements of 
relevance to the emergency situations 
• make forecasts for radioactive dispersion, fallout and radiation doses to 
the public 
• advise on preventing or reducing the radiological and economic 
consequences of a nuclear accident in Norway 
County Governors • coordinate regional and local preparedness 
• planning and initiating countermeasures according to local needs and 
demands 
• continuously liaise with the Crisis Committee (link between 
governmental level and municipalities) 
 
County Authorities 
(State Provincial Offices, ex. Civil 
defence) 
• established under the direction of the County Governors 
Municipalities • advise residents  
• implement clean-up actions  
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Ministries
Crisis Committee for 
Nuclear Accidents
- Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority
- Minestry of Defence
- Directorate for Health and Social Affairs
- Norwegian Food Safety Authority
- National Police Directorate
- Directorate of Civil Protection and      
Emergency Planning
Secretariat –
Norwegian Radiation 
Protection Authority
Advisers to the
Crisis Committee
County     
Governors
County
Authorities
Municipalities
Information Group Government Crisis
Information Unit
- Norwegian Meteorological Institute
- Geological Survey of Norway
- Norwegian Institute for Air Research
- Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
- Institute for Energy Technology
- Directorate for Nature Management
- Institute of Marine Research
- Norwegian Institute of Public Health
- Norwegian School of Veterinary Sciences
- The Norwegian University of Life Sciences
- Norwegian Polar Institute
- Directorate of Fisheries
Norwegian Nuclear Emergency Response Organisation
 
 
 
The Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority heads the Crisis Committee for Nuclear Accidents. 
Wherever possible, the Committee must consult its decisions with the Ministries before acting on 
such decisions. The Committee is operating with two levels of emergencies. These apply both for 
domestic and foreign accidents. No countermeasures are automatically implemented on the basis of 
declaration of level of emergency. The countermeasures will be implemented on an ad hoc basis 
depending on the assessments of the situation. 
 
The Advisors to the Crisis Committee for Nuclear Accidents is made up of representatives of 
organisations and institutions with expertise and responsibility required for an emergency 
organisation, both as regards the management of nuclear accident situations and for further 
development and maintenance of emergency preparedness. 
 
During accident situations, the tasks of the Advisors are to: 
 
• submit and make available all information, data and measurements of relevance to the 
emergency situations and make forecasts for radioactive dispersion, fallout and radiation 
doses to the public; 
• advise on preventing or reducing the radiological and economic consequences of a nuclear 
accident in Norway. 
  
The Secretariat for the Crisis Committee (the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority) is 
responsible, inter alia, for alerting the Nuclear Emergency Organisation. The Secretariat organise a 
24-hrs Officer on Duty Service.  
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The Regional Emergency Organisations are established under the direction of the County 
Governors. They coordinate regional and local preparedness. They are responsible for planning and 
initiating countermeasures according to local needs and demands, and shall continuously liase with 
the Crisis Committee. 
 
 
Table C.4. Organisations that are involved in remediation in Sweden and their respective 
responsibilities (situation of 2005)  
 
 
 
 
Organisations Responsibilities 
County Administrative Boards  • Responsible for planning and implementation of remediation 
• Make decisions on performed clean-up actions (where, when, how, 
who)  
• Implement clean-up actions 
• Request advice from NESA 
• Request personnel and material resources from municipalities and 
state authorities 
• Hire services and equipment needed e.g. transport, lawnmowers 
• Organise waste disposal  
• Inform and advice residents 
• Radiation protection and education of the clean-up workers according 
to valid legislation  
• Perform measurements on recommendation from SSI 
Swedish Radiation Protection Authority 
(SSI) 
• Assess health consequences 
• Coordinate the national monitoring of contamination e.g. car- and air-
borne deposition survey, environmental and food stuffs measurements 
• Information concerning radiation protection 
• Administratively responsible for NESA 
• Evaluate long term effect of remediation 
National group of experts on remediation 
(NESA): consists of representatives from 
the Swedish Radiation Protection 
Authority, Swedish Board of Agriculture, 
National Food Administration, Swedish 
University of Agricultural Sciences, 
Swedish Defense Research Agency, 
Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, 
Federation of Swedish Farmers, Swedish 
Rescue Services Agency 
• Give recommendation on clean-up actions 
 
Municipalities • Perform gamma dose rate measurements on request from the County 
Administrative Board 
• Provide the County Administrative Board with personal and material 
resources on request 
• Inform the residents 
Geological Survey of Sweden (SGU) • Perform air-borne deposition survey on request from SSI 
Laboratories at research centres • Perform nuclide specific measurements on environmental, pasture 
and food stuffs samples on request from SSI 
Voluntary organisations • Collect samples on request from SSI 
Nordic Nuclear Insurance Pool • Liability questions 
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C.3 Discussion 
 
The national contributions listed the involved organisations and the responsibilities they have in the 
crisis management concerned with the restoration of contaminated inhabited areas. Such a list of 
organisations and their respective mandate is valuable as a source of reference both for national 
stakeholders as well as for foreign observers.  
 
Another valuable source of reference is The Nordic Manual (2006). This biannually updated 
document describes practical arrangements and co-operations to fulfil obligations stated in bilateral 
agreements between Nordic states. These obligations concern mostly early notification and 
exchange of information. The Nordic Manual recognizes that in “cases of serious accidents or 
situations with any kind of possible transboundary impact it is important that different states deal 
with the situation in co-operation with the neighbouring states” and that the “responsible authorities 
need not only be able to communicate and explain the decisions on protective measures to the 
state’s own citizens, they must also be able to explain the possible deviating decisions made by 
authorities in other states involved”. National Warning Points (NWP) have been established 
therefore to receive and relay initial notifications. It is also possible for each Nordic state to send 
liaison officers to a Nordic accident state in order to increase the understanding of the situation and 
assist in communication and transmission of emergency information and data to home base.  
 
To foster mutual understanding within Nordic countries similarities and differences are outlined in 
the following. In order to be able to make a meaningful comparison, the disparate national 
descriptions must be brought into a common format. One way of doing this is to look at the 
activities that are reported to be performed in the crisis management. Looking at the descriptions it 
is somewhat easy to discern generic activities that the organisations are involved in. Following 
Carter and French (2004) and with regard to IAEA (2003) the following grouping is proposed: 
 
• Coordination and supervision 
• Technical support: monitoring, conduction of field studies, logistic services, etc. 
• Development of a remediation program: assessment of situation, evaluation of different 
clean-up options  
• Approval of the remediation program (formal decision making) 
• Implementation of remediation program: operational aspects like waste management, 
radiation protection of workers, request for resources, feedback 
• Information and communication: information to the public, media management and 
international communication  
 
Table C.5 shows basically a pivoted view of the information given in the tables of the previous 
section. Whereas the latter showed what all is done by whom (i.e. the grouping was made in terms 
of involved organisations), Table C.5 shows who all is doing what (i.e. the grouping is made in 
terms of the generic activities). Looking at the table, the following observations might be made: 
 
In Denmark, DEMA is the pivotal organisation for emergency management, a role that in Norway 
is held by the Crisis Committee and in Sweden by the County Administrative Boards. In Finland 
there is no such centralized decision making. Depending on the extent of the hazard decisions will 
be made by the relevant governmental, provincial, or municipal administrations. When large areas 
are contaminated and clean-up actions and compensation claims incur high costs, a political 
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decision is needed by the Council of State. In the early phase the main responsibility is – depending 
again on the extent of the situation – with the rescue authorities on national, regional, or local scale. 
 
Finnish and Swedish arrangements for the recovery phase rely mostly on organisations with a 
‘peacetime’ agenda, i.e. ministries, State Provincial Offices or County Administrative Boards, 
municipalities, radiation protection authorities, and no dedicated crisis centres like DEMA of 
Denmark or Crisis Committee of Norway are operated.    
 
In summary, the following portray might be given of the way that the emergency management is 
organized in the different Nordic countries: Denmark is characterised by a national emergency 
centre (DEMA), which is permanently staffed and operated during a wide range of crisis situations. 
In Norway a dedicated national crisis committee convenes during nuclear emergencies. In Finland, 
there is no such dedicated emergency management organisation and the decision making process 
(development of a remediation program, formal approval, and implementation related issues) 
involves, unless in case of urgency, normal administrative organisations. In addition, the process is 
not always promoted to a national level. The major characteristic of the Swedish arrangements is 
that, similar to Finland, there is no dedicated crisis centre, but unlike to Finland, the decision 
making process never rises to a nation level, because it is the counties’ administrative boards that 
are responsible.   
 
Coordination and supervision are somewhat ambiguous concepts as such activities are done to 
various degrees by almost all players. What was intended in Table C.5, however, is to list the major 
responsibilities for coordination and supervision, which lies at a national level in Denmark, at a 
national and provincial/county level in Finland and Norway, and at a county level in Sweden. Apart 
from Finland, responsibilities in this respect go hand in hand with responsibilities for the formal 
approval of the remediation programme.  
 
The description so far needs a clarification of the role of authorities in relation to private house 
holds, on the one hand, and commerce and industry, on the other, as decision making and 
implementation of actions is not necessarily (or entirely) with authorities. In cases like 
decontamination of private property authorities give merely advice and recommendations, but 
cannot enforce any decision. These are made by the property owners, who also implement them to a 
large extent (e.g. snow or grass removal, protection of kitchen gardens). 
 
It is characteristic for the organisational structures in all considered countries that technical support 
is provided from many organisations. Differences can be seen how their involvement is organised. 
In Denmark, Norway, and Sweden they are associated with DEMA, Crisis Committee for Nuclear 
Accidents, and NESA, respectively. The relationships in Finland are more intertwined and not so 
easily depicted.    
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Table C.5.   Generic activities of remediation and organisations that are mainly involved  
 
Activity Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
Coordination and 
supervision 
Central emergency 
command and 
organisation 
Ministries, 
State Provincial 
Offices 
Ministerial 
Coordination 
Committee, County 
Governors 
County 
Administrative 
Boards 
Technical support Ministry of Defence, 
Armed Forces, 
Ministry of Interior 
and Health, National 
Institute of Radiation 
Hygiene, RISO, 
DMI, Rescue 
services, Police 
Defence Forces, 
STUK  
 
Advisors to the Crisis 
Committee 
SSI, NESA, 
Municipalities, SGU, 
Research centres, 
Voluntary 
organisations  
Remediation 
program  
DEMA STUK, Ministries 
and State Provincial 
Offices 
Crisis Committee, 
County Governors 
County 
Administrative 
Boards 
Decision making Central emergency 
command 
Council of State Crisis Committee 
and County 
Governors 
County 
Administrative 
Boards 
Implementation Central emergency 
command and 
organisations; 
Municipalities 
Municipality Crisis Committee, 
County Governors, 
Municipalities 
County 
Administrative 
Boards 
Information DEMA, Danish 
Broadcasting 
corporation, Ritzau’s 
News Agency 
Information Unit of 
the Council of State, 
STUK, others as well 
Information Group of 
the Crisis Committee  
County 
Administrative 
Boards, SSI, 
Municipalities 
 
 
Another distinctive element is media management: Denmark and Norway seem to have a 
centralized and concerted information policy whereas in Finland it is generally practice that 
authorities at all political levels inform the media on issues within their sphere of competence. 
 
Information encompasses also international communication. For example in the Danish emergency 
preparedness plan “it is assumed that a high degree of international coordination will be required so 
as to ensure that the cessation of the emergency phase in one country coincides, as far as possible, 
with that in the neighbouring countries.” Therefore, information units of the Nordic nuclear and 
radiation safety authorities keep regular contact with each other.  
 
The descriptions must be checked for completeness, which can be done by tabulating the aspects 
that need consideration in the process versus the organisations that address the issues (Table C.6). 
Typically support organisations provide expertise on the various aspects, and ministries and/or 
liaison bodies (CC in Norway, NESA in Sweden, DEMA in Denmark) gather the input.  
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Table C.6.   Aspects of remediation that need consideration and organisations involved in their 
consideration 
 
 
 
Regarding waste, IAEA (2003) requires that an “appropriate waste management strategy and its 
associated legal framework shall be established that are capable of dealing with the waste arising 
from the remediation of contaminated areas. This shall include the assignment of any additional 
responsibilities for the funding, conduct and regulatory control of waste management activities”. A 
comparison of the waste management strategies adopted in the various countries was outside the 
scope the present description but would be worthwhile doing.  
 
The actual response organisation might depend on various factors, like the scale of contamination, 
or the causation (i.e. foreign or domestic nuclear accident, transport accident, terrorist attack). Only 
the highest activation level was investigated and reference was made to an accident at a nuclear 
power plant. The focus was on activities related to the remediation of radioactively contaminated 
inhabited areas. However, it remained slightly unclear to what extent the various national 
descriptions honoured this prescribed scope. It might well be that the descriptions (if not existing 
                                                          
1 In Finland environmental authorities ensure that environmental legislation is observed when deciding on clean-up 
actions and waste management. Regarding radioactive waste STUK is the authority to ensure radiation safety by 
providing instructions on collections, handling, storage, and final disposal of waste. 
 Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
Waste Central emergency 
command 
Ministry of 
Environment; 
Regional 
environmental 
centres; 
Municipalities1 
CC or advisors to the 
CC 
NESA 
Cost and liability Central emergency 
command 
Nuclear insurance 
pool; Council of 
State 
 Nordic Nuclear 
Insurance Pool 
Radiation protection 
of workers 
National Institute of 
Radiation Hygiene 
Authorities in charge 
of the operation; 
STUK gives 
recommendations 
CC or advisors to the 
CC 
SSI 
Health and psycho-
social 
Ministry of Interior 
and Health 
Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health; 
STUK 
CC or advisors to the 
CC 
NESA 
Resources Central emergency 
command 
Ministry of the 
Interior; Defence 
Forces; State 
Provincial Offices; 
Regional rescue 
services; Fire 
brigades 
CC or advisors to the 
CC 
NESA 
Environment Central emergency 
command 
Ministry of the 
Environment; 
Regional 
environmental 
centres 
CC or advisors to the 
CC 
NESA 
Economic Central emergency 
command; ministries 
relevant ministries 
and interest groups 
CC or advisors to the 
CC 
NESA 
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arrangements) are still somewhat geared towards the acute emergency phase and that the transition 
to later phase issues is a rather new development and not yet totally reflected in the various 
descriptions. The requirements for such a transition are stated by IAEA (2002) as follows: 
“Arrangements shall be established for the transition from emergency phase operations to routine 
term recovery operations. This process shall include: the definition of the roles and functions of 
organisations; methods of transferring information; methods of assessing radiological and non-
radiological consequences; and methods of modifying the actions taken to mitigate the radiological 
and non-radiological consequences of the nuclear or radiological emergency.”  
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